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Abstract
As part of the Research group on Lifestyles, Values and Environment (RESOLVE), at 
the University of Surrey, UK, this PhD study involves the development of a set of 
scenarios depicting the carbon intensity of UK household consumption over the next 20 
years.
A set of four scenario narratives are developed, accompanied by illustrative quantitative 
figures. The thesis sets out some of the background factors pertinent to this study, 
including economic, energy and enviromnental uncertainties, and establishes how 
household consumption is framed and rmderstood in the present work. Accordingly, 
emissions embedded within goods and services imported fi*om abroad are included in 
the accounting. A review of the scenario plaiming literature is provided, an 
investigation is conducted into the epistemological contribution that these scenarios 
might make, and the methodology adopted for this study is described, before the 
scenarios themselves are laid out.
Key lessons fi'om the scenarios are discussed, including: the importance of a 
coordinated international approach (if households are to be expected to engage 
proactively in environmental behaviour* change); the increasing dominance of embedded 
emissions in imports (as a share of total household emissions) in the event of significant 
decarbonisation in the UK; the centrality of social movements in driving political 
outcomes either for or against a low carbon transition; and the economic impact of 
energy and resoirr ce depletion and the divergence of subsequent responses according to 
the socio-political uncertainties used to fiame these scenarios.
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Glossary
CCC - Committee on Climate Change; an independent body established as part of the 
UK Climate Change Act (2008) to advise government on climate action.
COICOP - Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose; United 
Nations classification scheme for household expenditui'e on goods and services.
Consumption perspective - accounting and attributing responsibility for emissions 
according to where the associated goods and services are finally consumed. See also 
'Production perspective'.
Deductivism - A metliod of reasoning whereby speculative hypotheses may be tested 
against the evidence. Begins with hypothesised general laws and proceeds towards 
explanation or prediction of specific instances. See also 'Inductivism'.
Direct Emissions - Those emissions associated with use of electiicity, gas, vehicle fuels 
and otlier fuels by households.
ELESA - Economett'ic Lifestyle Environmental Scenario Analysis; A model that 
explores the role of income, price and non-economic factors in driving changes in UK 
household expenditure. Employed as the basis of the scenario quantification in this 
reseai'ch.
Embedded Emissions - Those emissions which aiise 'upstream' in the production of 
goods and services eventually consumed by households.
Environmental Scanning - A stage in the scenaiio planning process involving scanning 
for key factors, ti’ends and uncertainties in the domain of interest. May involve 
interviews, literature review, surveys etc.
Epistemological monism - The position that all (scientific) disciplines are to be heated 
equally with respect to the verification of knowledge claims.
Epistemological pluralism - The position that different (scientific) disciplines 
necessarily involve different standards in the verification of knowledge clamis.
EU ETS - European Union Emissions Trading Scheme; a carbon trading scheme 
covering selected sectors of the European Union economy, such as energy production 
and heavy industiy (as of 2011).
ExNEF - exogenous non-economic factors; a term used in relation to the econometric 
model applied in the quantification of the scenarios in this study. Refers to those factors 
other than income and price that have an impact on household expenditure.
Idiographic - refers to those disciplines whose object is the description of individual 
events, rather than general laws applicable to all events of a type. See also 'Nomothetic'.
Inductivism - A method of reasoning whereby observation of specific events lead to 
general laws. See also 'Deductivism'.
Instrumentalism - A method of reasoning in which theories are treated as mere 
insti'uments for the delivery of predictions to be tested against empirical data. The 
'realism' of the assumptions used in those theories is regarded as unimportant.
Intuitive logics - the term applied to the qualitative scenario planning approach 
developed at Shell.
Methodological monism - the position that, within a given (scientific) discipline, there 
is one school of thought best able to accoimt for all the phenomena of interest.
Methodological pluralism - the position that, within a given (scientific) discipline, 
different schools of thought may have different strengths in relation to different 
phenomena of interest.
Nomothetic - refers to those disciplines whose object is the positing of general laws 
about all events of a type, as opposed to description of individual instances only. See
also 'Idiographic'.
Production perspective - accounting and atti'ibuting responsibility for emissions 
according to the country where those emissions are produced. See also 'Consumption 
perspective'.
Rational choice theory - an approach to understanding human economic behaviour that 
assumes people always act to maximise utility, prefering more of a good rather than 
less.
RESOLVE - Research group on Lifestyles, Values and Enviromnent; an ESRC funded 
research group at the University of Surrey, comprising members from the Centre for 
Environmental Sti'ategy and the Departments of Economics, Psychology and Sociology.
Scenario planning - The technique of developing infoimed naiTatives of the (business) 
enviromnent over a given period into the friture, in order to use these as the basis of 
stiategic plamiing.
UKERC - UK Energy Reseai'ch Centre; funded by the UK Research Councils' Energy 
Programme to conduct reseai'ch into 'sustainable fritme energy systems' and inform UK 
policymakers.
1. Introduction
This PhD study is taking place within the Research gi'oup on Lifestyles, Values and 
Environment (RESOLVE), at the University of Surrey, UKf The inter-disciplinary 
natui’e of the research group provides the framework for this PhD research, which 
examines the possible impact of social, technological, economic and political factors on 
the carbon intensity of UK lifestyles thi'ough to 2030.
The overarching aim of RESOLVE is;
“to develop a robust understanding o f the links between lifestyles, societal 
values and the environment, and to provide informed advice to policy­
makers seeking to understand and to influence the behaviours and practices 
o f energy consumers''^.
Within that context, the specific objective of this PhD is to develop a range of coherent 
and plausible scenarios depicting the carbon intensity of UK household consumption 
over tlie next 20 years. The scenarios can be used to assist policy- and decision-makers 
in considering the implications of then* decisions under alternative conditions in the 
future. In this way, the scenarios can help to challenge entrenched thinking and 
unconscious assumptions associated with a business-as-usual mentality.
1 RESOLVE is funded by the Economic and Social Reseai'ch Council (ESRC) as part of tlie Research 
Councils’ Energy Programme. The group comprises academics, researchers and PhD students fi'om 
the Centre for Enviromnental Strategy and horn the Economics, Psychology and Sociology 
depai'tments at the University of Suirey.
2 "About RESOLVE", http://resolve.sustainablelifestyles.ac.uk/aboiit-resolve
1.1 Energy  ^ economic and environmental uncertainty
A  range of uncertainties relevant to this study are explored in some detail later in the 
thesis. It is perhaps useful though to provide a brief context for the cuiTent study by 
exploring some of the fundamental issues shaping the world today. Tluee such issues 
are the energy, economic and environmental uncertainties facing the UK and the wider 
world.
A recent report on global oil depletion by the UK Energy Research Centre reviewed 
over 500 studies, concluding tliat: "a peak in conventional oil production before 2030 
appears likely and there is a significant risk o f a peak before 2020" (UKERC, 2009a, p. 
x). The chief economist to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, has also 
stated that demand for oil could outstiip supply by 2020. This assessment brings 
forwai'd the lEA's previous estimate of 2030, due in part to revised estimates of output 
decline, but also due to the effects of the recent economic crisis in reducing expenditure 
on new exploration and extraction projects (Macalister & Monbiot, 2008). While the. 
dynamics of oil depletion are complex, including uncertainties over the true extent of 
OPEC reserves, the level of investment in exploration, the availability of non- 
conventional oil supplies, domestic consumption in the oil producing nations and the 
desire for energy secmity in oil importing nations, it is clear that a decline in oil 
availability is a significant medium to long term risk for the UK economy.
The impact of the economic crisis has not been confined to investment in the oil and gas 
industry. The events that have unfolded since July 2007 have been described in the Wall 
Sü'eet Journal as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression (Hilsemath et a l , 
2008). The crisis has resulted in govermnents taking unprecedented steps to prevent a
collapse of the global financial sector, including the nationalisation of banks, and 
wholescale bailouts of nation states in Eui'ope. A drop in the value of housing, 
increased unemployment and shortage of credit have all contiibuted to the economic 
uncertainty for UK households. A contraction of the economy by 0.5% in the last thi'ee 
months of 2010 led to renewed fears of a double dip recession, and while the following 
three months saw growth of the same magnitude, at the time of writing (early 2011) 
significant uncertainty remains around the strength of the recovery.
In the midst of this economic crisis, global leaders were also tasked with delivering 
progress on tackling climate change. An unprecedented level of expectation was placed 
on global leaders to secui*e a deal at the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009. 
In the end, the UNFCCC negotiating process bai'ely suiwived, with the non-legally 
binding commitments that were made falling far* short of the levels necessary to avoid 
the risk of catastrophic climate change (Fudge et a l, 2011). One year on, in Cancun, 
the climate talks achieved little more than a political agreement to continue holding 
talks, with little if any further improvement on commitments by individual member 
states. In addition to the political and economic uncertainties around an international 
agreement, the extreme weather events of 2010 serve as a reminder of the potential 
direct impacts of climate change, even in the short term, as a result of increased average 
global temperatures (Black, 2010).
In the midst of such overarching global uncertainties it might appear that individual and 
voluntary behaviour’ change will have little role to play in determining the carbon 
intensity of UK lifestyles through to 2030. Clearly, the transition to a low carbon 
society will require substantial technological innovation. Many of these innovations
will occur out of sight of consumers going about theh day-to-day lives, e.g. supply side 
innovations in electricity supply, new agricultural methods for low carbon food 
production etc. However, in addressing these challenges, significant change may also 
be required on the part of citizens and consumers more directly. In many cases the 
changes may be subtle, e.g. where economic (dis)incentives influence consumption 
patterns towards less energy intensive versions of the same goods and services. In other 
cases, more radical behaviour change may be called for, such as modal shifts in 
transport use, installation of micro-generation technologies or retraining for green collar 
jobs. Ultimately, it may be that individuals' values and behaviours hold the key to 
ensuring a low carbon transition can be made in an ordered and proactive fashion, rather 
than a disordered and reactive one. Therefore, while global uncertainties should 
certainly frame the landscape of change to 2030, and technological innovations will 
play an enormous role in the way society responds to those uncertainties, these should 
not be fteated in a deterministic way, independent of the will of individuals. This study 
therefore aims to explore the oppoitunities and constraints for householders in the UK 
in shaping and responding to this future.
1.2 Research questions
The primary research question to be addressed is:
How could the carbon intensity o f UK lifestyles be affected by social, 
technological, economic, political, psychological and environmental factors 
through to 2030?
In addition, two secondary reseai'ch questions were identified, a prelimenary question 
which required to be addressed ahead of the main body of work, and an epistemological 
question regarding the value of the contribution made by this scenario building study:
Prelimenary question: Can a RESOLVE consensus on a definition o f
'lifestyle' he reached? I f  so, what would this definition be? I f  not, what 
alternative definition of'lifestyle' should be adopted for use in determining 
the parameters o f this research?
Epistemological question: What epistemological contribution can be
offered by a set o f scenarios detailing the carbon intensity o f lifestyles under 
different conditions in the future?
1.3 Thesis structure
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 - Background sets out the historical development of UK legislation on 
climate change and describes how caibon emissions are accounted for, where a 
distinction is made between the production and consumption perspectives. There 
follows a summary of how the prelimenaiy research question on the definition of 
lifestyles was addressed.
Chapter 3 - The ’scenario' technique gives a description of the technique of scenario 
building and scenario planning, defining key terms and offering an liistorical account of 
different schools of practice associated with the technique. A scenario typology is then 
adopted in order to highlight some of the key features of the scenarios developed in this 
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study. Finally, a series of scenario studies are drawn from the literature as they relate to 
the present work.
Chapter 4 - Episternology addresses the secondary research question focused on the 
contiibution to the knowledge space made by a study of this nature, and is organised in 
two parts. The first section considers what lessons might be drawn from the discipline 
of history, to inform a qualitative, narrative scenario building approach. The second 
part focuses on economics, delving into the history of the discipline to show how the 
concept of rational choice has informed mainstream economic theories of consumer 
behaviour. A summary of the various criticisms of this concept is provided, before 
outlining how the quantitative modelling approach followed in this study might offer 
new insights in this area.
Chapter 5 - Methodology describes the process of conducting the research. First there 
is a summary of how the methodology was designed, then revised in light of feedback 
from experts and practitioners. Then the various stages are explained in detail, 
including: the design, running and analysis of a series of internal interviews; an analysis 
of the key uncertainties these produced; the provisional scenario fr amework generated; 
a description of the external expert interview process; the drafting of the scenario |
nar ratives; and details of the quantitative modelling process. i
Chapter 6 - Scenarios depicts the key outcome fr om the study, including a primer or 
inti’oduction to the four scenarios, the four' scenario narratives each with a summary of 
the quantitative figures for expenditui'e and emissions, and a summary section 
compai'ing and contrasting the outcomes from each scenario and drawing lessons for
decision makers.
Chapter 7 - Conclusions offers a series of reflections in two broad categories: 
methodological conclusions drawn from the scenario/modelling process itself, and 
epistemological conclusions reflecting on the earlier discussion in light of the scenario 
outcomes.
2. Background
2.1 UK legislation on carbon emissions
As a result of the Rio Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, an international treaty 
was signed known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). This treaty included provisions for further updates, or Protocols, that 
would include mandatory targets for reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
After lengthy negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the UNFCCC in 
December 1997.
Along with the other EU member states, the UK ratified the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing 
to a 12.5% reduction on 1990 UK emissions over the period 2008-2012 (averaged 
annually). Moreover, the UK Government believed that a stronger reduction was both 
possible and desirable, leading to a voluntary domestic target of a 20% reduction by 
2010 (DEFRA, 2006).
Later, the UK Government passed the world's first legally binding framework on 
climate change with the Climate Change Act 2008 (DEFRA, 2008). Key provisions of 
the Act include:
GHG emission reduction targets of at least 80% by 2050, CO2 emission 
reduction of at least 26% by 2020, against 1990 levels;
A series of five year carbon budgets;
Establishment of a Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent body 
set up to advise the Government on appropriate measures for achieving targets;
Plans to include emissions from international aviation and shipping by 2012.
The newly formed CCC then recommended a revised 2020 emissions reduction target of 
34% on 1990 levels, which was accepted by Govermnent and announced alongside the 
2009 Budget (CCC, 2008). The CCC also proposed that in the event of a global deal on 
emissions, the UK should improve its reduction targets to 42% by 2020, and 90% by 
2050. However, the failure to secure a sufficiently robust deal at Copenhagen meant 
that the UK target remained unchanged through 2010.
In spite of the lack of progress at a global level, there have been calls fr om within 
Europe for the EU to voluntarily adopt a stronger target of 30% by 2020 (above the 
present target of 20%). Tluee arguments have been given: lower economic activity 
resulting from the global recession has set back emissions levels such that a 20% target 
is no longer ambitious (Kinver, 2010); it is also argued that the move would give the EU 
a more commanding position in the development of emerging low carbon technologies 
(Harvey, 2011a); and finally, some commentators believe that post-Copenhagen, the 
only card left for Europe to play is a voluntary move intended to coax the US and China 
into adopting targets of their own (Dimsdale & Findlay, 2010). Wliatever the merits of 
these arguments, any strengthening of the EU target, voluntary or otherwise, would 
require the adoption of stronger targets across member states, including the UK, thus a 
target of 42% by 2020 remains a possibility.
Having adopted the interim emissions targets recommended by the CCC, the UK 
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Government launched its Low Carbon Transition Plan, outlining specific measures to 
achieve the goals set out in earlier legislation (DECC, 2009). The plan includes several 
tar gets to 2020:
• More than 1.2 million people in green jobs;
• 7 million homes to undergo 'pay-as-you-save' energy retr ofits;
• More than 1.5 million households supported in producing clean energy;
• 40% of electricity fiorn renewables, nuclear and clean coal;
• UK gas imports 20-30% lower tlian they would be without intervention;
• New cars will emit on average 40% less carbon than today's models.
The CCC continues to publish advice to UK Government, establishing appropriate short 
term carton budgets as required imder the Climate Change Act, and recommending 
specific sectoral targets and policy measur'es for achieving these. The UK carbon 
budgets are divided between the traded and non-traded sectors. The traded sector 
includes those businesses already part of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
including power generation and energy intensive industry e.g. iron and steel, cement, 
refining. Because EU allowances (EUAs) traded through the EU ETS are capped, any 
savings achieved thr'ough trading represent a real contribution to emissions reductions. 
In contrast to EUAs, offset credits (generated through Joint Implementation and Clean 
Development Mechanism projects under the Kyoto Treaty) are not part of a capped 
trading system and thus may not reliably count towards emissions reduction in the same 
way. Nevertheless, the EU ETS allows member states to secure a proportion of their 
emissions reductions through such offset credits (CCC, 2008).
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The non-ü'aded sector covers direct CO2 emissions from buildings, transport and less 
energy-intensive industiy, as well as non-COa emissions. By definition, the non-traded 
sector does not fomi part of the EU ETS, and thus has no access to emissions reductions 
through ti'ading of EUAs. Limited use of offset credits in the non-ti'aded sector are 
allowed under EU rules, however the CCC has advised agamst using these to meet the 
interim budget, and the government has made a legally binding commitment to this 
effect, for the fu'st budget only (2008-2012).
Clearly, for a study exploring UK carbon emissions tlirough to 2030, the CCC 
recommendations might act as a powerful framework through which to develop 
alternative visions of implementation. However, in accounting for carbon emissions, 
the present study takes an approach quite different to that used in the government 
figures and targets. The two approaches are discussed below.
2.2 Production versus consumption
The metliod used by government to assess historical emissions levels and to establish 
legally-binding targets is known as the production perspective. This method counts 
emissions arising from all goods and services produced within the UK, regardless of 
whether they are consumed domestically or exported for consumption abroad. With 
manufacturing and other energy intensive industries having shifted away from the UK 
in recent decades, this production perspective has accordingly shown a reduction in UK 
emissions of around 15% between 1990-2004 (Druckman et a l, 2007). However, this
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approach ignores emissions from goods and services that must now be imported -  
perhaps from countries with less energy efficient manufacturing industries, and 
requiring increased transportation to reach the UK market.
Recent work has attempted to assess GHG emissions from a 'consumption perspective'. 
In this approach, exported goods and services are excluded from the accounting while 
emissions from imported goods and services are attributed to the UK. In other words, it 
is the consumers of goods and services who are deemed responsible for any associated 
emissions, regardless of where they are produced. Following a consumption approach, 
emissions in the UK actually increased by 7% between 1990-2004 (Druckman & 
Jackson, 2009).
While the production perspective is employed for global accounting of emissions as part 
of the Kyoto Protocol, it has long been argued that the consumption perspective 
represents a more egalitarian approach (Bastianoni et aï., 2004, Jackson et a l, 2007, 
Munksgaard & Pedersen, 2001, G. P. Peters & Hertwich, 2006). Indeed, in 2009 the 
BBC published comments by Professor David Mackay, the newly appointed Chief 
Scientist at the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), in which he argued 
that apparent reductions in UK emissions since 1990 were "an illusion", failing to 
account for embedded emissions in imported goods and services (Harrabin, 2009). A 
spokesman for DECC, declining to challenge the principles or figures quoted by 
Professor Mackay, argued simply that the production perspective was the official 
recognised mechanism for international accounting of emissions.
It seems likely that a production perspective will continue to dominate international
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accounting of emissions for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, in assessing the true 
carbon intensity of UK lifestyles as opposed to UK industry, a consumption perspective 
is arguably more appropriate and insightful. For these reasons, the consumption 
perspective is adopted in this study.
2.3 Characterising iifestyies
Although the remit of RESOLVE is to examine the links between lifestyles, values and 
the environment, there was -  as of November 2008 -  no consensus on how the term 
'lifestyle' was actually understood by members of the research group. This presented 
several challenges for the present scenario resear ch. For example, a clear understanding 
of the term would be a useful tool when attempting to interview external experts 
regarding their views on how lifestyles may be affected by different factors. In 
addition, without an understanding of what constitutes a lifestyle, it would be difficult to 
establish the issues that should be explored in the scenario narratives. As a result, those 
narratives would risk being unfocused and counter-productive as a means of 
engagement with policy-makers. On a more practical note, the ability to provide 
measures of the carbon intensity of lifestyles would be severely diminished if the 
activities to be examined could not be clearly defined. So, it was seen as desirable to 
have a definition of lifestyles in order that the research could be relevant, focused and 
engaging, thus giving rise to the prelimenary research question identified earlier. To 
begin to address this question, a discussion was organised at one of the RESOLVE 
research meetings around 'a definition of lifestyles'.
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2.3.1 RESOLVE discussion on a definition of lifestyles
Prior to the discussion, a representative of each research strand in RESOLVE had been 
invited to prepare a short statement describing their understanding of lifestyles. The 
economics/modelling contributor explained that the focus of their work was 
consumption, i.e. how people spend their money. Thus lifestyles are understood in 
terms of consumer demand for goods and services. Interestingly, the psychology 
contributor said that psychologists 'don't do lifestyles'. Rather, their research is 
concerned with the relationship between independent variables. If the focus is on 
consumption behaviour, this does not take account of lifestyles per se. Lifestyles are 
not just what people do, but also why they do it. The sociology contiibutor suggested 
tliat defining lifestyles is deeply problematic, but that they might be best understood as 
bundles of social practices. In addition, they argued that tlie term lifestyles could be 
applied to individuals or to groups. The psychology contributor added that identifying 
lifestyle groups is itself problematic and depends very much on the approach taken. 
From the policy and governance strand, the contiibutor also described the term lifestyles 
as problematic, arguing that it was a recent, western-centric construct. Other issues to 
arise during the discussion included:
• consideration for the relationship between individual agency and institutional 
structures;
• issues of social equity; regarding some individuals, the question is not are they 
consuming too much, but rather ar e they consuming enough?
• the role of lifestyles in establishing our' social status and identity.
From this short summary it can be seen that there are a vai'iety of approaches to 
understanding lifestyles across the disciplines. Also, a common theme thi'oughout the
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session was the hesitance of the participants to attempt a definition, at least one that 
would be satisfactory across the inter-disciplinary team. Instead, the discussion often 
focused on the perils of attempting a definition.
When it became obvious that a definition was not going to be achieved, a contingency 
plan was then followed, whereby the discussion was steered towards the more practical 
task of identifying individual issues that the group thought should be addressed through 
the scenarios. Some examples of relevant issues were introduced, i.e. food, housing, 
transport. The Shell Group scenarios were also summarised, wherein the scenario team 
had identified four key areas: Demand, Resources, Technology, Environment including 
specific issues such as (for Resoui'ces): Oil & Gas, Coal, Nuclear*, Electi'ic Renewables, 
Biomass (Shell, 2008). Despite this contingency approach, comments continued to 
focus on the shortcomings of vai'ious understandings of lifestyles. As a result, it was not 
possible to identify any issues that people felt should be addressed in the scenarios.
With hindsight, an alternative approach might have been to begin the discussion with 
this identification of issues, by explaining that the session aimed to develop a 
fr amework of issues around lifestyles, rather than a strict definition. Doing this might 
have resulted in some useful insights that could have subsequently contributed to a 
discussion on establishing a definition. Nevertheless, it is believed that the approach 
taken was appropriate, given the intention of avoiding 'contaminating' the discussion too 
early on with suggestions and examples of issues, preferring instead to see if these 
would emerge out of the discussion.
Following the discussion session, further research was then carried out to investigate
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how lifestyles are characterised in the literature on sustainable consumption. The 
remainder of this section details the development of a suitable framework drawing on 
the literatur e as well as points fr om the discussion.
2.3.2 Lifestyles
In imderstanding how lifestyles might be characterised, a useful starting point is the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Man'akech Task Force on Sustainable 
Lifestyles (MTFSL). In its concept paper on Sustainable Lifestyles, the Task Force 
argues that:
”Lifestyles is a way we live our lives that allows us to fulfil our needs and 
aspirations. They serve as "social conversations”, in which people signal 
their social position and psychological aspirations to others. Since many o f  
the signals are mediated by goods, lifestyles are closely linked to material 
and resource flows in the society. ” (UNEP, 2007a, p. 2)
Elsewhere, in a 2004 report on Sustainable Lifestyles, the Centre for Sustainable 
Development at the University of Westminster argued:
"what this term [lifestyle] describes is an accumulation o f patterns o f 
behaviour, resource use and consumption, as well as choices about
employment and the best ways to live As patterns o f consumption
replace employment type as the primary social marker, the goods and 
services that individuals and households consume become the most
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important elements in demonstrating social class, wealth and identity. They 
become the means by which individuals express their values and their 
desires as well as the way individuals are judged by others. ” (Bedford et al,
2004, pp. 3-4)
For Bedford et al then, consumption is central to the notion of lifestyles. Although 
values and attitudes may be key to understanding the motivations behind any act of 
consumption, the present study is interested in tlie actual and potential carbon intensity 
of lifestyles, thus it seems appropriate that consumption should play a centr*al role in any 
framework on lifestyles.
2.3.3 Consumption
Bedford et al (2004, pp. 7-8) use the notion of 'consumption clusters' to group together 
patterns of actions along with the goods and services associated with a particular ar*ea of 
consumption. This was based on work elsewhere that had identified the following ten 
clusters where households can make a difference in reducing enviromnental impact: 
clothing, education/training, food, healthcare, construction/housing, hygiene, cleaning, 
recreation, social life and transport (Lorek & Spangenberg, 2001). These clusters were 
estimated to account for over 95% of environmental impacts from household 
consumption (environmental impacts being material extraction, energy consumption 
and land use). Bedford et al made a series of amendments:
* removing three clusters that consist primarily of public consumption, namely 
education/training, healthcare and social life (where social life is understood as 
the police, military and other public services, as distinct from recreation);
• adding financial investments, domestic appliances and domestic durables;
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• returning education and healthcaie to the list, under the heading 'social choices';
• disaggregating recreation into leisure activities and holidays.
The resulting clusters can be seen in Figure 2.1 :
lAd\or consumption dustens 
Nutrition
Housing
Social choices (education, health provision etc)
Financial investments
Leisure activities
Transport
Domestic appliances
Domestic durables 
Clothing
Holiday Personal hygiene
Cleaning
Otiior consumption clusters
Figure 2.1: Bedford et aVs Consumption Clusters for Lifestyles
Of these consumption clusters, it is estimated that housing, nutrition and transport 
account for around 70% of environmental impacts (Lorek & Spangenberg, 2001).
In 2006, the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable produced a report investigating 
oppoitunities for more sustainable consumer lifestyles (Sustainable Consumption 
Roundtable, 2006). The Roundtable organised a consumer forum involving over a 
hundred people, inviting them to discuss their aspirations and how these related to 
policies for sustainable consumption. Arising out of these discussions were four areas 
of our lives where significant change could begin to take place:
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• how we run our homes;
• the food we eat;
• how we get around;
• how we get away.
These equate neatly with the main three consumption clusters identified earlier (Bedford 
et a l, 2004, Lorek & Spangenberg, 2001), with transport being disaggregated into day- 
to-day tiavel and holiday travel. In addition, the fact that these four categories arose out 
of the expressed aspirations of forum participants makes this framing of consumption 
activities more accessible in terms of communicating potential flituie lifestyles to 
stakeholders. For this reason, these four categories were adopted as the primary means 
of communicating the notion of lifestyle consumption in the scenaiio development 
process.
2.3.4 External factors or drivers of consumption
As discussed previously, lifestyles are 'not just what we do, but why we do if. In 
developing a lifestyles fi*amework for scenario development then, it is also necessary to 
consider those external factors responsible for driving consumption. In the initial 
planning stage of this research, a standard set of five external factors used in scenario 
planning were used to frame the problem space, namely: social, technological, 
environmental, economic and political (STEEP). A fuither examination of the literature 
provides another perspective on these external factors.
The UNEP MTFSL list five external factors, broadly similar to the STEEP factors listed 
above but with some variation (UNEP, 2007a). These factors are: economic.
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technological, policy, socio-psychological, cultural/historical. The first thi'ee of these 
are covered within the STEEP factors. MTFSL have used the term policy rather than 
political, but in the context of this research, these terms may be regarded as 
interchangeable. Interestingly for a sustainability task force, MTFSL have omitted the 
term enviromnent. Although some environmental factors e.g. climate change, may 
impact on lifestyles indirectly through other categories, many environmental changes 
such as deforestation, resomce and water scarcity could affect lifestyles more or less 
directly. For scenarios through to 2030 then, it is important to retain an explicit 
recognition of possible enviromnental factors.
The remaining difference between the original list of STEEP factors and those put 
forward by MTFSL is the sub-categorisation of social factors into socio-psychological 
and cultural/historical. In this scenario exercise, it would be possible to use the term 
social to cover both the psychological and the cultural/liistorical. Withm the RESOLVE 
group however, there exist two separate strands covering the psychological and the 
sociological. Thus dealing with these two areas as important factors in their own right 
would mean that each of these two strands within RESOLVE had a clear opportunity to 
contribute to the building of the scenarios.
Incorporating this amendment to the original list of external factors, we now have 
Social (i.e. Sociological, Cultural/Historical), Technological, Economic, Political, 
Psychological, Enviromnental. These may be referred to as the STEPPE factors, for 
convenience. These external factors and the consumption clusters identified previously 
can be seen in Figure 2.2, with examples of issues within each factor based on the 
MTFSL model presented in their Fact Sheet (Govermnent Offices of Sweden, 2007).
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Social
Family and friends 
Education 
Cultural differences 
Fashion and tastes
Technological
Innoi/atton 
Infrastructure 
Product development
Economic
Grov%l:h & competition 
Productivity & income 
Price fluctuations 
Marlîeting & advertising
 ^ At home
:'61»*iaWA#tca755US-,A«5CC3S3as:
\  Getting \around
What we eat
■sTOsaeKSKwrcati^?;
Getting away
Psychological
Emotions & desires 
Values & attitudes 
Identity construction 
Needs & wants
PoHtfcaf
Growth model 
Information provision 
Social equali^' & riÿits 
Environmental demands
Environmental
Climate change 
Resource scarcity 
Waste management 
Amenity
Figure 2.2: Consumption Clusters and External Factors
2.3,5 Lifestyles framework
The prelimenary question was formulated as follows:
Can a RESOLVE consensus on a definition of'lifestyle' be reached? I f  so, 
what would this definition be? I f  not, what alternative definition o f 
'lifestyle' should be adopted for use in determining the parameters o f this 
research?
As to the first part, a consensus on a definition of 'lifestyle' across the disciplines within 
RESOLVE was not achieved. Instead, a framework has been devised in which 
consumption plays the central role, divided into four broad categories and placed within 
the context of the various external factors described above.
The framework is intended as a guide during the interview of key experts, rather than as 
a strict model of how lifestyles should be understood more generally. The actual trends.
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issues, impacts and shocks that are deemed to be relevant to this study may not fall 
neatly into these categories. The purpose of identifying such categories is therefore to 
stimulate broad reflection and not to act as a limiting factor on the environmental 
scanning process. The use of this framework may ensuie a better understanding of what 
constitutes a relevant insight when engaging with interviewees, and will help to make it 
deal' where the conversation may be drifting away from the areas of core interest.
2.4 Summary
The emergence of an international approach to the management of GHG emissions in 
tlie form of the Kyoto Protocol has led to reduction targets for specific member states 
including the UK. Witli the establisliment of the Climate Change Act, the UK is 
committed to long term emissions reduction, although the precise level of domestic 
emissions targets remains subject to uncertainty as key states continue to negotiate a 
more substantive global deal. Whatever the eventual targets, those are likely to be 
specified in terms of emissions produced in the member states, while the consumption 
perspective adopted here attempts to account for emissions by attributing responsibility 
to the consumer, irrespective of where the emissions are produced. Tliis approach 
enables a more meaningful consideration of the carbon intensity of individual lifestyles. 
The concept of lifestyle is problematic though, and no single definition is sufficient to 
satisfy the various disciplines represented within RESOLVE. Instead, a working 
fi-amework has been developed with consumption at its heart, divided into four broad 
categories and surroimded by vaiious external factors that might influence consumption.
The next chapter introduces the technique of scenario planning and offers a review of 
the scenario planning literature relevant to the present study.
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3. The 'scenarios' technique
3.1 A definition of 'scenarios' and 'scenario pianning'
Various definitions of “scenario planning” were identified in a review of the literature 
by Chermack and Lynliam (2002). A total of 18 definitions were identified, the earliest 
being fiom 1985, despite scenarios being used since the 1960s. Almost half of the 
definitions had been published in the five years since 1997, suggesting increased 
attention to scenario planning in academic literature over recent years. A sample of 
these definitions from Chermack and Lynham (2002) is reproduced here:
”An internally consistent view o f what the future might turn out to be—not a 
forecast, but one possible future outcome” (Porter, 1985, p. 63)
“A tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments 
in which one’s decisions might be played out” (Schwartz, 1991, p. 45)
“A disciplined methodology for imagining possible futures in which 
organizational decisions may be played out” (Schoemaker, 1995, p. 25)
"That part o f strategic planning which relates to the tools and technologies 
for managing the uncertainties o f the future” (Ringland, 1998, p. 83)
"Creating stories o f equally plausible futures and planning as though any 
one could move forward” (Tucker, 1999, p. 70)
"A series o f imaginative but plausible and well-focused stories o f the 
future” (Kahane, 1999, p. 511)
"Scenarios are literally stories about the future that are plausible and based 
on analysis o f the interaction o f a number o f environmental variables” 
(Kloss, 1999, p. 73)
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"A scenario is simply a means to represent a future reality in order to shed 
light on current action in view o f possible and desirable futures ” (Godet, 
2001, p. 63)
After analysing these definitions, Chermack and Lynham extracted what they saw as the 
fom* major outcome categories of scenario planning, before building an 'integrative 
definition' incorporating each of these categories which reads:
"Scenario planning is a process o f positing several informed, plausible, and 
imagined alternative future environments in which decisions about the 
future may be played out for the purpose o f changing current thinking, 
improving decision making, enhancing human and organization learning, 
and improving performance ” (Chermack & Lynham, 2002, p. 376)
Commenting on Chermack and Lynham's analysis, Nicol (2005, p. 35) points out that 
their list includes definitions of both scenario planning and scenarios themselves and 
concludes that their integrative definition told us "a lot about what scenarios were and 
the purposes to which they were put, but about scenario planning only that it was a 
process”. Nicol followed a similar approach involving a study of existing definitions, 
analysis of key elements and creation of a new definition, but was clear on seeking a 
definition of 'scenarios' specifically. The following twenty elements were found 
repeatedly in tlie definitions reviewed by Nicol:
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i. internally consistent xi. time-limited
ii. coherent xii. ordering perceptions
iii. plausible xiii. based on assumptions
iv. interconnected events xiv. different possibilities
V. relevance XV. based on past/present
vi. challenging xvi. based on pre-determin
vii. representative xvii. trend outcomes
viii. external xviii. imagined
ix. narrative xix. decision-making tools
X. boundaries/framework XX. progressive
(Nicol, 2005)
Nicol then constructed a foui-pait statement incorporating each of these elements, 
which reads:
1. Scenarios are descriptive naiTatives (ix). They need to be internally 
consistent (i), coherent (ii) and plausible (iii), about interconnected events 
(iv) and relevant to the organisation (v), which are all characteristics that 
help make narratives meaningfiil and acceptable. These characteristics 
concern communication of the scenarios.
2. Scenarios provide boundaries or frameworks (x) for considering the 
future, by encompassing a range of representative possible futures (vii) but 
limiting the number of different possibilities for the future to be considered 
(xiv) and by relating to a defined time period (xi). Usually they describe the 
progress of events (xx), not just an end state. They concern the environment
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external (viii) to the organisation. These characteristics all concern the 
substance of scenarios.
3. Scenario nanatives are imaginative accounts (xviii) grounded in 
predetermined events (xvi) and trends (xvii) discerned from the past and 
present (xv). The stories reflect and order the varied perceptions (xii) of the 
participants in the process and are grounded in the present knowledge. 
These char acteristics concern what scenarios are based on.
4. The narratives provide a structure, i.e., a framework, for the participants 
to explore (xiii) assumptions about and make sense of the otherwise 
incomprehensible multiplicity of possible future events. However, to be 
effective as a decision-making tool (xix) scenarios should challenge (vi) the 
mindsets -  entr enched thinking -  and assumptions of the participants. These 
characteristics concern the effect of scenarios. (Nicol, 2005)
Finally, Nicol provides a summarised definition:
"Scenarios are narratives, grounded in present knowledge, that have the 
purpose o f communicating bounded possibilities for the future, challenging 
entf^enched thinking and providing a framework for decision-making." 
(Nicol, 2005, p. 33)
Taking account of Nicol's critique that the definition provided by Chermack and 
Lynham is more appropriate for a definition of scenarios than scenario plamiing, these
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two definitions give a broadly similar account of how scenarios are understood in this 
research, i.e. as:
Informed narratives describing plausible alternative futures in which 
decisions can be played out, helping to challenge current thinking and 
assist decision making.
The difficulty in reaching a consensus on what constitutes 'scenario planning' is evident 
from Nicol's literatuie review, where several wiiters are quoted as expressing 
discomfort with the term, suggesting alternatives including: scenario learning, scenario- 
based learning, scenario-driven planning, scenario building, scenario analysis, scenario 
process and scenario method. Nicol gives further examples of authors offering 
'definitions' of scenario planning that fall short of providing any real meaning and 
argues that "scenario planning has become a label, a term that can mean different 
things to different people ” (Nicol, 2005, p. 36).
It is certainly useful to make a distinction between the process of building scenarios and 
that of using scenarios to inform decision making. Scenario planning has been used to 
describe each of these and both of them together. In tliis research, no actual planning 
will be undertaken on the basis of the scenarios, rather it is intended that the scenarios 
will be disseminated for use by the target audience of policy- and decision-makers in 
their own planning processes. Instead, the term scenario building more accurately 
describes what will be conducted in the present study. Nevertheless, the term scenario 
planning is so pervasive in the literatuie tliat tlie proceeding discussion of the method 
uses these terms interchangeably according to the literature being discussed.
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3.2 A history of futures thinking
Long before the term scenarios came into use, humans have been imagining possible 
future worlds. Since the advent of the written word in early civilisations, these 
imagined worlds have been recorded. A long tradition of utopian writing in Western 
culture begins with Plato's Republic (c. 360 B.C.E.), including works such as Augustine 
of Hippo's The City o f God (413) and Thomas More's Utopia (1516) as well as various 
dystopian works such as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932) and George Orwell's 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).
As a tool for strategic planning, scenarios were first employed in a military context 
(Bradfreld et a l, 2005). The earliest written works wliich might be said to constitute 
scenario planning are those of tire Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz in the 
19th Century. Published postlrurnously in 1832, von Clausewitz's On War deals with 
the complexity and uncertainty inlierent in real world events.
In one of the seminal works in the scenario literature, Kalin and Wiener (1967) 
document some of the early attempts at future thinking from the 20th Century, in the 
introduction to which Bell discusses a series of books entitled "Today and Tomorrow" 
written in the 1930s. These numbered around 80 books in total, covering a wide range 
of topics including "food, clothes, architecture, war, peace, Jews, India, labor, 
machines, and even crime ” (Bell, in: Kalm & Wiener, 1967, p. xxi). According to Bell, 
these works took a playful attitude towards futufe thinking:
"What is striking about these volumes is their fanciful character, the
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personal and even prejudiced judgments, the airy and even comical tone, as 
i f  the idea o f speculating about the future had a somewhat absurd but 
pleasant quality -  in effect, a lack o f seriousness. " (Bell, in: Kahn & Wiener, 
1967, p. xxi)
The serious use of scenario thinking beyond a military context would not emerge until 
the mid-20th Century. Bradfreld et al (2005, p. 797) detail two concurrent 
developments which they term 'The USA Cenhe' and 'The French Centre'. Numerous 
similarities and cross-overs occur between these centres, with certain methodological 
approaches having been pur'sued independently by both. Nevertheless, the geographical 
distinction is useful in tracing the origins and history of different schools of thought and 
their associated branches.
3.2,1 The USA Centre
The emergence of scenario thinking in the USA can be traced back to Herman Kahn in 
the 1960s. Kahn had worked since the late 1940s as a physicist and mathematician at 
the RAND Corporation, a defence research group which emerged in 1946 from a project 
originally sponsored by the US Air Force and the Douglas Aircraft company (Bradfreld 
et a l, 2005, p. 798). It was here that Kahn pioneered 'future-now' thinking: "to 
combine detailed analyses with imagination and produce reports as though they might 
be written by people in the future ” (Chermack et a l, 2001, p. 10).
In his role as head of Civil Defense and Strategic Planning, Kalm began developing 
scenarios for the Air Defense System Missile Command. The resulting scenarios led
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him to the conclusion that the cuiTent US military sti'ategy was deeply flawed, and he 
used the scenarios to explore alternatives to amiihilation and surrender, work that 
Bradfreld et al (2005, p. 798) claim had a major influence on military planning in the 
1950s. Aligica (2007) supports this claim, adding that Kahn had "a profound impact on 
the US nuclear and military strategy and on strategic thinking in general”. Kahn 
published his results in his book On Thermonuclear War (1960), believing that "the 
best way to prevent nuclear war was to think through in detail what would happen i f  the 
war did occur, and publicise the results” (Ringland, 2006, p. 13). Aligica writes that 
Kahn's book "was the first book to systematically analyze the possible effects o f nuclear 
war and the possible strategic options under various circumstances” (Aligica, 2007). 
Kahn is credited as having coined the term "thinking about the unthinkable ” in relation 
to his work of this period (Aligica, 2007, Bradfreld et a l , 2005, p. 798).
In 1961 Kahn left RAND and founded the Hudson Institute think-tanlc, where he 
expanded his interests beyond military and strategic issues to encompass economics, 
politics and public policy. It was in this context that Kahn:
"became one o f the founding fathers o f the Futures Studies (futurology) 
movement contributing to the highest degree to its methodological and 
theoretical foundations: he developed the scenario method, the application 
o f systems analysis and o f mathematical and scientific tools to forecasting, 
and the organizational bases o f interdisciplinary and future-oriented 
research ” (Aligica, 2007)
Kleiner (2003) reports that it was during this period that film-maker Leo Rosten 
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suggested to Kahn that he adopt tlie term 'scenarios', which had recently been 
abandoned by the film industry in favoui* of 'screenplay'. Ringland (2006, p. 13) 
explains that Kahn liked the term because of its emphasis on creating a story or myth, 
rather than on forecasting. The term was then introduced into the literature through his 
book The Year 2000 (Kahn & Wiener, 1967). According to Bradfreld et al. (2005, p. 
799) the book "has since come to he regarded as a landmark in the field o f scenario 
planning”. Not only did the book introduce 'scenarios' and provide one of the earliest 
definitions of the term, it also "demonstrated the use o f scenarios as a methodological 
tool” and inspired the development of scenario techniques by other practitioners 
(Bradfreld et a l, 2005).
Two other RAND employees, Theodore Jay Gordon and Olaf Helmer, also left the 
coiporation to form the Institute for the Future in 1968. Described as having been 
"encouraged by the publicity and controversy caused by Kahn's boolcs” (Bradfreld et 
a l , 2005, p. 799), Gordon and Helmer began working with Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI) Futures Group and California Institute of Technology, experimenting with 
scenarios and becoming "pioneers in the field o f future studies” (Bradfreld et a l, 2005, 
p. 799).
The SRI, founded in 1946, was engaged in planning which incorporated operations 
research, economics, political strategy, science and military consulting (Ringland, 2006, 
p. 13). In 1958, the SRI inaugurated its Long-Range Plaiming Services, an 
environmental scanning service which later became the Scan Program operated by the 
spin-out company SRI Consulting Business Intelligence.
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The collaboration between the Institute for the Futui*e and SRI was originally concerned 
with public policy, but their work began to influence the business community where the 
experience of Shell provides the earliest documented use of scenarios (Bradfreld et a l , 
2005, p. 799).
According to Ringland (Ringland, 2006, p. 20), after a decade of physically-oriented 
planning at Shell following the Second World War, financial planning began to play a 
larger role between 1955-1965. By 1965, the company had developed a tool called 
Unified Planning Machinery (UPM) which allowed integrated planning across all of 
Shell's operations, from oil extraction to point-of-sale at petrol stations. However, it 
eventually became apparent that the results of UPM could not be relied upon as a basis 
for action, and Shell "considered itself in a state o f mild crisis” (Heijden et a l, 2002, p. 
132).
Heijden et al (2002, p. 132) document how in 1967, Pierre Wack -  an employee of the 
Group Plamiing team at Shell -  is said to have expressed criticism of UPM, 
complaining that it applied statistical techniques to what were essentially unpredictable 
variables. As a Frenchman, Wack was familiar with the French school of scenario 
planning, but believed their method to be too technocratic, preferring instead the 
approach pioneered by Herman Kahn (Heijden et a l, 2002, p. 132). So, Wack teamed 
up with Shell colleague Ted Newland in 1971 to conduct a scenario exercise (Kleiner, 
2003). Inspired by the book of the same name by Kahn, Wack persuaded the Shell 
Group to conduct a 'Year 2000' scenario exercise of their own, specifically for the oil 
industiy (Heijden et a l, 2002, p. 132). Numerous commentators, including Kleiner, 
have claimed that this process demonstrated eai'ly success in foreseeing the oil crisis of
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the early 1970s, enabling Shell to respond decisively, gaining an advantage over its 
competitors. Kleiner also argues that in future scenario planning exercises, fuither 
competitive advantage was gained from the Group's foresight of the oil price shock 
resulting from the Iranian revolution of 1979 and from seeing that the oil industiy 
bubble of the early 1980s would collapse, with oil becoming more of a commodity 
product (Kleiner, 2003).
According to Bradfreld et al (2005, p. 800), General Electric (GE) also began to 
experiment with scenarios around the same time. In 1971, the company produced four 
alternative scenarios depicting global and US economic and socio-political conditions in 
1980 (Millett, 2003). However, Bradfreld et al (2005, p. 800) point out that Shell 
remain the only company whose scenario work fr om this period is widely documented 
in the literatuie.
3,2.2 Key methods of the USA Centre
The scenario model discussed above -  pioneered by Kalm and refined by Wack and 
Newland at Shell -  has come to be known as the 'Intuitive Logics' approach (Bradfreld 
et a l, 2005, p. 799). Bradfreld et al detail a number of proprietary scenario models 
based on this approach, and suggest that "when it comes to the intuitive logics model a 
large part o f the 'methodological chaos'... arises from the observation that there are 
almost as many ways o f developing scenarios as there are practitioners in the field” 
(Bradfreld et al, 2005, p. 800).
Along with the Intuitive Logics approach, two other signifrcant methods evolved out of 
the USA Centie, in particular from the work of Gordon and Helmer, during their time at 
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the RAND Corporation and subsequently at the Institute for the Future. These methods 
are described as involving "the probabilistic modification o f extrapolated trends” 
(Bradfreld et a l, 2005, p. 800).
Gordon (1994a, p. 1) explains that 'Trend Impact Analysis' (TIA) was developed in the 
late 1970s to answer "a particularly difficult and important question in futures 
research ”. Gordon argued that quantitative methods such as time-series techniques and 
econometrics were based on extrapolating historical data into the futui'e, failing to take 
into account the impact of unexpected friture events. Such methods, Gordon claimed, 
resulted in "surprise-free projections” which were unlikely to occur (Gordon, 1994a, p. 
1). TIA was designed to enhance this process by supplementing the time-series forecast 
with a qualitative stage where unprecedented future events that could affect the original 
forecast are listed, before expert judgement is sought regarding the probability of these 
events occurring and their expected hnpact.
According to Nicol (2005, p. 38) however, TIA is focused on the impact of events on a 
single forecast variable and does not take into account the "dynamic interactive 
interplay o f interdependent events”. As noted by Bradfreld et a l, Gordon claims that 
"the TIA method is used frequently” (Gordon, 1994a, p. 1), however there are very few 
references in the literatuie relating to TIA in the context of scenarios.
Cross Impact Analysis (CIA) was developed in 1966 by Gordon and Helmer while still 
working at the RAND Corporation (Gordon, 1994b, p. 1). CIA was initially designed as 
a game for Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company. A summary of the game, 
provided by Gordon, helps explain the CIA method. The game, called Future, consisted
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of a set of cards each depicting a futine event. These events were given a probability 
value by Gordon and Helmer, and players would roll a die which displayed probability 
values rather than numbers. If the probability value shown on the die was equal to or 
greater than the probability of the event occurring, then the event 'occuiTed'. If an event 
occurred, the card was turned over to reveal a set of cross impacts i.e. changes to the 
probability of other events in the game.
In 1968, Gordon and Hayward built a computer program of the CIA method (Gordon, 
1994b, p. 1). They were now able to rim tlirough many iterations of the game, with 
events being selected in a random order each time such that different outcomes were 
obtained. By keeping a record of the number of times an event occurred across a large 
number of iterations, a final probability could be assigned to each event.
According to Gordon (1994b, p. 2), numerous variations of CIA have since been 
developed by other teams. Some of these go beyond the forecasting of specific events 
to incorporate a scenario element, such as EXPLOR-SIM developed at the Battelle 
Institute in Geneva, and SMIC (Cross Impact Systems and Matrices) developed by 
Duperrin and Gabus in France. Other CIA variations emerged as part of the French 
Centre, discussed below.
3.2.3 The French Centre
Bradfreld et al. (2005, p. 802) write that the development of the French Centre of 
scenario tliinking began with philosopher Gaston Berger in tlie 1950s at the Centre 
d'Etudes Prospectives, a school which he had founded. Berger developed a scenario 
method for long-teim planning which he called 'la prospective'. According to Bradfreld 
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et a l, la prospective -  as in the case of the USA Centi'e -  was developed in response to 
the failure of conventional forecasting techniques:
“Berger was concerned with the long-term political and social future o f  
France and the underlying philosophical premise o f his work was that the 
future is not part o f a ‘predetermined temporal continuity ’ but something 
which is to be created and which can be ‘consciously modeled to be 
humanly beneficial \ The primary objective o f the Prospectives centre \\>as 
to formulate an acceptable scenario-based methodology for developing 
positive images or ‘normative scenarios ‘ o f the future and to lead these 
images into the political arena where they could serve as a guiding vision to 
policy makers and the nation, providing a basis for action. ” (Bradfield et 
aA, 2005, p. 802)
Despite Berger's death in 1960, the Centi*e d'Etudes Prospectives continued to apply la 
prospective to public policy and planning issues. Scenaiio tlihiking was inti'oduced into 
the Fourth French National Plan (1960-1965) by Pierre Masse, then director of French 
National Economic Planning (Bradfield et a l, 2005, p. 802). Bertiand de Jouvenel then 
joined the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives in 1966, having previously founded the Comite 
Internationale Futuribles (Futuribles International Committee) which would lead to tlie 
formation in 1967 of the Association Internationale de Futuribles. According to 
Bradfield et al (2005, p. 802), De Jouvenel contended that the futm'e of a nation was 
often determined by small, dominant political groups, but that this could be avoided if 
positive scenarios were developed to serve as a blueprint for a better future for ordinary 
people.
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Michel Godet became head of the Department of Futures Studies at defence firm SEMA 
in 1974 (Chermack et a l, 2001, p. 19). He soon began developing scenarios for several 
lai'ge French groups including Électricité de France (EDF) and Elf Aquitaine (Elf). 
Chermack et al wiite that Godef s scenario work was based on la prospective, however 
he began to establish his own method, developing vaiious mathematical and 
computational tools to bring a more probabilistic approach to scenaiio thinking.
Chermack et al (2001, p. 19) describe the approach pioneered by Godet, which took the 
form of a sti'uctuial analysis in three phases. Phase One involves building a system of 
interrelated elements by identifying internal and external variables. These elements are 
quantified and compiled into a database. A cross-impact matiix is then used to study the 
interactions between variables. Phase Two identifies key variables and strategies. 
Software, detailed below, is used to estimate the subjective probabilities of different 
combinations of variables and thus reduce uncertainty. Phase Three involves the 
development of the scenarios. These begin as sets of hypotheses which are tested 
against the data before being fleshed out to describe the path that would lead from the 
present to this future scenario. The software tools developed by Godet to assist in this 
included: Micmac to identify key variables, Mactor to analyse actors' strategies and 
Smic-Prob-Expert to determine the probability of scenarios (Bradfield et al, 2005, p. 
803).
3.2.4 Futures thinking summary
Scenario planning can be traced back to tlie middle of the 20th centuiy, where two 
schools emerged independently. The USA Centre initiated by Heiman Kalin involved 
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the development of the popular Intuitive Logics approach, as well as Trend Impact 
Analysis and Cross Impact Analysis. The French Centie and its 'la prospective' 
approach, was established by Gaston Berger and continued after his death by Bertrand 
de Jouvenel at the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives, before being modified by Michel 
Godet to form a more probabilistic approach to scenario development.
The approach adopted for the qualitative scenaiio narrative development in this research 
is the Intuitive Logics approach, pioneered by Shell Group, which traces its existence 
back to the work of Herman Kahn. As explained by Bradfield et al : “when it comes to 
the intuitive logics model., there are almost as many ways o f developing scenarios as 
there are practitioners in the field” (Bradfield et a l, 2005, p. 800). The particular 
methodology developed for this research is therefore explained in detail later. In 
addition, this research also includes a quantitative component, intended to complement 
the qualitative nairatives by providing illustiative figures for key economic variables. 
As explained later, the quantitative approach involves the use of a time-series model, 
with assumptions for the variables informed by the qualitative storylines. In this sense, 
the approach is reminiscent of the Trend Impact Analysis technique developed by 
Gordon and Helmer.
Although the French Centre also developed tools to synthesize qualitative and 
quantitative methods, these took a more probabilistic tuin after Michel Godet, a 
controversial approach given the deep uncertainty inherent in any scenario process. 
These probabilistic approaches have therefore been avoided in this research. In 
summary, the methodology adopted in this study is more closely aligned with the 
methods and techniques developed as part of the USA Centre, rather than those of the
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French Centre.
3.3 Relevant Scenario Studies
Dming an early literature scanning exercise in 2008, a range of scenario and futures 
studies from within the previous ten years were examined for their potential role in 
informing an appropriate methodological approach for the present study. A selection of 
these (in clii'onological order of publication) is listed below:
• Which World?: Scenarios for the 21st Centuiy - Global Destinies, Regional 
Choices (Hammond, 1998).
• China's Futures: Scenarios for the Worlds Fastest Growing Economy, Ecology, 
and Society (Ogilvy & Schwartz, 2000).
• Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III 
of the Intergovermnental Panel on Climate Change (Nakicenovic & Swart,
2000).
• Energy for Tomorrow: Powering the 21st Century (DTI, 2001).
• Tyndall Centre, Climate Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The 
UKCIP02 Scientific Report (Hulme et a l, 2002).
• Foresight Futui'es 2020: Revised scenarios and guidance (DTI, 2002).
• Tyndall Centre, UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050 (Watson, 2003).
• Surrey in 2020 (SAMI Consulting, 2004).
• Scenarios for Europe in 2020 (Ringland, 2004).
• UKSHEC Hydrogen Visions (Eanies & McDowall, 2005).
• Tyndall Centr-e, World Transporf Scenarios project (Timms et a l , 2005).
• Using energy scenarios to explore alternative energy pathways in California 
(Ghanadan & Koomey, 2005),
• Decarbonising the UK: Energy for a Climate Conscious Futur e (Tyndall Centre, 
2005).
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• Program on Technology Innovation: Electric Power Industry Teclinology 
Scenaiios (Electric Power Resear ch Institute, 2005).
• Decentralising UK Energy (Greenpeace, 2006).
• Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050 - In Support 
of the G8 Plan of Action (OECD/IEA, 2006).
• Electricity Network Scenarios for 2020 (SuperGen, 2006).
• The Role of Electricity: A new Path to Secure and Competitive Energy in a 
Carbon-Constrained World (eurelectric, 2007).
• Technology & Policy Implications of Global Energy Scenarios that Stabilize 
Climate Change (Hummel, 2007).
• Japan Scenarios towards Low-Carbon Society (LCS): Feasibility study for 70% 
C02 emission reduction by 2050 below 1990 level (NIES, 2007).
• GEO-4 Global Environmental Outlook: environment for development (UNEP, 
2007b).
• Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050 (Shell, 2008).
• Long Term Electricity Networks Scenarios (LENS) (OFGEM, 2008).
• Environmental Outlook to 2030 (OECD, 2008).
Many of these studies were informative during the development of an appropriate 
methodological approach in this research, described in Chapter 5, although a detailed 
account of each of these scenario studies is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, 
the next section provides an insight into the evolution of ideas that can occur tlrrough 
scenario plamiing by focusing on a series of scenario studies produced by one 
organisation in particular.
3.3.1 Scenarios at Shell
The emergence of scenario planning at Shell in the 1970s was documented above. 
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Since 1992, Shell have published a set of scenarios roughly every thi'ee years. As the 
organisation often attributed with the leading role in popularising the scenario method, a 
short summary of the Shell scenarios to date provides a usefril insight into the shifting 
focus of their scenario planners in response to an ever changing business envhomnent.
In 1992, Shell published a set of two scenarios to 2020 influenced by global political 
events, most notably the fall of the Berlin Wall. The scenarios pivoted around whether 
economic and political liberalisation would be embraced across the world, or resisted; 
these scenarios were named 'New Frontiers' and 'Barricades' respectively (Shell, 1992).
By 1995, the forces of globalisation, liberalisation and technology seemed UTesistible 
and the Shell study of that year echoed the words of Margaret Thatcher: There Is No 
Alternative (TINA) (Shell, 1995). A new pair of 2020 scenarios were published, termed 
'Just Do It!' and 'Da Wo (Big Me)'. The first scenario describes a world characterised by 
US-style capitalism, rewarding innovation and creating a space for individual creativity. 
The alternative scenario describes a world in which companies and governments 
recognise the need for longer-term relationships of trust, a world in which Asian 
societies are at an advantage due to existing social and business structur es of this nature.
Just as the 1995 scenarios had assumed a 'winner' fiorn the 1992 set (New Frontiers), in 
1998 Shell developed two new 2020 scenarios, based upon the success of Just Do It! 
(Shell, 1998). In 'The New Game' the world would be shaped more by strengthened 
global institutions and global rules favouring "open and transparent markets, 
globalisation, commoditisation" (Shell, 1998, p. 8). In 'People Power' the world would
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be dominated more by the individual forces of wealth, choice and education, with 
"consumer choice, rising personal expectations, and grassroots pressure groups [able 
to] overwhelm attempts to impose rules and overshadow old institutions" (Shell, 1998, 
p. 9).
The scenarios published in 2001 built on the economic and political dimensions of 
earlier scenarios, but added a social dimension (Shell, 2001). The two scenarios 
presented were 'Business Class', characterised by "a globally interconnected 
meritocracy based on individual freedom and the American dream" and 'Prism', with 
"many networks reflecting the persisting power o f culture and history" (Shell, 2001, p. 
1).
In Global Scenarios to 2025 (Shell, 2005), Shell explored the interplay between three 
forces: market incentives, state coercion or regulation, and communities. These forces 
were seen to have competing objectives: efficiency, security, and social cohesion and 
justice respectively. Shell visualised these forces as comers of a 'Trilemma Triangle' 
(Figure 3.1). The interplay between these forces then defined the scenarios, i.e. each 
scenario represented an edge of the triangle, characterised by “two wins, one loss” 
(Shell, 2005).
Points on tfie mop 
show complex 
trode offs...
...as competing forces 
puli toward the three 
triangle apexes
Figure 3.1: Shell's Trilemma Triangle (Shell, 2005)
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The three scenarios were as follows: 'Low Trust Globalisation' represented a 
compromised between the efficiency of market incentives and the security of state 
coercion/regulation (with communities losing out); in 'Flags', a compromise was 
reached between state coercion/regulation and the social cohesion/justice of 
communities (with market incentives losing out); while 'Open Doors' was characterised 
by a compromise between market incentives and coimnunities (with state 
coercion/regulation losing out).
In 2007, Shell published “Signposts”, a supplement to the 2005 scenarios which 
discussed a selection of recent global developments, attempting to make sense of these 
through the framework of the Trilemma Triangle (Shell, 2007). The impacts of two 
particulai* events -  9/11 and Emon -  had led to an increased demand for physical 
security along with tighter market regulation. Additionally, the collapse of the Doha 
trade negotiations was seen as indicative of national identity and social cohesion 
overruling economic efficiency. The team inteipreted this combination of events by 
arguing: “we are therefore currently living in a world that predominantly reflects the 
Low Trust Globalisation scenario, with a strong component o f Flags ” (Shell, 2007, p. 
4). Nevertheless, “significant fault-lines and opposing pressures” between the tliree 
forces had been revealed, meaning that the future patli “remains highly uncertain” 
(Shell, 2007, p. 4).
In the introduction to the 2008 scenarios, the fault-lines identified in Signposts were 
said to be adding to the pressmes on energy supply, energy demand and the 
environment, brought on by population growth and economic development (Shell, 
2008). According to Shell, there were “three hard truths” that could no longer be 
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ignored, namely: Step-change in energy use; Supply will struggle to keep pace; 
Enviromnental stresses are increasing (Shell, 2008, p. 8). These three ai'eas -  demand, 
supply and the environment -  are seen as the key drivers of the energy world. The 
scenaiios through to 2050 reflect the “revolutionary transitions and considerable 
turbulence” (Shell, 2008, p. 10) that will result fiom the enormous changes affecting 
these. In the first scenario, 'Scramble', policy-makers fail to address energy efficiency 
and greenhouse gas emissions until forced into action due to severe supply shortages 
and climate shocks respectively. In the alternative scenario, 'Blueprints', local 
organisations at grassroots, city and regional levels take the initiative. As these gain 
momentum, they are brought together at a national level, resulting in effective market- 
based mechanisms to address energy efficiency and emissions.
In their most recent publication at the time of writing, Signals & Signposts, Shell 
provide an update to the 2008 scenarios to take account of new uncertainties arising 
fi'orn the 2008 financial crisis (Shell, 2011). A range of economic outlooks are provided 
in light of the crisis, including 'Deeper and longer', 'Severe-yet-sharp', and 'Depression 
2.0', although this latter outlook is described as unlikely.
Different lessons might be drawn from this chronological summary. On the one hand, 
the sequence makes clear that many of the scenario stirdies begin by selecting a 'winner', 
i.e. one of the possible worlds envisioned in a previous study. Although this is a 
judgement made by the Shell team themselves, this observation might support the claim 
that scenario planning can prove successful in identifying broad 'themes' emerging or 
solidifying within the global landscape. On the other hand, it is clear that however well- 
resourced, scenario practitioners ar e generally incapable of detecting the major 'events' 
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that will retrospectively come to be considered as world changing. Although the Shell 
scenar io team of the 1960s and 1970s were credited with foreseeing the risk of oil crises 
during that period (Kleiner, 2003), in this more recent series of studies two of the most 
pivotal moments in history - 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis - have instead led to a 
rethink and revisioning of earlier scenarios. These game-changing events are often 
referi'ed to as 'Black Swans', although some analysts would argue that the financial 
crisis was perfectly detectable if only the correct economic model had been applied to 
the analysis (Taleb, 2011). Thus, in any scenario study, although some key themes may 
well prove to have been identified corTectly, by missing key events that change the 
landscape so profoundly, other emerging themes will necessarily go undetected. All of 
which goes to support the argument, explored later, that scenarios should never be an 
exercise in prediction, but rather in sensemaking of the uncertainties of the present.
In terms of providing fur ther background to the particular areas of interest to this study, 
it is worth turning attention to two reports which were published in 2009, once this 
study was rmderway.
3.3.2 A critique of low carbon energy scenarios
The first report offers a critique of low carbon energy scenarios, with a review and 
analysis of 21 such scenario studies (Hughes et al, 2009). Hughes et al argue that 
these studies have made an important contribution by beginning to imagine and 
articulate a range of low carbon futures, thus prompting consideration of the necessary 
first steps. Nevertheless, the critique identified several shortcomings that must be 
addressed if low carbon energy scenarios are to move beyond this imaginitive stage to
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offer strategic insight regarding appropriate actions to be undertaken by specific actors. 
The authors identified three main obstacles to be overcome.
Exogenous constraints
Many of the studies reviewed by Hughes et al portray scenarios that are bounded by a 
'normative exogenous constraint', typically a carbon emissions reduction target. The 
authors warn that such a constraint “creates an illusion o f inevitability” regarding the 
achievement of that goal, which can “diminish and underestimate the significance o f 
certain potentially highly significant obstacles” (Hughes et a l, 2009, p. 39). Crucially, 
by imposing a target as an exogenous constraint, it is removed from the interplay of 
actors and their motivations, and elevated to a realm where it is no longer clear how that 
goal might be brought about by particular actors and institutions within the system. The 
authors compare this to the ancient Greek concept of 'deus ex machina', a storytelling 
device where “the characters within the drama are unable to resolve a situation 
through their own efforts, but are saved by a force completely external to the previously 
established plot, and thus completely implausible within the structure o f the drama 
previously established” (Hughes et a l, 2009, p. 40).
If scenarios are to portray the transition towai'ds certain goals, then these should first be 
attiibuted to particulai* actors in the scenaiio, such that the supporting and conflicting 
forces that might affect the achievement of these goals can be explicitly drawn out.
High level trends
Hughes et al argue that the scenaiio studies reviewed are “overly reliant on high level 
trends... [including] ...consumerism, environmentalism, globalisation, fragmentation
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etc” (Hughes et al, 2009, pp. 4, 40). Typically, two of these trends are selected as
bisecting axes to form a 2x2 matrix.
The authors question the ability of high level ti'ends to generate meaningful 
representations of the world. In any ongoing social/technical/economic/political 
development, a multitude of conflicting forces operate simultaneously. Over time, some 
of these forces will dominate, some will fade, others will adapt and yet more will 
emerge. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be possible to identify and isolate those 
dominant forces for the purposes of siunmarising key historical developments. Thus, 
high level ti'ends may be useful in developing nairatives intended to provide a broad 
retrospective summary of events. However, the dynamic interplay of a multitude of 
forces is precisely what is required in thinking prospectively, for only then is it possible 
to identify points of intervention and gain strategic insight for future action. Therefore, 
“an actor-based perception o f the evolution o f events would be much more useful than 
one based in high-level trends” (Hughes et a l, 2009, p. 41).
Co-evolution of social, technological, economic and political factors
In the 21 scenai'io studies investigated by Hughes et a l, the focus is predominantly on 
the development of the technological energy system, at the expense of other 
considerations such as social, political and enviromnental factors. Where social and 
political dynamics are included, this is done either in a post-hoc manner, where a 
technology mix is proposed with a socio-political landscape then painted around this, or 
else a socio-political system is described first and a technology mix chosen as deemed 
appropriate. In both cases, such descriptions can fail to account for the dynamic co­
evolution of these systems.
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In reality, social systems are not constructed independently of technological systems. 
Instead, the various systems (social, technological, economic, political) develop in an 
“iterative and reflexive” mamier (Hughes et a l, 2009, p. 44). Thus, what is politically 
feasible depends on what is socially acceptable, technologically possible and so on. 
Similai'ly, what is technologically (and economically) feasible depends on policy 
interventions, social trends and more.
Hughes et al sti ess again the importance of understanding the role of different actors in 
this co-evolution process, a demand that is all the more important in the present research 
given the explicit consideration of psychological factors among those other systems.
Lessons for lifestyle scenarios
A common theme across all three characteristics described above is the need to better 
poifray the role of actors in bringing about change. Whether as citizens, consumers, 
communities, firms, local authorities or governments, the developments that will shape 
the future should be attributable to these actors, and not merely abstr'acted to 
megatrends, if scenarios are to provide opportunities for strategic insight. If previous 
scenario developers might be forgiven for focusing on technology given the supply-side 
nature of their studies, any scenarios depicting the carbon intensity of lifestyles must 
clearly incorporate the role of actors in society if they are to achieve credibility among 
decision-makers.
As well as the actors themselves, the social, technological, economic and political 
systems should be represented in terms of a process of dynamic co-evolution. This
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representation will be aided fioni the outset by efforts to portray actors and their 
motivations. However, special care should be taken to ensure this co-evolution of 
systems is represented explicitly.
3.3.4 UKERC lifestyle scenarios
The second report of interest is a scenario study conducted by the UK Energy Research 
Centre (UKERC). Whereas the focus of previous energy scenarios has tended to be on 
the technological system, the UKERC scenario study also attempts to portray the role 
that lifestyles might play in reducing energy demand to 2050 (UKERC, 2009b). The 
focus of these lifestyle scenarios is on household energy use and personal transport, 
“the forms o f energy most directly controlled by the individual” (UKERC, 2009b, p. 
104).
The report details a series of assumptions regarding changes in energy behaviour' by 
2050. For household energy use, tliese include: a high standard of insulation; social 
unacceptability of over-heating; low-carbon heating systems; phasing out of 
incandescent lighting; improved efficiency of appliances; rolling out of smart meters.
For personal transportation, assumptions include: social norms demoting large cars, 
single occupancy, speeding and air travel; efficient, low-energy transport systems 
replacing petr'ol and diesel car-based systems; increased localism resulting in shorter 
average distances; new models of car ownership; increased role of information and 
communication teclinology in making cost and energy use transparent; radical changes 
in work patterns and business travel including teleworking and video conferencing; the 
appeal of air travel fading due to social unacceptability and inconvenience.
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These assumptions are then used to investigate energy demand for 2050 using three 
different models. The report explains how the general assumptions listed above are 
translated into more specific assumptions suitable for input into tliese models.
This scenario complements the range of earlier scenarios focusing more on the 
technological energy system and makes an important contribution to the discussion on 
energy systems, energy policy and economics by thinking about the opportunities for 
reducing energy demand (and thus carbon emissions) through lifestyle change. What is 
absent in this scenai'io though, is a meaningful reflection on how lifestyle change might 
come about. The report states that: “I f  Government is pursuing ambitious carbon 
emissions, this is likely to be consistent with social acceptance, and therefore it is 
probable that attitudes and personal behaviour will change. ” (UKERC, 2009b, p. 103). 
By way of an explanation for the assmnptions given for 2050, the following brief 
synopsis is provided:
“The basic storyline o f the scenario is o f steadily changing social attitudes 
to the environment, with increasing understanding leading to a widely held 
belief that human activity is having a serious impact on the global climate.
This is followed by a broad social consensus that personal consumption is a 
key driver and needs to change. We do not assume complete social 
agreement, nor widespread frugality, but majority support geared to 
improving quality o f life without increased material consumption in rich 
countries. Starting with some key opinion leaders, social norms emphasise 
'green housing'; and 'community living' and 'accessibility' replace 'mobility'
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as aspirations. ” (UKERC, 2009b, p. 104)
In the executive summary, the report makes it clear that further work remains to be 
done:
“There is little existing evidence o f how to bring about comprehensive 
changes in people's lifestyle and behaviour that will lead to reduced energy
demand and CO2 emissions Research is needed to understand the
conditions under which people would voluntarily take on lifestyles 
embodying these types o f behaviour. ” (UKERC, 2009b, p. 7)
It therefore remains an aim of this research to add to this literature by exploring the 
specific conditions under which lifestyle change might occur, and in which directions. 
In this way, it will be possible to examine the intricacies of behaviour change in relation 
to other socio-technical systems and to better infoim policy and decision-makers on 
possible points of intervention en route to a low carbon future.
Having drawn lessons from the literature for this research, the following section 
discusses some of the key chai'acteristics of the scenarios developed here.
3A Scenario characteristics
A scenario typology can offer a comprehensive and comprehensible fiamework for 
communicating the nature and chai'acteristics of the proposed scenario study (van 
Notten et a l, 2003, p. 423). This has the added advantage of allowing heterogenous 
scenai'io studies to be compared to one another in order to draw out similarities and 
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differences. The use of a scenario typology can also assist in informing stakeholders on 
why a particular approach has been chosen over the alternatives.
An early typology for scenarios was proposed by Ducot and Lubben (1980, p. 51), 
consisting of tliree axes with the following poles:
Exploratory -  Anticipatory: this axis considers the temporal view. An 
exploratory scenario begins with a set of basic hypotlieses in the present and 
ti'aces the effects of these into the futm*e, while an anticipatory scenario 
begins with a set of basic hypotheses about the future and works backwards 
to identify which key events could be responsible for this situation 
unfolding.
Descriptive -  Normative: this refers to the inclusion of values in describing 
the scenarios. A descriptive scenario attempts to represent a 'value-free' 
account of how events might imfold, while a normative scenario explicitly 
takes into account the values of the scenario developer in describing a 
desirable futur'e world.
Trend -  Peripheral: this final axis considers the conventionality of the 
scenarios. A trend scenario is based on cruTent trends extr'apolated into the 
futur’e, while a peripheral scenario is derived from the consequences of more 
extreme and imlikely events.
The 3-axis model also allows for midpoints, so that any given scenario could be based 
in one of three categories for each axis, allowing a total of 27 'types' of scenario (3x3x3)
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(Ducot & Lubben, 1980, p. 54). This model is represented by a cube with 27 points of 
intersection, as in Figure 3.2:
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Figure 3.2: Ducot and Lubben's Typology Cube (1980, p. 54)
Other scenaiio theorists have proposed broadly similar models, witli some variation. 
Some 23 years after Ducot and Lubben, a significantly updated scenario typology was 
proposed by van Notten et al. (2003). Explaining why an updated scenario typology 
was necessary, the authors argued that “existing typologies do not sufficiently capture 
the diversity in contemporary scenario analysis" (van Notten et a l, 2003, p. 424). In 
particular, the existing typologies were criticised for being too broad, such that a variety 
of distinct scenaiio types are often clustered together within the same category. To 
develop their updated scenaiio typology, van Notten et al reviewed approximately 70 
scenaiio studies from the literatui’e, using these to “distil the features common to most 
scenario development processes These common featui’es were then used to compose 
tlie new typology. The typology consists of thi’ee overarching themes, each with a set of 
characteristics. The three themes are the project goal (why), the process design (how) 
and scenar io content (what). The Scenario Characteristics identified within each of these 
themes are detailed in Table 3.1.
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Themes Scenario Characteristics
Project Goal
(Exploration vs
Decision
Support)
I Inclusion o f  Norms Descriptive vs Normative
11 Vantage Point Forecasting vs Backcasting
III Subject Issue-based, Area-based, Institution-based
IV Time Scale Long Term vs Short Term
V Spatial Scale Global/Supranational vs National/Local
Process Design
(Intuitive vs 
Fonnal)
VI Nature o f  the Data Qualitative vs Quantitative
VII Method o f  Data Collection Participatory vs Desk Research
VIII Resources Extensive vs Limited
IX Institutional Conditions Open vs Constrained
Scenario
C ontent
(Complex vs 
Simple)
X Temporal Nature Chain vs Snapshot
XI Nature o f  the Variables Heterogeneous vs Homogeneous
XII Dynamics Peripheral vs Trend
XIII Level o f  Deviation Alternative vs Conventional
XIV Level o f  Integration High vs Low
Table 3.1: van Notten et al. 's (2003) Updated Scenario Typology
This scenario typology is not without its shortcomings, as articulated below. However, 
it has been adopted as a contingent framework for communicating the characteristics of 
the scenarios to be developed in this research.
3.4.1 Project goal
The first set of scenario characteristics relate to the project goal, or 'why' the scenarios 
are being developed. These consist of: Inclusion of Norms, Vantage Point, Subject, 
Time Scale and Spatial Scale.
Inclusions of Norms
This first characteristic is perhaps also the most contentious, for it may be argued that 
scenario development is inherently normative. For van Notten et al. :
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“[It] can he justifiably argued that all scenarios are normative as they 
consist o f the interpretations, values, and interests o f the scenario 
developers. Consequently, for our typology  ^ we distinguish between 
descriptive scenarios that explore possible futures, and normative scenarios 
that describe probable or preferable futures. ” (van Notten et a l, 2003, p. 
429)
This distinction is problematic however, for it is repeatedly argued in the literature that 
the very definition of scenarios requires that they be plausible (see for example 
Chermack & Lynliam, 2002, Nicol, 2005 for a review of definitions). Accordingly, all 
scenarios (not just descriptive scenaiios) should share the characteristic of being 
possible. Additionally, whereas van Notten et al define normative scenarios as 
describing probable futures, this is a quality we might instead expect to find associated 
with descriptive scenarios. Thus, a better distinction might have been made between 
exploratory (probable) futures and normative (preferable) futures. A similar distinction 
is made by Rotmans et al (2000):
“Descriptive scenarios state an ordered set o f possible events irrespective o f 
their (un)desirability, whereas normative scenarios take values and interests 
into account, often reasoning from specific targets to be reached. ” (Rotmans 
et a l, 2000, p. 812)
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The issue of probability remains contentious, some practitioners aim to imbue 
descriptive scenaiios with an assessment of their probability, while others prefer to 
avoid this altogether. Either way, the distinction of interest here is the sense of 
'directedness', i.e. descriptive scenarios may be said to 'unfold' from knowledge about 
the present and about the diiving forces involved, without any preconceived end-state 
on the part of the scenaiio developers; meanwhile, normative scenarios begin with the 
(un)desirable end-states and focus on finding those paths which it is believed will lead 
there. In terms of the inclusion of norms then, descriptive scenarios aie influence by the 
norms of the scenario developers only implicitly (and as little as possible), while 
normative scenar ios are influenced explicitly by the norms of the developers.
In developing scenarios of the carbon intensity of UK lifestyles for this research, in 
particular considering their potential role in influencing policy- and decision-makers, it 
is tempting to opt for the normative approach, enabling clear recommendations for paths 
to a low carbon society. At the same time though, it may be argued that the best way to 
enable clear thinking on suitable policy alternatives is to provide an impartial 
assessment of the different paths that our lifestyles might take under a variety of 
conditions. Moreover, it may be that a set of normative scenarios would engender a 
sense of complacency regarding the prospects of reaching such a low carbon society, 
thus having the opposite effect from that intended.
In light of these considerations, a descriptive approach can be seen to hold two main 
advantages over a normative one. Firstly, the effort of following a scenario building 
process that prizes objectivity over subjectivity (even if true objectivity can never be 
fully attained) helps to ensure the legitimacy and acceptability of the scenarios among
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an academic audience which may hold some scepticism towards the scenario technique. 
Secondly, any scenarios resulting from a normative approach may be seen as 
prescriptive, and may fail to engage policy-makers in the intended fashion, i.e. as 
artefacts to be used to challenge existing thinking rather than as forthright 
recommendations. Instead, descriptive scenarios merely provide a 'sandpit' or testbed 
for policy- and decision-makers, enabling a sense of ownership over any agreed policy 
outcomes.
Based on these considerations, this research will involve descriptive scenarios.
Vantage Point
This characteristic tends to go hand-in-hand with the previous one, as the vantage point 
is largely determined by the inclusion (or otherwise) of norms. Normative scenaiios are 
typically backcasting scenarios, beginning with the horizon year and working 
backwards from there. Descriptive scenarios aie typically forecasting scenaiios, in that 
they begin from the present and work out the implications of interactions between 
valions forces over time until the horizon year. Indeed, so inextricably linked are these 
two characteristics that van Notten et al. acknowledged that “some o f the [typology] 
characteristics overlap... For example, a backcasting scenario is invariably normative” 
(van Notten et al., 2003, p. 439). Nevertheless, these characteristics have been retained 
as distinct entries in the typology, thus in the interests of thoroughness it is necessary to 
establish that the scenarios developed in this research shall be forecasting scenarios.
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Subject
This chaiacteristic is somewhat self-selecting in the case of this reseai ch. Although it 
has been estabished that the focus is on the UK, the predominant concern here is with 
lifestyles, thus these scenarios are to be issue-based, rather than area- or institution- 
based.
Time Scale
According to van Notten et a l, a short term scale is 3-10 years, while a long term scale 
is anything over 25 years. Thus the scenarios developed here are on a medium-term 
scale.
Spatial Scale
The spatial scale refers to the geographical extent of the scenario study. This can be 
global, international, national, regional, local etc. In this research, the geographical area 
of interest is the UK, thus the scenarios developed here will be at a national scale, even 
if global factors will play a significant role.
3.4.2 Process Design
This second set of characteristics addresses the process design, in other words 'how' the 
scenarios will be developed. These characteristics are: Nature of the Data, Method of 
Data Collection, Resouices, Institutional Conditions.
Nature of the Data
This characteristic distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative data. The nature 
of the data used depends on tlie object of the study, and van Notten et al write:
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“Qualitative or narrative scenarios are appropriate in the analysis o f 
complex situations with high levels o f uncertainty and when relevant 
information cannot he entirely quantified. For example, information that 
relates to human values, emotions, and behaviour is invariably 
incorporated in qualitative rather than quantitative scenarios ” (van Notten 
et a l, 2003, p. 431)
The wide range of factors to be investigated in this study (including human values and 
behavioui) makes it clear that the natur e of the data will be qualitative. Nevertlieless, a 
quantitative model will also be employed to provide illustrative emissions and 
expenditure figures.
Method of Data Collection
In this chaiacteristic, van Notten et al. distinguish between a participatory approach and 
desk research. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive though. Different 
stages in this research will involve participatory approaches and desk research 
alternately. The first stage of data collection will involve interviews with experts for 
example, while a later stage involves desk research on candidate scenario uncertainties. 
Therefore tliis study does not adhere to either pole of this characteristic but involves 
both participatory and desk research methods, in a complementary role.
Resources
The resources available in a scenaiio study include finance, time and competencies, and 
van Notten et al distinguish between extensive and limited resources. While the period
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of time given over to this research might exceed that of some other scenario studies, 
many of those studies will involve more than one scenario 'developer' as part of a larger 
team, perhaps supported by considerable organisational financing. A direct comparison 
between studies for this characteristic is therefore difficult.
Institutional Conditions
The institutional conditions describe the (internal) political environment of the 
organisation, and the freedom that can be exercised by the scenario team in conducting 
the scenarios. Institutional conditions may be constrained if there is pressrue on the 
team to produce particular results, for example. In the case of this research, there is no 
such 'controlling organisation' and so the institutional conditions can be said to be open.
3.4.3 Scenario Content
This final set of characteristics describes the scenario content, or 'what' the scenarios 
look like. These characteristics are: Temporal Nature, Nature of the Variables, 
Dynamics, Level of Deviation, Level of Integration. These characteristics are 
necessarily less concrete at the outset, as the nature of the scenario narratives only 
become clear once the process is underway, so there must be sufficient leeway to allow 
the scenarios to be developed in a way that reflects the outcomes of the earlier stages.
Temporal Nature
This characteristic is concerned with whether the narratives describe the chain of 
developments of each scenario over the course of time, or instead provide a snapshot of 
the end-state. It was the intention in this research to provide not just the end-state of 
each scenaiio, but also the story of how these may have developed, and this objective 
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was indeed achieved. This research therefore provides a set of chain scenarios.
Nature of the Variables
A scenario study may address a multitude of variables of different types, or the variables 
may instead be limited in both number and type. The terms homogenous and 
heterogenous are used here by van Notten et a l, even though these terms seem to 
address only the type of variables in relation to each other and not the number of 
variables. Nevertheless, we can say that the variables in this study are varied in type, 
addressing the external factors and consumption categories of interest. As such, this 
research will involve a heterogenous set o f variables.
Dynamics
This is yet another problematic characteristic, for it refers to the extent to which the 
scenarios deviate from a business-as-usual scenario. Cleaiiy, in a context where the 
value of scenarios is considered to be their ability to challenge conventional thinking, 
there is a value judgement implicit in this characteristic. Consequently, ti'end scenaiios, 
those which extrapolate in a lineai* fashion from existing trends, are less useful than 
peripheral scenarios, which are discontinuous and often include extreme events. In 
some ways it would be disingenuous to make a deliberate effort to push the scenarios in 
either direction, as the dynamics should be something that emerge as a consequence of 
the interaction between scenario inputs, unknown at the outset. However it can be 
useful, once the scenario nairatives have been developed, to reflect on the dynamics 
portrayed therein and to ask what their role might be in challenging entrenched thinking. 
In the event, tlie coordinator of a scenario building process may not be the most 
appropriate person to pass judgement on the dynamic nature of their work, however:
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this reseai'ch makes an attempt to portray peripheral scenarios.
Level of Deviation
The level of deviation reflects the variation between the scenarios produced. 
Conventional scenaiios involve little deviation from one another, and may be used 
where the scenario team wishes to fine-tune a particular strategy. Alternative scenarios 
on the other hand present markedly different views of the future, thus providing a series 
of distinct testbeds for considering the implications of decision making. As with 
Dynamics, there appears to be an implicit value judgement here in favoui* of alternative 
scenarios and similarly it seems inappropriate for a scenario coordinator to judge the 
level of deviation appaient in their own work. Nevertheless, the attempt in this research 
was to develop alternative scenarios.
Level of Integration
The level of integration describes the extent to which the various scenario inputs are 
interwoven over the course of the scenario timeline. A high level of integration would 
involve a great deal of interaction between these inputs, while a low level of integration 
might portray the inputs as distinct developments without attempting to offer any insight 
into how these might effect each other in the process. In the case of this scenario study, 
a high level o f integration between the scenario inputs was attempted in order to 
achieve a series of interwoven narratives rather than a list of discrete developments for 
each scenario.
3.4.4 Typology summary
Although the typology has its flaws, the adoption of a framework for drinking through 
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each characteristic and the alternatives available helps to clarify and guide the process 
of scenario building. In addition, using a typology such as this enables more effective 
communication and dissemination of the process to stakeholders. The characteristics of 
the scenarios developed in this research are summarised in Table 3.2.
Themes Scenario Characteristics
Project Goal
(Exploration vs
Decision
Support)
I Inclusion o f  Norms Descriptive
II Vantage Point Forecasting
III Subject Issue-based
IV Time Scale Medium Term
V Spatial Scale National
Process Design
(Intuitive vs 
Formal)
VI Nature o f  the Data Qualitative (and Quantitative)
VII Method o f  Data Collection Participatory and Desk Research
VIII Resources unspecified
IX Institutional Conditions Open
Scenario
C ontent
(Complex vs 
Simple)
X Temporal Nature Chain
XI Nature o f  the Variables Heterogeneous
XII Dynamics Peripheral
XIII Level o f  Deviation Alternative
XIV Level o f  Integration High
Table 3.2: van Notten et al. 's typology with characteristics for this study highlighted
3.5 Chapter summary
The scenario planning technique emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, through two distinct 
schools. In the USA, the term 'scenarios' was introduced and pioneered by Herman 
Kahn, before Shell popularised the method through its use in planning exercises which 
helped the organisation foresee the oil crises of the 1970s. Meanwhile in France, 
another school developed in parallel, eventually being modernised by Michel Godet into 
a more probabilistic approach. The scenario planning actitivies at Shell continue to the
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present day, and an examination of die group's scenario studies since 1992 gives an 
insight into the evolution of ideas within the team. Meanwhile other publications in the 
scenaiio literature point more directly to some of the key lessons for a study focussed on 
the carbon intensity of lifestyles, lessons which are articulated above. Finally, thiough 
the use of a scenario typology, the characteristics of the scenarios developed in this 
research have been outlined to better enable cross comparison with similar studies now 
or in the friture.
In the next section, the secondary reseai'ch question regaining the epistemological 
contribution of scenarios is addressed.
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4. Epistemology
The present reseai*ch includes qualitative and quantitative components. The qualitative 
component consists of a series of scenario narratives thi'ough to 2030, while the 
quantitative component seeks to provide illustrative expenditure and emissions figures 
to accompany these. It therefore seemed appropriate to consider:
What epistemological contribution can be offered by a set o f scenarios 
exploring the carbon intensity o f UK household consumption under different 
conditions in the future?
This chapter begins by exploring the traditional 'soft' defence of scenario planning as a 
tool for learning. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of explanation and 
prediction in the sciences generally, and how this has developed over time. The next 
section examines what insights might be drawn from history in terms of constructing 
plausible narratives to describe sequences of events and the behaviour of individuals. 
The final section in this chapter explores historical developments in economics related 
to the modelling of consmner behavioru', including various criticisms from the 
psychological and sociological traditions, before the modelling approach used in this 
research is introduced.
4.1 The ’soft' defence of scenario planning
In approaching the scenario planning literatui*e, it is immediately evident that this 
technique has its roots in tlie applied fields of management and strategic planning. This 
emphasis on scenario planning as an applied technique, as opposed to a more theoretical
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approach based on a body of scientific knowledge, may explain why scenarios are 
described as having been historically marginalised in academia (Aligica, 2005, p. 816). 
It may also go some way to explaining why the predominant focus of the scenario 
literature has been on the craft of scenario building, with relatively little reflection on 
epistemology -  that is, the contribution of scenarios to the knowledge space.
Anyone engaged in a futures thinking process such as scenario planning will frequently 
encounter the view, implicitly or explicitly, that thinking about the medium to long-term 
future is purely speculative, a kind of guess work, and thus has little or no place in an 
academic setting. After all, academic activities are concerned with advancing our 
understanding of the world, or contiibuting to the knowledge space. Sui'ely speculating 
about the future lies in the realm of fiction? And if so, then doesn't the intioduction of 
futures thinking into a research project undermine the aims of that project to provide 
evidence-based advice to decision makers?
An initial defence of scenario planning is that it is not concerned with predicting the 
future, but rather with assisting our decision-making in the present by raising awareness 
of the range of possible fritures that lie before us. Furthermore, even if we cannot know 
what the future holds, we nevertheless have to make some kind of contingency plans for 
the futm'e. Therefore, since people will inevitably plan for the future, it is surely better 
to do so in a systematic way by thinking explicitly about the range of possibilities that 
await us. For proponents of this view, it is sufficient to show that by envisioning a 
series of possible futines, we challenge our preconceptions and mental models and are 
therefore able to make less biased judgements about the path ahead. Thus, scenarios are 
intended to play a 'propaedeutic' role, a learning role, which in turn may facilitate the
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emergence of other kinds of knowledge, but are not designed as knowledge artefacts in 
their own right (Aligica, 2005, p, 817),
That scenario planning can help challenge preconceptions and raise awareness of 
alternate futures from those implicitly held in the minds of decision makers seems a 
reasonable clahn to make. Yet, in its dealing of the epistemological question, this line 
of defence seems almost tantamount to sophistry. As Aligica has pointed out: 
"Learning involves by definition a growth o f knowledge and thus on the one hand, a 
claim to knowledge is softly downplayed while at the same time another identical claim 
is made in a disguisedform” (Aligica, 2005, p. 817).
The 'soff defence often asserts that by refraining from assigning probabilities to 
alternate fritures, the scenario planner is not seeking to offer an assessment of the 
likelihood of the various outcomes. However, important questions must still be raised 
around the validity of the alternate futures such as they are. Specifically, it must be 
asked: what basis can there be for describing a set of alternate futur es as 'possible'? The 
use of the word 'possible' implies that a particular set of circumstances in the flitur'e may 
conceivably arise. Thus, without claiming to know that a particular* outcome will occur, 
it is implicitly claimed that it could. Ultimately then, each possible future rests on a 
series of assumptions regarding causality in human affairs and the natural world.
So, it seems that even if a range of alternate futures are never treated as knowledge 
ar*tefacts themselves, they ar*e nevertheless grounded in knowledge (or assumptions) 
about discer*nible patterns in the past that form the basis of an extrapolation (quantitative 
or otherwise) into the futur*e. Indeed, perhaps upon inspection trends or tendencies can
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be identified that have characterised oui* progress to date and which seem, if not 
immutable, then certainly dominant and persistent. It may reasonably be argued that 
such 'mega-trends' are likely to have a presence and influence in our medimn or even 
long-term future. However, identifying mega-trends from historical data is one thing, 
but understanding the causal processes which have given rise to those is another matter 
entirely. Thus, to assess whether scenarios might clahn an epistemological status 
beyond that of a 'prodaedeutic' tool, it is necessary to first examine the epistemological 
nature of patterns discerned from the past, i.e. the generalisation of historical events. 
This will involve thinking about the scientific nature of historical explanations, an 
enquiry which begins here by turning the question around and looking at the history of 
scientific explanation.
4.2 Developments In the philosophy of science
Wliereas particular* scientific disciplines are concerned witli phenomena within their 
domain and how these can be explained in relation to one another, the philosophy of 
science is concer*ned with explanation itself. Over the centuries, as various thinkers 
have contributed to this branch of philosophy, the accepted view of what constitutes the 
'scientific method’ has changed significantly. In addition, the birth of ever more distinct 
areas of inquiry that might be considered ‘sciences’ has led to a plethora of diverse 
methodologies, such tliat it is difficult to discern a pattern that tr anscends them all and 
which could be meaningfully described as a universal scientific method.
Up until the mid-nineteenth centur y, tlie standard view of scientific method was one of 
inductive reasoning. It was believed that science began with die objective observation 
of facts in the real world, based on which die scientist could first infer* universal laws, 
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and subsequently more general theories. Those laws and theories could then be tested 
against further observations (Blaug, 1992, p. 4). However, the inductive approach had 
been challenged as early as the second centmy by the Pyrrhonian philosopher Sextus 
Empiricus. Perhaps more famously, the Scottish philosopher David Hume challenged 
the justification for inductive reasoning (Hume, 1748). Put simply, the problem with 
induction is that although we might observe a series of events demonstrating some 
consistent property, we have no guarantee that our subsequent observations will also 
exliibit this propeity. Therefore any general law infened from these observations must 
be contingent. Bertrand Russell famously made the point using the example of a 
chicken having been fed every day, expecting this day to be like any other, only to have 
the farmer wiing its neck (Russell et a l, 1992, pp. 150-151).
Despite Hume's challenge, this inductive approach held until the second half of the 
nineteenth centmy when it began to break down (Blaug, 1992, p. 4). In its place came a 
model of scientific method based on deduction, eventually formalised by Hempel and 
Oppenheim (1948). Blaug smnmarises this 'deductive-nomological model' as follows:
• A scientific explanation consists of the explanans and an explanandum.
• The explanans, or premises, ai*e made up of:
o one or more universal law(s), i.e. statements of the fomi: 'if A is true, then B 
is also ti*ue'; and:
° details of relevant initial conditions.
• From these premises, and with the use of deductive logic (such as 'if A is true, 
then B is tiue. A is ti'ue, therefore B must be true'), it is possible to derive an 
explanandum - a statement about some phenomenon wliich needs explaining 
(Blaug, 1992, p. 4).
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Blaug writes:
"The point o f the model is that it employs no other rules o f logical inference 
than that o f deduction...The universal laws that are involved in explanations 
are not derived by inductive generalization from individual instances; they 
are merely hypotheses, inspired conjectures i f  you like, that may be tested by 
using them to make predictions about particular events but which are not 
themselves reducible to observations about events, ” (Blaug, 1992, p. 5)
An important consequence of this model for Hempel and Oppenheim is that scientific 
explanation involves the same logical structure as scientific prediction, the only 
difference being that one is concerned with past events and the other witli futine events. 
This has been termed the symmetry thesis (Blaug, 1992, p. 5).
To reiterate, the deductive-nomological model considers scientific explanation and 
prediction to have the same form. An explanation begins with an event tliat has 
occurred and establishes premises to account for it. Prediction instead begins with the 
premises and posits the occuirence of an event. In principle then, if an explanation can 
be achieved for a given phenomenon, then future occurrences may be predicted by 
identifying the presence of the relevant initial conditions.
However, Helmer and Rescher (1959) contested this received view, arguing that 
explanation and prediction are in fact asymmetrical, an explanation must state why a 
given event occuired, while a prediction need only state that a given event will occur. 
Helmer and Rescher therefore argued that whereas an explanation must establish its
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conclusion beyond reasonable doubt, a prediction has only to demonstrate itself as 
"more credible than any comparable alternative” (Helmer & Rescher, 1959, p. 32). A 
similar view is expressed by Blaug, arguing that "prediction only requires a correlation, 
whereas explanation cries out for something more ” (Blaug, 1992, p. 5). Indeed, history 
provides many examples of scientific laws which provide either strong explanatory or 
predictive power, but not both. Newton's inverse squai*e law is often cited as an 
example of the latter. The law offers remarkable predictive power relating to the 
movement of bodies, however Newton himself felt that this law failed to explain why 
gravity acts in the way it does (Blackburn, 2001, p. 226).
Blaug also discusses the converse situation, i.e. a scientific explanation lacking 
predictive power. With the theory of evolution, Daiwin provided an account of how 
relatively simple forms of life develop into more specialized forms thiough natural 
selection. Nevertheless, the theory of evolution is unable to predict in advance which 
specialised forms will evolve under given conditions (Blaug, 1992, p. 7). Blaug cites 
other examples of theories offering explanations without predictive power, including an 
entire class of theories discussed later, namely historical laws.
It seems then tliat there may be a reasonable case to be made for the rejection of the 
symmetry thesis, as called for by Helmer and Rescher. For Blaug though, the Hempel- 
Oppenheim model of scientific method withstands the explanation-without-prediction 
criticism, for where explanatory power is not matched by predictive power this is either 
due to a lack of sufficient information about initial conditions (as in the case of 
biological evolution), or due to the explanation not having being suitably based on any 
universal law, in which latter case the scientific nature of the explanation should be
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called into question (Blaug, 1992, p. 10). Furthermore, the symmetiy thesis says only 
that scientific explanation and prediction are logically symmetrical, i.e. an explanation 
for a given event would look the same as a prediction of the same event if one were to 
be proposed. If, in practice, one is not accompanied by the other, the principle of 
logical symmetiy would remain unaffected (Ruben, 1990, p. 124). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to argue the case for a 'specifically predictive method' on pui'ely pragmatic 
grounds, but without having to reject the symmetry thesis altogether.
However, if explanation and prediction are still held to be 'logically' symmetrical, then it 
holds that predictions about the future should take the form proposed by Hempel and 
Oppenheim, comprising one or more universal laws and a description of initial 
conditions, prior to the statement that a particular type of event will occur if these 
conditions are met. Thus, even if a pui’ely predictive approach is undertaken, if this is to 
be described as 'scientific' then it ought still to be founded in universal laws. And in 
searching for universal laws applicable to the social, technological, economic and 
political tiansitions of interest to this study, we now tum to the discipline which might 
be described as logically symmetrical to futures thinking, namely history.
4.3 Insights from history
If scenarios are concerned witli explaining possible events and chcumstances in the 
futui'e, how do historians account for events that have actually occurred in the past? 
Specifically, (how) do historians depict causal relationships between events? And (how) 
do they offer generalisations of those events such that they could help us envisage the 
futui’e?
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This section presents a chronological account of how historians have reflected on 
history-as-science. Next, the issue of causality and general laws is examined to see how 
historians approach the task of explaining past events. Finally, the question of agency, 
or the role of the individual in history, is explored. The implications of the determinism 
vs free will debate in explaining historical events are drawn out.
If, as shall be shown, historians view their work as more of a craft than a science, then 
futures thinking may be seen in a similar light, as expressed by Heijden (1996). 
However, this turn away from making strong epistemological claims has implications 
for both fields, namely: why should one account of the past or future be considered any 
more worthy of attention than another? Exactly how historians attempt to answer this 
question is explored here.
4.3,1 A history of historical explanations
The first question that must be addi'essed here is whether historians themselves see 
theirs as a scientific discipline. Evans addresses the challenges that have been mounted 
against history since the 1980s by postmodernists, by first giving an accoimt of 
historians' views on the nature of historical enquiry throughout the ages (Evans, 2000, 
pp. 15-44). This account explains a great deal about the state of history in the present 
day, and is sununarised here.
In 1862 die French historian Coulanges stated: "History is, and should be, a science” 
(Evans, 2000, p. 20). As discussed earlier, scientific enquiry at that time was earned out 
tlii'ough inductive reasoning. For Coulanges and his contemporaries, the 'facts' were out 
there, all that was required of the historian was to accumulate them. Evans recounts that 
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the physicist Max Planck, at the beginning of his studies in the 1870s, was advised 
against a career in physics by his professor, who insisted there was nothing left to 
discover. But just as Planck and others would revolutionise their own areas of enquiry 
with new breakthi'oughs and discoveries, the same was to happen in the field of 
historical enquhy where archaeological advances led to ftirther discoveries about the 
distant past. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth centuiy the notion that all the facts 
could be gathered up was already beginning to look questionable. In the early twentieth 
century too, historians began to pui’sue a range of different approaches in their 
endeavour's, branching out from the traditional focus on the nation-state to consider 
economic history, social history and more: "New questions, it seemed, could render 
previously neglected areas o f evidence freshly meaningful" (Evans, 2000, p. 21). 
Moreover, the rapid development of new technologies was leading to ever more 
material sources to be 'gathered up' such as newspapers, photographs and films. Thus, 
"the notion o f a truly scientific history, began to seem more than a little shaky by the 
turn o f the century" (Evans, 2000, p. 22).
For those such as Trevelyan, it was wi'ong to consider history to be analogous to the 
physical sciences (Evans, 2000, p. 25). For Trevelyan, the sciences were of value 
regar dless of whether or not the general public could engage in them. History, on the 
other hand, had to be disseminated to be of any value. In addition, whereas the natural 
sciences were capable of deducing laws of cause and effect, no general laws had ever 
been derived ft'om history in such a way that they could lead to predictions about the 
future. Trevelyan believed that certain activities conducted by historians could be 
described as scientific, i.e. the gathering of facts, assessing the evidence, but the attempt 
to micover the causes and effects of historical events could never be described as such.
74
Similarly, Ranke had earlier made a distinction between the "rigorous principles o f  
source-criticism" required to assess historical documents, and the more intuitive 
approach of identifying the thi'ead that connects different events together (Evans, 2000, 
p. 25). For Trevelyan, history was "a mixture o f the scientific (research), the 
imaginative or speculative (interpretation) and the literary (presentation)" (Evans, 
2000, p. 25).
In the wake of the First World War, the belief in history as essentially objective and 
scientific was dealt a fuither blow, as historians' accounts of the causes of the conflict 
became highly partisan. Moreover, the belief in an oveiTiding pattern of progress 
throughout history was shattered: "if unpredictable and uncontrollable forces were 
shaping the present, it seemed, then the previous belief o f historians that they could 
understand by a simple process o f induction the forces that shaped the past now seemed 
dangerously naïve. " (Evans, 2000, p. 29).
Evans writes that the eariy part of the twentieth century, with the publication of 
Einstein's General Theory of Relativity in 1913, saw a shift towar'ds "an intellectual 
climate in which it was thought that the 'aspect o f things' changed with the position o f  
the observer" (Evans, 2000, p. 30). As well as in the physical sciences, this view was 
brought to bear on historical enquiry. The effect of this incursion of relativity into 
history was to "blur the distinction... between fact and interpretation” (Evans, 2000, p. 
31).
The 'reassertion of objectivity' would talce place in the 1950s and 1960s in both history 
and the sciences. Famously, Popper put forward his arguments for falsification -
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arguing that the pursuit of objective knowledge involved putting forth propositions in 
such a way that it was possible to discern the conditions under which they could be 
proved false. Elsewhere, in France, a more scientific and objective approach was 
emerging among a group of historians who incorporated methods fi'om economics, 
sociology, geography and statistics (Evans, 2000, pp. 38-39). The resiu'gence of history- 
as-science culminated in the emergence of 'social science history' and cliometrics, in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s. As seen by their proponents, these new 
approaches distinguished themselves from traditional history thr*ough the use of 
"explicitly elaborated, sometimes mathematical models that could be rigorously tested 
by quantitative means” (Evans, 2000, p. 39). However, Evans delivers a rebuke of this 
movement, stating that it only ever delivered results on a very small number of very 
specific questions: "When it came to the really big issues in history, it had to remain 
silent, because they could not be solved by quantitative methods” (Evans, 2000, p. 41).
Evans writes that this resurgence of 'scientific history' was set back fui'ther by 
developments in the philosophy of science, where the falsification of Popper had given 
way to Kuhn's model, which held that the scientist worked within a 'paradigm' of 
assumptions and theories which guided their work and "ensured that their observations 
matched the theories they held” (Evans, 2000, p. 42). Although Kuhn restricted the 
application of his model to the natural sciences, Evans suggests that those historians 
who were influenced by Kuhn's ideas nevertheless saw pai'allels in their own 
endeavoui'S, resulting in a sense of relativism: '"By the 1980s, therefore, the long search 
for a scientific method o f history had failed to yield any definitive results" (Evans, 2000, 
p. 43).
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Evans' chronological account of historians' reflections on their discipline makes it cleai* 
that -  even allowing for the differing views among historians at any given point in time 
-  the broad case for history-as-science has been oscillating back and forth between 
strong and weak views, often informed by developments outside the field, primarily in 
the philosophy of science. It seems uncontioversial to claim for history that it at least 
employs a great number of scientific methods in its approach towards ancient 
documents, artefacts and so on. The gathering of 'facts' then, might be said to be a 
properly scientific aspect of the work of historians. Things become more problematic 
when discussion timis to the ways in which such facts are employed in the weaving 
together of causal narratives, or more controversially, the positing of general laws from 
history.
4.3.2 Causation and General Laws in History
In a 1942 paper, Hempel gave an account of the function of general laws in history 
(Hempel, 1942). The paper includes many of the ideas on causation and explanation 
that would be formalised in the 1948 paper inhoducing the deductive-nomological 
model, discussed above. Describing the form of a scientific explanation for an event E, 
Hempel wiites that this consists of:
1. a set o f statements asserting the occurrence o f certain causes (Cj, Q, ... C„)
2. a set o f universal hypotheses
where: both are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence, and the 
occuiTence of event E  can be logically deduced from these. (Hempel, 1942)
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Hempel also explains that the 'C  and 'E  here refer to types of events, not individual 
instances of that type. Hempel's proposed structure is, of course, deductive. That is, if 
the first two sets of conditions are true, then the conclusion (or event) is necessarily true 
also. Thus, Hempel asserts that causal explanation in history can and does exhibit the 
same form as a scientific explanation. However, even for the sciences, this approach to 
causal explanation has been seen as problematic.
McClelland ar gues that to understand the nature of causal explanation, it is necessary to 
understand how such statements are put together, and the terms used therein 
(McClelland, 1975). The first issue is whether causal explanations should be qualified 
with 'Necessarily', 'Always' or 'Probably'. Even if it is assumed that all causes of a 
certain type C can be specified, and that these are invariably followed by an event of 
type E, it is still imclear whether the explanation deserves the preface 'Necessarily' or 
merely 'Always'. This depends on whether causation consists of anything other than 
observed correlations (McClelland, 1975, pp. 22, 35). For Hume, an observer may 
repeatedly witness the conjunction of one event with another, but never a connection 
between them (Hume, 1748, p. 58). If this approach is adopted, then causal 
explanations must be preceded by the term 'Always', and not 'Necessarily'. But for 
McClelland there are further difficulties.
The second difficulty relates to the grouping of individual instances of events into 
homogenised 'types' of both causes and effects. But reality can only be organised into 
such homogenised sets tlii'ough a process of abstraction in which some of the unique 
characteristics of individual events are ignored. Thus, the result is frequently 
unsatisfactory either because too much has been lost in the abstraction, and/or because
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the resulting set of events is still insufficiently homogeneous (McClelland, 1975, pp. 24, 
42). This is problematic enough for the scientist analysing e.g. the lighting of a match, 
but is many times more complicated for the historian dealing with types of events such 
as 'assassinations' or 'revolutions'.
The final problem for McClelland is that, even if events could be grouped satisfactorily 
into 'event types', the task of identifying a complete list of antecedent causes -  known to 
be complete -  would be impossible. This is ti'ue for the historian and is widely accepted 
as such in that field. Evans elucidates further;
"it is obvious enough what a cause is; we can have necessary causes (if A 
had not happened, then B could not have happened) and sufficient causes 
(A happening was enough to make B happen). Within the first category at 
least, we can have a hierarchy o f causes, absolute causes (if A had not 
happened, then B definitely could not have happened) and relative causes 
(if A had not happened, then B probably could not have happened). 
Accustomed as they are to stating their arguments in a careful gradation o f 
assessment o f probability and plausibility, historians do not in practice 
approach the discussion o f causation in concrete historical instances in 
such a schematic way. ” (Evans, 2000, p. 157)
But even in the sciences, for seemingly precise statements of the form 'If (Cl,..., Cn), 
then E', it can never be known with certainty that all -  and only -  the relevant causes 
have been enumerated (McClelland, 1975, pp. 24, 42). Thus, rather than applying the 
preface 'Always', causal explanations ought to be qualified with 'Probably'. The
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consequence of this qualification is that inferences based on such probabilistic laws can 
no longer be described as deductive. Where probabilistic premises are present, then 
conclusions drawn from those aie necessarily probabilistic also (McClelland, 1975, p. 
48).
A further problem arises for the historian in that, in order to establish the causes of an 
event, a scientist may conduct experiments where possible causes are removed one at a 
time to determine their role in inducing the effect. The historian however, has no means 
of isolating candidate causes and repeating sequences of events.
The very notion of deriving generalised explanations from historical events begins to 
appear flitile. Indeed, Evans wiites that "Most historians have always felt the 
establishment o f general laws to be alien to the enterprise in which they are engaged” 
(Evans, 2000, p. 56). However, there have been notable exceptions, Evans describes 
how CaiT put foi*ward the case for history-as-science by arguing that even if history 
dealt with unique events, the objects of interest to scientists -  atoms, stai's, living 
organisms -  were similarly unique, and yet scientists fi'ame general laws all the same. 
But as Evans points out, the differences between two human beings are far more 
complex that those of two atoms, making general laws equally more difficult to achieve 
at this level. This point relates to the homogenisation of individual instances into 
'types', as discussed above. Wliile the abstraction of two atoms for the purpose of 
homogeneity would incur some loss of detail, the abstraction of two political 
revolutions would present vastly greater losses to tire point that -  for either of the two 
reasons McClelland has discussed -  the resulting groupings would be unsatisfactory for 
the positing of general laws. The cliometricians attempted to eliminate this problem by
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dealing only with statistically significant numbers of people. Yet again though, Evans 
expresses scepticism: "history clearly includes the study o f individual people, events 
and structures as well as groups and collectives” (Evans, 2000, p. 57).
The tendency among some historians to imbue their works with explanatory power, 
indeed holding this to be the goal of history over and above 'mere description', has been 
termed the "explanatory bias" (Megill, 1989, p. 632). For Megill, this bias has been 
supported by the 'prejudice for universality'. This prejudice regards historical 
description as being tied to individual events and instances, to the mere particular, while 
explanation is seen as universal. Megill points to the work of Windelband who, in 
1894, described the dichotomy between the 'nomothetic' sciences concerned with 
general laws, and the 'idiographic' disciplines concerned with paiticular events and 
entities (Megill, 1989, p. 632).
This polai'isation of approaches, and particularly the elevation of the nomothetic 
sciences above the idiographic, has obscured an alternative understanding of the term 
'generalisation' that would go a long way towards resolving many of the seemingly 
intractable disputes over the scientific natuie of histoiy discussed above. This 
understanding of generalisation refers not to imiversal laws applicable across all time 
and space, but to a broad statement applied to a particular historical context:
"In historians' language, the following invented statement counts as a 
generalization: "As a result o f the growth o f towns and trade, feudalism 
gave way to incipient capitalism in late medieval and early modern 
Europe. " The "problem o f generalization, " as historians conceive o f it, is
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usually the problem o f how to get from fragmentary and confusing data to 
such larger assertions. But such assertions are not what the logical 
positivists, or Windelband before them, had in mind when they spoke o f  
general laws. In "nomothetic" science, the desired generalizations 
transcend particular times and places, as in, for instance, this invented 
statement: "Whenever, within a feudal system, towns and trade begin to 
grow, then feudalism gives way to capitalism. "" (Megill, 1989, p. 633)
Following this definition, a generalisation need not be universally applicable to be of 
value to the historian. Adopting this revised understanding of what constitutes a 
generalisation leads to a parting of ways between the historian and the scientist. As 
Kaplan explains, the scientist begins with empirical observations, knowledge about 
what is going on in the world, but is not content with this. Instead, the scientist aims to 
discover what must be true, not shnply what happens to be true at a particular time and 
place, hence the effort to uncover universal laws (Kaplan, 1964, p. 123), The historian 
however, in providing a contextual generalisation, makes no claim to universality -  the 
commonalities between the events they describe need not hold for events occurring 
beyond the temporal or geographical boimdaries that they have drawn. Helmer and 
Rescher nevertheless argue that historical generalisations constitute laws that carried 
counterfactual force and could be applied to other situations (Helmer & Rescher, 1959, 
pp. 27-28). But as Dray points out, it is impossible to test whether these generalisations 
would have held true even for other posited events in the same time and place, let alone 
those outside the original historical context (Dray, 1964, pp. 16-17).
Evans seems to support a contextual understanding of generalisation, arguing that 
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histoiy can in this way identify "patterns, trends and structures ” with "a high degree o f 
plausibility” (Evans, 2000, p. 60). Yet he concedes that histoiy cannot generate 
universal laws with strong predictive power:
"History, in the end, may for the most part he seen as a science in the weak 
sense o f the German term Wissenschaft, an organised body o f Imowledge 
acquired through research carried out according to generally agi^eed 
methods, presented in published reports, and subject to peer review. It is 
not a science in the strong sense that it can frame general laws or predict 
the future. " (Evans, 2000, p. 73)
Indeed, Wissenschaft is precisely the term Windelband used to described his two 
categories of enquiry, the nomothetic and the idiographic. The description was intended 
to mark these approaches as equals. It was only later, as the logical positivists restricted 
the use of the term 'science' to the nomothetic pursuits, that the 'prejudice for 
universality' led to the nomothetic being elevated in status above the idiographic, a bias 
which significantly influenced -  and still holds sway over -  the historical discipline 
(Megill, 1989, pp. 632, 636).
So, while historians may not seek to derive imiversal laws from the observation of past 
events, they nevertheless deal with contextual generalisations, ones which are intended 
to help malce sense of a paiticular period or process without claiming to explain events 
beyond that. So long as these generalisations are understood in this way, they may be a 
useful and constructive pai't of the 'craft' of history. Similarly, causality -  even if it may 
not be dealt with in a 'schematic' way -  can be a part of the sense-malcing approach
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undertaken by practitioners of this craft. No discussion of causality would be complete 
though, without dealing with the question of agency.
4.3.3 The role of the individual in history
Of particular interest in this research on lifestyles and environmental behavioui*, is the 
historians' discussion on the role of the individual in causal explanations. Evans quotes 
Roberts who calls for a "human action approach” in which the freedom of the 
individual is central and where historical events are reconstructed from the actors' point 
of view (Evans, 2000, p. 137). But Evans criticises this position arguing that historians 
generally do not assume that individuals have 'unfettered freedom' to act. Indeed, at the 
opposite end of the spectrum historians such as Carr discussed causation in a way that 
has been described as determinist, where historical events are typically brought about by 
external factors independent of the will of the actor(s) involved (Evans, 2000, p. 138). 
But this position too has been attacked, accused of having "trapped human beings... in 
an inescapable net o f causation and robbed them offreedom o f action in the present” 
(Evans, 2000, p. 138, smnmarising Wliite, 1966).
It was Tolstoy who wi'ote:
"As the sun and each atom in the ether is a sphere complete in itself, and yet 
at the same time only a part o f a whole too immense for man to 
comprehend, so each individual bears within himself his own aims and yet 
bears them to serve a general purpose incomprehensible to man. " (Tolstoy,
1997, p. 1255).
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Some might read the claim that humans exist to serve a general purpose as being 
essentially a religious statement, but even those who do not share such beliefs might 
appreciate the notion of purpose here in a biological context as one geared towards 
reproduction and sui'vival of the species and/or in a social context as part of some 
collective geai*ed towards a 'greater good'. So, if individuals have some capacity for 
conscious self-determination, but are at the behest of external forces and constraints and 
crucially, are also biological beings driven by internal forces, then the interplay between 
individual agency and those internal and external forces must be explored.
Causal analysis of human behavioiu* is of course qualitatively different from that of 
inanimate objects. Humans have "internal response mechanisms that mediate between 
external stimuli and resulting overt action” (McClelland, 1975, p. 66). For McClelland, 
the historian begins with an action committed by an individual, and seeks to uncover the 
cause(s). While this will involve consideration of external factors, it also requires 
hypotheses concerning humans' internal dispositions (McClelland, 1975, pp. 67-68). 
Similarly, Collingwood believed that while natural events may be explained from the 
outside, historical events have an inside or thought-side, thus their explanation requires 
that the thoughts of the actor be discovered (Dray, 1964, p. 11). To this end, 
Collingwood espoused the doctiine of 're-enactmenf, wherein the historian tiies to 'get 
inside the head' of the historical character in order to assess the opportunities and 
challenges surrounding them at the time of the action, thus leading to an understanding 
of the actor's behaviour. For Collingwood, whereas a scientist aiming to explain a 
natural event attempts to demonstrate its inevitability, the historian exploring human 
action instead tries to reveal its point or rationale (Dray, 1964, p. 12). Vaiious criticisms
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have been directed at this approach though. As Evans put it: “Getting inside the head 
o f someone who buried treasure in a grave in the fourth century, or made a newsreel in 
the twentieth, is far from easy” (Evans, 2000, p. 92). In other words, the lack of 
relevant artefacts and documents renders re-enactment impossible in many cases. 
Another criticism concerns the assumption of 'rational behaviour' on the part of the 
actor. For Dray, humans commit not only conscious, rational acts, but also sub­
conscious, irrational ones, or even rational acts but towards foolish ends (Dray, 1964, 
pp. 12-13). A third criticism comes from the positivist tiudition, arguing that the 
doctrine of re-enactment is merely a methodological tool or 'heuristic device' for 
deriving psychological hypotheses (Hempel, 1942, p. 44). Those hypotheses are in turn 
dependent on universal laws of the form: “a rational agent, when in a situation o f kind 
C, will invariably (or with high probability) do X ” (Dray, 1964, p. 14). Thus, while 
Collingwood asserts that the explanation of human action is fundamentally different 
from the scientist's explanation of natuial events, Hempel wishes to show that the 
former, while employing the tool of ’empathetic understanding', nevertheless involves 
recoiu'se to universal laws if it is indeed to explain anything.
Whether supporting Collingwood's account of human action informed by an empathetic 
approach, or Hempel's call for an account based on psychological laws, it is clear that 
explaining human action in history is problematic. For the former approach, this is due 
to the subjective natuie of one historian in a different place and time attempting to 
recreate in their mind the conditions and thought processes of an historical chaiucter. 
For the latter approach, the problem is rather due to the difficulty in identifying suitably 
robust psychological 'laws' to account for different types of human behaviour. As Evans 
explains, in either case, a lack of relevant infoiination in the form of documents and
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aitefacts leaves most human actions -  let alone their causes -  all but inaccessible to the 
historian (Evans, 2000, p. 92).
Still, both approaches share one important thing in common: a distinction is drawn 
between external conditions and internal response mechanisms. That those mechanisms 
are described by some as being characterised by freedom of choice, and by others in a 
more deterministic manner, does not preclude a role for the psychological and 
sociological disciplines in accounting for human actions. In the next section, the 
contribution of these disciplines in accounting for consumer behaviour will be 
discussed, but first a smmnaiy is provided of the key lessons to be drawn from this 
review of the epistemology of historical explanations.
4.3.4 Lessons for qualitative scenario narratives
This review of thinking within the historical discipline has attempted to elucidate a 
range of views on a number of topics of interest to futures thinking. Firstly, the notion 
of history-as-science tliroughout the ages has been addressed. It seems clear that 
historians' views on this have been significantly influenced by developments in the 
philosophy of science. From a relatively sti'ong view of the objectivity and scientific 
natuie of their discipline in the late nineteenth century, historians experienced a crisis of 
confidence in the wake of the First World War when proponents on different sides of 
that conflict produced works heavily biased in their favour. The resiugence of history- 
as-science coincided in the 1950s with the emergence of Popper's ideas on falsification 
in science. In history this led to the emergence of more statistical approaches to the 
reading of historical data. Meanwhile though, it was clear that a pmely statistical 
approach was of limited use in the historical discipline. History consists also of 
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individual people and events which would always resist homogenisation into general 
trends.
That process of homogenisation, problematic enough at times for the sciences, can 
prove intractable for historians given the complexity of their subject matter. Thus, the 
strong generalisation of causes and events into universal laws as in the sciences cannot 
be duplicated in history. Instead a more localised approach to describing groups of 
events must suffice, in the form of contextual generalisations aimed at drawing out 
patterns within a particular time and place. The notion that such contextual 
generalisations carmot admit of predictive power, nor even claim to be exhaustively 
applicable within the time and place of interest, may invite criticism of their 
contribution to knowledge. When history is regarded as an idiographic discipline 
however, concerned with describing particular events for their own sake, such modest 
generalisations may be seen as usefril sense-making devices, rather than scientific 
hypotheses. But history-as-craft nevertheless requires that the documents and artefacts 
that represent the starting point of enquiry be methodically investigated, following 
sound scientific procedures, before these can be counted as evidence. In this way, as 
Trevelyan argued, history begins with scientific research, and only then proceeds to 
speculative interpretation and literary presentation (Evans, 2000, p. 25).
In the end, history might best be viewed -  as in the eyes of Windelband, Megill and 
Evans — as a form of Wissenschaft^ “an organised body o f knowledge acquired through 
research carried out according to generally agreed methods, presented in published 
reports, and subject to peer review” (Evans, 2000, p. 73). If the desire for a more 
scientific view of the discipline has preoccupied many historians over the past century
88
or so, this might be understood as a consequence of the logical positivist inspired 
elevation of the nomothetic over the idiographic disciplines, and the appropriation of the 
term 'science' for the nomothetic disciplines only. At the other extreme, for those 
commentators who wish to take a postmodernist approach to understanding history, 
Benson and Stangroom remind us that:
“history is not the same thing as wishful-history The word 'history' itself 
derives from the Greek 'historein' which means both 'research' and 
'enquiry'... History is highly interpretive, to be sure, but it is always, when 
done properly, grounded in evidence. The questions are empirical ones, and 
the interpretation is o f evidence, not o f daydreams or fantasies. ” (Benson & 
Stangroom, 2006, pp. 122-123)
In turning attention back to the future, it might be said that futures studies are similaiiy 
a kind of'craft', rather than a science. Indeed, according to Heijden:
“Scenario planning is a practitioner's art. Its origins are in the real world 
o f management, it is therefore more a craft than a science. Over the years a 
number o f general principles have emerged but most o f the rules o f 
implementation evolve from day-to-day practice. ” (Heijden, 1996, p. 133)
A problem remains though, even for this soft defence of futures-thinking-as-craft. 
Whereas history begins with the scientific analysis of documents and artefacts before 
proceeding to the interpretive and literary stages, it is very often the outcomes of these
speculative stages that futures tliinking has as its own starting point. In other words, the 
'documents and artefacts' employed in futui'es thinking include the very generalisations, 
trends and causal explanations that historians would consider to be purely speculative. 
In other cases though, the trends in question are claimed by their proponents to have a 
more reliable, scientific quality to them, including in the case of quantitative trends 
identified in historical economic data.
Thus, it is necessary to conduct a discussion of the epistemological issues in economics, 
as these relate to the modelling of consumer behaviom*.
4.4 Epistemology in economics and consumer behaviour
In a discussion of epistemology in economics, an important distinction to begin with is 
that of monism vs pluralism in economic enquiry. Before this distinction can be drawn 
out, some clarification of terms is required, given that monism and pluralism - and 
indeed methodology - are used in different ways in the literature. It should be obvious 
enough that monism and pluralism refer to 'one' and 'many' respectively, but these are 
applied at various levels of the discussion, and so for clarity, in this chapter: 
'epistemological monism' refers to the view that tliere ought to be unity across the 
sciences in terms of what qualifies as knowledge, wliile 'epistemological plui'alism' 
implies that different standards may be deemed appropriate for different scientific 
disciplines; 'methodological monism' here is the view that, withm economics, there is 
one school of thought best equipt to address questions of an economic natuie, while 
'methodological pluralism' allows that different economic schools may have 
complementary insights to offer according to their different stiengtlis (Blaug, 1992, p. 
42, Dow, 2008).
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Proponents of the neoclassical school might assert its dominance over heterodox 
schools in the form of methodological monism, although in principle there is no reason 
why a neoclassicist should not consider other schools of thought to be more appropriate 
in addressing some aspects of economics. Proponents of other schools, however 
marginalised, might still adopt a methodological monist position, insisting that their 
school is in fact the most appropriate lens through which to examine economic issues, 
while others may adopt a pluralist approach. Whether any of these proponents would 
argue that economic theories in general should be judged by the same standards as the 
physical sciences, adopting epistemological monism, will depend veiy much on the |
methods of enquiry within their par ticular" school.
This is intimately linked to the question of whether economics is more a 'nomothetic'
discipline, aimed at deriving general laws, or an 'idiographic' discipline focused instead
on describing individual actions and events. It seems clear that the neoclassical school
which dominates modern economics is best characterised as seeking general laws, or at
the very least law-like statements applicable across time and space, and does not limit I
itself to descriptions of individual phenomena. I
To give a sense of how modern economics came to be shaped this way, a brief selected 
history of economic enquiry is provided below.
4.4.1 Theory in the history of economics
Wlratever their contributions to economic thought, many of the early economists failed 
to address issues of methodology directly (Blaug, 1992, p. 51). Thus, the works of 
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Adam Smith, David Ricai'do and Thomas Malthas offer no explicit treatment of their 
philosophical approach to economic theorising. Instead, Blaug points to other figures 
including Nassau William Senior and John Stuart Mill as the classical economists who 
did the most to develop the methodology of the young discipline (Blaug, 1992, pp. 51- 
52).
Early economic metliodology followed a process of deductive reasoning: a theory 
consisted of certain premises, stmctured according to the rules of logic, which led to 
certain implications. But the classical economists were wary of the notion that the 
implications of economic theory ought to provide predictive power. Rather, the ability 
of a theory to predict was seen as an indication of its applicability in a given context, not 
of its validity in general. Consequently, where the implications of a theory did not 
match real world experience, this was due to 'disturbing causes' which, rather than 
invalidating the theory, merely indicated that the theory was not applicable in that 
particular instance (Blaug, 1992, p. 51). The validity of a theory was instead 
determined by the appropriateness of the premises, the assumptions about economic 
behaviour upon which the theory was built, and so it was here that the early 
methodologists focused their efforts.
The premises of economic theoiy were said to consist of a priori facts, know to be true 
independent of experience. For Senior, these premises are "the result o f observation, or 
consciousness, and scarcely requiring proof, or even formal statement, which almost 
every man, as soon as he hears them, admits as familiar to his thoughts" (Senior, 1836, 
p. 129). Chief among these a priori facts was the principle of rationality, or utility- 
maximisation, i.e. the observation, in Senior's words, that: "every person desires to
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maximise wealth with as little sacrifice as possible" (Senior, 1836, p. 129).
In his own work elaborating on the concept of rationality. Mill was keen to emphasise 
that this concept was only an abstraction, which perhaps explains why Mill and his 
contemporaries were less concerned with prediction: if ti'ue premises are required to 
ensui'e true conclusions, then untrue premises (including absti'actions such as utility- 
maximisation) necessarily produce wrong conclusions (Blaug, 1992, pp. 55-56).
The methodological approach espoused by Senior, Mill and their contemporaries was 
endorsed as late as 1932 by Lionel Robbins. For Robbins, there are a priori economic 
truths, general laws, that form the basis of economic theory, and though it may be 
necessary to supplement these general laws with details about the context in which we 
wish to apply them, the laws themselves are never reducible to contextual details 
(Robbins, 1932, p. 80).
This view of economic laws as a priori truths, or in Robbins' words "the stuff o f our 
everyday experience"(fijdhhms, 1932, p. 80), came under increasing pressuie coinciding 
with the emergence of logical positivism in the sciences generally. In 1947, Paul 
Samuelson, stated one of the central aims of economics as being to derive "meaningful 
theorems" by which he meant "a hypothesis about empirical data which could 
conceivably be refuted i f  only under ideal conditions" (Samuelson, 1947, p. 4). And so, 
despite the lack of any explicit reference to Popper, Samuelson set out to apply 
falsificationism to economic theory.
But no sooner had Samuelson expressed this intention than Milton Friedman, in his
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1953 essay on economic methodology, dismissed the very idea that economic theorists 
should proceed by testing assmnptions (Friedman, 1953). Friedman argued that the 
validity of a theory does not rest on the conformity of its assumptions with the facts, 
indeed: "to be important... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions” 
(Friedman, 1953, p. 14). Instead, he argued, the validity of a theory depends solely on 
whether it delivers acciuate predictions, an approach known as instrumentalism. Thus, 
in Friedman, we have a methodological attitude to the validation of economic theories 
that is diametrically opposed to the eai'ly classical economists such as Mill.
Friedman's essay has been criticised for lacking a proper treatment of the different kinds 
of assumptions that may be used in economic theories, i.e. assumptions about: 
motivations, behaviour*, functional relationships, boundai*y conditions etc (Blaug, 1992, 
p. 94). Blaug provides further criticism of Friedman's approach, suggesting that without 
"an underlying structure o f assumptions", there is nothing that can be adjusted and 
improved if the theory initially fails in its predictions: "It is for this reason that 
scientists usually do worry when the assumptions o f their theories are blatantly 
unrealistic" (B\di\xg, 1992, p. 99).
According to Blaug (1992, p. 110), despite the array of methodological criticisms it 
encountered, Friedman's essay never*therless persuaded a generation of economists that 
theories were ultimately to be judged according to the accuracy of their predictions and 
that the alternative approach focussing on testing of assumptions was "fundamentally 
wrong" (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). Summarising, Blaug says:
"The prevailing methodological mood is not only highly protective o f
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received economic theory, it is also ultrapermissive within the limits o f the 
"rules o f the game": almost any model will do provided it is rigorously 
formulated, elegantly constructed, and promising o f potential relevance o f 
real-world situations... Modern economists frequently preach 
falsificationism... hut they rarely practice it" (Blaug, 1992, p. 111).
4.4.2 Rational choice
One of the core assumptions of mainstream economics in relation to consumer 
behaviour that might be considered 'unrealistic' is that of utility-maximisation, or 
rational choice, outlined above. According to rational choice theory, human behaviour 
can be characterised as the result of self-interested individuals making calculated 
decisions on the basis of their preferences. In any decision making process, the 
individual assesses the expected benefits and costs of the various options, and chooses 
the option which will maximise their gains while minimising their losses. The theory of 
consumer preferences draws on the assumptions of rational choice to explain how a 
consumer with particular tastes and preferences, faced with a given level of income and 
a particular range of goods (at particular* prices), will choose from those goods in such a 
way as to maximise their expected utility (Jackson, 2005, p. 30).
Jackson (2005) makes some observations about rational choice theory as it relates to 
consumer preferences. Firstly, in the world of rational decision making, information 
(e.g. on available goods and their prices) is key to consumer behaviour. Rational 
choices are said to be possible only where perfect information is available on market 
conditions. Secondly, consumer tastes and preferences are exogenous to the model.
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There is no exploration of the forces, internal or external, underlying them.
It should be self-evident that these problems impose serious limitations on the 'realism' 
of rational choice theory. Perfect information "would seem to be a rare attribute of real 
world decision making processes, while satisfying (and verifying) this condition for the 
pui'poses of empirical work would be problematic to say the least. Many leading 
economists now emphasise the centi'ality of information asymmetry in making sense of 
economic outcomes (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Nobel Foundation, 2001). 
That consumer tastes and preferences ar e treated as exogenous to the model also limits 
opportunities for those seeking to intervene and influence consumer behaviour. Without 
any exploration of how tastes and preferences are formed and how they may be re­
formed, the rational choice model would seem to offer only two points of intervention: 
through the provision of information (where that information has a bearing on the 
expected benefits and costs of particular choices) and by changing those benefits and 
costs directly, e.g. through taxes or subsidies (Jackson, 2005, p. 31).
4,4.3 Core criticisms of rational choice
Jackson (2005) characterises criticisms of rational choice tlieoiy as tending to focus on 
three main assumptions of the model: rationality, individualism, and self-interest. Each 
set of criticisms will be explored here in turn.
For Simon (1957), in real life situations, obtaining infoimation for decision making not 
only imposes a time cost but is often hampered by uncertainties regarding future 
outcomes. For this reason, he argued for a model of 'bounded rationality' in which, 
rather than reviewing all information to obtain the optimal outcome, individuals instead 
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malce do with a satisfactory outcome that meets a minimum level of utility (Jackson, 
2005, pp. 35-36, Shnon, 1957). The bounded rationality model points to the use of 
heuristics for decision making, which needn't contiadict rational choice per se, 
especially if such heuristics are viewed as devices for saving time, or in economic 
terms, reducing transaction costs. However, unconscious or habitual behaviour would 
seem to contiadict rational choice in cases where it acts as a substantial impediment to 
(a consciously preferred) behaviour* change.
Further criticisms along these lines point to the significant role played by emotions in 
decision making. Again, allowing for* an affective component in decision making 
needn't contradict rational choice if the satisfaction of emotional needs were treated as 
simply another aspect of utility. Things get more complicated though, when cognitive 
processes are seen as being fundamentally driven and shaped by emotions, which are 
themselves triggered by physiological factors. In this view, “reason itself [is] a 
construct o f our emotional responses to situations” (Jackson, 2005, p. 37). Not all 
criticisms of rational choice theory tr*eat emotion in this way. Nevertheless, rational 
choice theory lacks any explicit tr eatment of its own with regards to affective aspects of 
behaviom*.
The next set of criticisms Jackson describes ar e those focused on the assumption that the 
individual is the appropriate unit of analysis in die study of behaviour. This 
'methodological individualism', epitomised in rational choice theory, is to be found more 
widely embedded in the Western society and economy (Jackson, 2005, p. 38). Seen 
thr'ough this lense, social behaviour is understood as an 'emergent property' of the many 
behaviours performed at the individual level. Early criticisms of individualism drew
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upon the notion of the self as par tly socially constructed:
“At the very least, according to social psychology, the relationship between 
self and other must be regarded as dualistic. Though the concept o f an 
individual ‘se lf’ capable o f engaging with others and thereby influencing 
the nature and structure o f social conversations is at one level coherent, it 
depends for its existence and its development on social interaction, on the 
social conversations that it also plays a part in perpetuating. ” (Jackson, 
2005, p. 38)
Other critics point to the organisational or collective manner in which decision making 
is often canied out in practice. In addition to the overt negotiations, compromises and 
settlements that are often dictated by procedural constraints, organisational psychology 
indicates that individuals often adopt 'social roles' that relate strongly to the group 
setting. Nor are individuals alone in adopting social roles. The behaviour of the group 
itself can often be determined by its identity in the wider social setting (Jackson, 2005, 
p. 38,Tajfel, 1982).
Another criticism of individualism is a more general attempt within sociology to resist a 
reductionist approach to tire understanding of social structures. For sociologists, there 
are simply too many factors relating to social structures that fail to corxespond to the 
self-interest of individuals. This has led to the development of alternative accoimts of 
social action wherein the structur es themselves, rather than the individual, are treated as 
the main unit of analysis. Far from resolving the situation though, the sociological 
approach has been accused by some of going too far in its response to individualism,
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leading to an ongoing debate in the literature. Nevertheless, Jackson (2005, p. 39) 
concludes that there is a sufficiently strong case to be made against rational choice 
theory in terms of its persistent 'imdersocialisation' of human behaviour.
The third and final strand of criticism relates to the tr eatment of the individual as purely 
self-interested. One aspect of this criticism echoes the claim of sociologists described 
above: that individualism fails to account for the influence of social stnictur'es. Instead, 
these critics would argue, our sense of 'self emerges within these structures and we are 
effectively bound by them; or else, as individuals with agency, we nevertheless 
recognise that the good of society as a whole cannot be met through having all its 
members act out of self-interest. In the former case, individuals lack the power to act 
independently of social structur*es; in the latter case, we consciously sacrifice our* self- 
interest for the good of society.
Rational choice theorists may seek to account for altruistic behaviour by widening their 
notion of self-interest, i.e. where individuals act to secure the best interests of the 
family/tribe/species as a whole. Alternatively, seemingly altr'uistic behaviour may be 
put down to a simple 'feel good' factor, or the expectation that such behaviour* will be 
reciprocated. But critics insist this is a move too far from the individual self-interest 
implied by the theor*y. Instead of developing the theory in a way that may provide scope 
for* further* investigation, these responses simply redefine self-interest so broadly that, in 
the end, the theory lacks all explanatory power.
Criticisms of rational choice theory come not only from other academic disciplines, 
such as psychology or sociology, but also from alternative schools of thought within
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economics itself. Thus, while rational choice may be considered a hallmark of 
mainsti'eam (i.e. neoclassical) economics, the theory receives substantial criticism from 
more heterodox economics schools, such as institutional, behavioural and ecological 
economics (Hodgson, 2000, Wilkinsorr, 2008, Faber et al., 2002). A thorough treatment 
of these heterodox schools is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, these schools 
ar*e highlighted here to make clear that the criticism of rational choice is not a criticism 
of economics per se.
4.4.4 Rationality revisited
To assess the prospect of reconciliation between proponents and critics of rational 
choice, or to be able to proceed with meaningful enquiry into consumer behaviour- 
regardless, the historical development of the concept must be revisited.
Senior was quoted earlier, outlining the core principle of rationality: "every person 
desires to maximise wealth with as little sacrifice as possible" (Senior, 1836, p. 129). 
Mill subsequently elaborated on the concept, insisting that this supposition should be 
tr eated as a mere abstr action, but one that was necessary for the science of political 
economy: "Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that 
mankind are really thus constituted, but... this is the mode in which science must 
necessarily proceed" (Mill quoted in Blaug 1992, p.55).
Furthermore, Mill was adamant that there are many aspects of human conduct where 
"wealth is not even the principle object” and to which economics does not apply (Mill 
quoted in Blaug, 1992, p. 55). Instead, Mill argues that economics applies only to those 
areas of human conduct where the accumulation of wealth is the main objective, and 
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must proceed by treating this main objective as if it were the sole objective, in order to 
arrive at an approximation of reality. Crucially though, that approximation must be 
adjusted to take account of non-economic impulses. Mill delivers a clear statement of 
the necessity of such accommodation;
"So far as it is Imow, or may be presumed, that the conduct o f mankind in 
the pursuit o f wealth is under the collateral influence o f any other o f the 
properties o f our nature that the desire o f obtaining the greatest quantity o f 
wealth with the least labour and self-denial, the conclusions o f Political 
Economy will so far fail o f being applicable to the explanation ofprediction 
o f real events, until these are modified by a correct allowance for the degree 
o f influence exercised by the other cause" (Mill quoted in Blaug, 1992, pp. 
55-56)
Despite Mill's clarity in describing rational behaviour as an abstraction and his call for 
coixections to be made for other effects, the concept of Homo economicus was bom in 
response to his work, and tlie view that economic man could be used directly as a basis 
of economic tlieory would gradually take hold (Blaug, 1992, p. 74).
Although rational choice has come to dominate modern economics as an approximation 
of actual human behaviour, as opposed to a mere abstraction of certain aspects of it. 
Mill's writing makes it clear that the consideration of non-economic factors is embedded 
in the heritage, at least, of modem economic theory. Thus, any attempt to incorporate 
non-economic factors into models of consumer behaviour should not be seen as an 
attack on the discipline of economics, but rather as an attempt to provide the kind of
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correction advocated by one of the fathers of the discipline. Of course, if it can be 
shown that the principle of rationality can fully account for consumer behavioui*, then 
there would be no need for such corrections, and the instiumentalism of Friedman - 
which disregai'ds the 'realism' of assumptions - may be seen as a sufficient 
methodological approach. Where the principle of rationality fails to account fully for 
consumer behavioui' however, greater consideration for the "underlying sti'ucture o f 
assumptions" will be necessary if adjustments ai*e to be made in an informed and 
systematic way (Blaug, 1992, p. 99).
4.4.5 Accounting for non-economic factors
In the context of the current research, this problem of adjustment and correction around 
the core principle of rationality can be articulated in the following way: to what extent 
can economic factors account for expenditure patterns of UK households, and to what 
extent do non-economic factors play a role? The quantitative component of this 
research employs a model that has attempted to address this very question in an analysis 
of the historical data (Chitnis & Himt, 2009, 2010). ELESA (Econometiic Lifestyle 
Environmental Scenario Analysis) employs a number of econometrically estimated 
equations across 16 categories of goods and services to determine the impact of changes 
in income, price and exogenous non-economic factors (ExNEF) on changes in 
expenditure. The relative importance of these thiee factors differs between categories, 
however the equations estimate that for some categories, e.g. 'recreation and culture', or 
'communications’, tire economic factors of income and price can explain only a fraction 
of the observed changes in expenditure, with the majority of the change attributed to 
non-economic factors. In other categories, die relative importance of different factors 
was more evenly mixed, but importantly, non-economic factors made some contribution 
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in driving changes in expenditure in all categories (Chitnis & Hunt, 2010).
More will be said in Chapter 5 about how this model operates and how it has been used 
to derive illusti'ative figures for UK household expenditure. Clearly though, for UK 
household expenditure, the principle of rationality alone is not sufficient to fully explain 
the observed data. Thus, even though an improved economic theory is beyond the 
scope of this research, it is clear that any such theory will require consideration of non­
economic factors as explored here.
4.4.6 Lessons for Quantification
The earlier review of theory in the history of economics suggests a move away from the 
early economists' focus on assumptions alone, towards an exclusive focus on 
predictions in the latter half of the twentieth-century. In that context, the importance of 
the 'realism' of assumptions has been downplayed. Instead, instrumentalists regarded it 
as sufficient, even desirable, to rely on overly simplistic assumptions and to focus 
instead on testing tlie predictions of theories against empirical data. However, this lack 
of an underlying str'uctme of assumptions complicates the process of refining and 
improving theories in light of predictions that fail. Thus, in tlie case of consumer 
behaviour, where the principle of rationality is employed as one such 'umealistic' 
assumption, an instrumentalist approach leaves the theorist str-anded when the observed 
data cannot be explained in terms of rational choice alone.
In this research, a model is employed that highlights tlie role of non-economic factors in 
driving changes in UK household expenditure. Although no alternative economic 
tlieory is proposed here, a number of criticisms of rational choice theory have been 
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explored above, indicating a possible route forward in more accurately accounting for 
consumer behaviour. Importantly, it is argued that any attempt to improve upon the 
principle of rational behaviour' should not be seen as an attack on the discipline of 
economics. Rather, it should be treated as a return to the requirements of John Stuart 
Mill, one of the originators of the principle of rationality and of the discipline of 
economics itself, who made an early case for the need to adjust and correct for non­
economic factors.
In the next chapter, the methodology adopted in this research is explored in detail.
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5. Methodology
As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on scenario planning reveals a multitude of 
methodologies under the broad heading of the intuitive logics approach. Bradfield et al. 
explain that each variation identifies “a number o f discrete steps, varying from five to 
15 or more, depending on what features o f scenarios are highlighted or ignored. ” 
(Bradfield et a l, 2005).
Given the objective of developing descriptive scenaiios, it was decided that the key 
stages and outcomes of this research should be reviewed by a panel of experts, to ensui'e 
that those outcomes avoid being skewed by the subjective values of a sole scenario 
developer. Thioughout the reseai'ch, this panel would be called upon to bring a variety 
of perspectives to bear on any key decisions, ensuring that those decisions were subject 
to close scrutiny and conscious reflection, and that outcomes were consistent with the 
data gathered. The scenaiio panel was therefore appointed prior to conducting the 
initial interviews, and consisted of this author and four members of RESOLVE: 
Professor Lester Hunt, Professor Tim Jackson, Dr Yacob Mulugetta and Dr Michael 
Peters.
As a first step towards developing a methodology for this study, a brief outline of 
proposed stages was developed. This outline was then sent to two individuals with 
different scenario-related expertise who had agreed to provide critical feedback. The 
first of these was Ron Bradfield at Strathclyde Business School. Bradfield is a leading 
practitioner in the scénario planning field, the author of several joui’iial papers on the 
history and successfiil uses of the scenario technique, and coauthor - with Kees van der 
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Heidjen and others - of 'The Sixth Sense: accelerating organizational learning with 
scenarios' (Heijden et a l, 2002). The second expert was Nick Hughes at King's College 
London. Hughes also has experience as a scenario practitioner, but perhaps more 
importantly for present pui'poses he conducted the critique of low carbon scenarios 
discussed in Chapter 3.
5.1 Feedback on proposed methodology
The original email sent to these experts can be found in Appendix L Proposed 
Methodology. In response to this email, Bradfield was generally supportive of the broad 
approach outlined. He suggested that in addition to consulting 'experts' it may be worth 
consulting groups of young people or students to ensure a more varied set of 
contr ibutions. Bradfield also highlighted the work of Philip Tetlock, whose research has 
questioned the role that experts can usefully play in forecasting work. Tetlock found 
that although experts tend to be more confident in tlieir predictions than lay people, they 
ai'e generally no more accurate, and in any case they are less accurate than simple 
computer model extrapolations. Bradfield also emphasised that scenarios are not a 
science, radier they are an art and a craft and as such the particular approach or 
'methodology' that should be followed will depend on particular aspects of the research 
at hand. “There are it has been said, as many processes are there are practitioners ” 
(personal conespondence, Bradfield, 2009).
Hughes offered similar encouragement and delved a bit more into the methodology. He 
commented that the vai'ious categories of external factors identified (social, 
technological etc) are of course dynamically integrated to one another, and suggested
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thinking about how to reintegrate these having previously delineated them for the 
interview stage. Hughes's most substantial point focused on the extensive use of 
external experts and the multiple rounds of assessment involving RESOLVE members 
and a scenario panel. Here he plays devil's advocate:
"In terms o f how you are getting your data, the raw materials from which 
you are going to build scenarios- you are getting it from a mix o f people. 
From 'experts' in particular areas (who as you say won't be experts in other 
areas). Some o f these may have a relatively 'neutral' view o f their area, 
some may have preference for how things should evolve. Then you are going 
to put the responses in front o f a panel o f your colleagues who you hope are 
going to be reasonably well informed across the board but able to remain 
impartial, and you are going to use them to identify some key variables, 
then you are going to use a smaller group to develop some 'pathways' and 
then flesh out the narratives yourself.
"I suppose my general question is whether you need all o f these processes, 
what added value are you gaining from getting all these different peoples' 
inputs- are they finally going to boil down to a few key trends or variables? 
how different would it have been i f  you had Just thought up the variables 
yourself, intuitively (apart from the sense o f having 'validated' variables)?
"I think the process o f interviews and consultation are most obviously 
relevant for company-based scenarios, here you are asking a bunch o f 
people who all have the shared interest o f working for the same company, 
how it should evolve and what the key threats are. the process o f making
107
scenarios about broad societal changes is more complicated, you can't talk 
to the whole o f society, even i f  you select some experts and ask them so 
speak around broad areas like 'consumption' you risk being overwhelmed 
with data, you will end up hoovering these up into a few separate bags to 
give you broad themes- but as i provocatively suggested these might not be 
much more enlightening than if  you had just thought up the themes 
yourself" (personal correspondence, Hughes, 2009)
One point raised here by Hughes relates to an ongoing concern in this study: the 
predominance of organisation-based scenarios in the literature, and the subsequent 
difficulty in identifying a suitable methodology for developing scenarios in any context 
other than this. While the approach set out above would certainly ensure useful input 
was gathered fi'om experts, Hughes was keen to suggest that the present study shouldn't 
necessarily follow the steps outlined in the organisationally focused scenario literature, 
if another process would be more suitable here. Through subsequent correspondence, 
Hughes was keen to highlight that he wasn't necessarily advocating scrapping the 
approach outlined above, but rather was encouraging conscious reflection on whether 
this approach was being adopted for the right reasons.
These comments from Bradfield and Hughes provided a useful stimulus for subsequent 
reflection on the proposed methodology, and led to a substantial rethink on how to 
ensure tlie most effective use of tlie time and resoiuces available.
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5.2 Revised methodology
In line with both Bradfield and Hughes' comments about the role of experts, it was 
important to call into question the value of conducting 20 expert interviews simply to 
draw out the key tiends and issues of interest. This exercise would certainly have 
helped in building credibility and legitimacy for the scenarios, thus some level of 
external consultation would need to be retained. However, it was decided that the initial 
scanning exercise could just as effectively be conducted with members of RESOLVE, 
who are themselves experts in various fields. This would involve a much less onerous 
round of interviews, given the ease of access to interviewees, and the basic preparations 
already made on the interview protocol would remain valid.
This initial round of internal interviews would be followed by analysis of the key 
themes, drivers and uncertainties, which would be summarised into a draft 'scenario 
fr amework' report for review by the scenario panel.
Following agreement among the scenario panel on a provisional scenario framework, 
this framework would then provide the basis for a series of external interviews, in which 
a range of expert would be invited to critique the provisional fr amework and offer their 
thoughts on the key factors of interest to the study.
After analysing the data fr om the external interviews, a series of 'narxative outlines' 
would be developed, synthesising the key contributions of the external and internal 
interviewees into a set of cohesive and plausible list of developments. These outlines 
would subsequently be revised and expanded into nmxative form.
109
Finally, the econometric model developed by Chitnis & Himt (2009) would be used to 
produce illustrative forecasts of expenditure and emissions for each scenario.
This revised methodology reverses the order in which internal and external experts 
would be engaged in this work. With this new approach, the key themes and even a 
provisional framework would all be prepared prior to consulting externally. This would 
ensure the most effective use of the limited time available with experts. It might be 
remarked that the prior identification of two key tr*ends by a scenario panel internal to 
the research group seems premature given the subsequent opportunity for external 
experts to contribute more of their own. An alternative approach would be to conduct 
the internal and external interviews in the same phase, before clustering these into one 
collection of insights for the scenario panel to review and select from. The approach 
taken here is justified on three grounds:
• The research group are recognised experts on issues around lifestyle and 
enviromnental behaviour. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that those 
individuals can provide important insight into the issues and tr’ends of interest to 
the study.
• The scenarios will be built in a way that requires close collaboration across the 
research str*ands in the group, and will be published under the auspices of the 
group as a whole. Therefore, it is imperative that the building of the scenarios 
follows a direction which is appropriate for the exploration of those issues felt to 
be most significant by the group, thus maintaining support internally.
• The framing of the scenar io spaces prior to consultation with external experts 
allows a more focused approach to be taken at this stage, both in terms of the
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identification of relevant experts as well as in the preparation and conduct of the 
interviews in order for these to offer the greatest insight possible.
Nevertheless, in order to ensui'e flexibility within the methodology and to take full 
advantage of the expertise available, the working fiamework would be subject to the 
scrutiny of these experts duiing the initial part of each interview. In this way, feedback 
on the suitability and usefulness of the working framework would be received in an 
ongoing fashion. Should it become appai'ent that there was a consensus among the 
experts for a modification of the firamework, this could be discussed during a meeting of 
the scenario panel. Either way, as the interviews progress, the scenario framework 
would become increasingly solidified.
The suggestion by Bradfield to conduct workshops with a vaiiety of groups was 
deferred to future work. Wliile engaging with stakeholders is paramoimt if the scenarios 
aie to have an impact on decision making, this is perhaps most applicable in the 
dissemination phase. Since the cuirent study aims to huild the relevant scenarios only, a 
limited round of external engagement at this stage seems sufficient, while any 
subsequent engagement workshops may still be arrange by the reseaich group to ensure 
impact.
In the following sections of this chapter, each stage of the methodology is discussed in 
more detail.
I l l
5.3 Environmental scanning - internai interviews
The initial phase of the scenario building process involved semi-structured interviews 
with members of RESOLVE. The interview protocol is provided in Appendix 11. The 
purpose of this phase was to gather together insights from the different disciplines 
within the research group and begin to identify the broad issues and trends considered to 
be important for the futuie carbon intensity of lifestyles. Interviewees were invited to 
reflect on the social, technological, economic, political, psychological and 
environmental factors (STEPPE) that they believe will drive lifestyle change. They 
were encoinaged to discuss these in terms of the four categories of consumption 
discussed previously: around the home, the food we eat, getting around, and getting 
away.
Describing the interview process, Heijden explains:
“Interviews are as much as possible o f an open-ended nature. This means 
that the interviewer does not arrive with a ready set o f specific questions 
concerning the business. Instead questions are general, and intended to 
trigger a free-flowing conversation, in which the interviewee sets the 
agenda. ” (Heijden, 1996, p. 145)
This open-ended approach ensures that the interviewee is able to bring to the fore those 
issues which they believe to be pertinent to the research, rather than the interviewer 
deciding in advance on a pre-selected range of issues to be discussed. The difficulty 
comes in preparing an interview protocol that encodages the interviewee to focus on
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lifestyles and the relevant external factors, whilst leaving the discussion sufficiently 
open to ensure the issues solicited have not been contaminated by the interviewer's own 
agenda.
The inteiwiew usually begins by allowing the interviewee to explain their background 
and perspective on the ai*ea of interest. This helps to settle the inteiviewee and get the 
discussion flowing before the main pait of the interview begins (Heijden, 1996, pp. 145- 
6). A number of possible tiigger questions are then suggested by Heijden, intended to 
ensm'e the interview flows in the manner described above. The first set of questions are 
intended to imcover the main uncertainties in relation to the business environment under 
consideration, in this case the caibon intensity of UK lifestyles. To begin, the 
interviewee is asked to imagine that they are able to present three questions to a 
clairvoyant (Heijden, 1996, p. 146). The interviewee is invited to elaborate on how they 
would use these thi*ee questions, and to discuss how they would prioritise the various 
issues they might wish to explore, giving due consideration for the uncertainty and 
impact of each.
The light-hearted approach of this initial question eases the atmosphere of the interview 
and helps the interviewee become comfortable in thinking about the futuie (Heijden, 
1996, p. 146). Wlien the interview begins to slow, the next question is raised. This time 
the inteiwiewee is asked to assume the role of the clairvoyant, providing the answers to 
the three questions. Specifically, the interviewee is asked to provide a vision of the 
futuie which turns out favourably. Then, they are asked to consider all three questions 
again but this time within a future which is undesirable. Heijden explains:
11:
“Earlier (page 109) I  argued strongly that the idea o f 'good' and 'had' 
futures in the scenario design stage lead to poor quality scenarios. In most 
circumstances the scenario planner does best to stay away from good and 
bod worlds, instead focusing on what is plausible and internally consistent. 
However, in the elicitation interview the discussion o f good and bad worlds 
tends to be powerful in triggering ideas o f what could be important factors 
to look at, leading to the discovery o f underlying driving forces. ” (Heijden, 
1996, p. 147)
The development of these issues into actual scenarios would be done at a later stage, 
tlius the subjective visions collected in this interviewing phase are used merely as a tool 
for eliciting the issues of interest.
Taking inspiration from some of these ideas, the interview protocol in Appendix II was 
then prepared. The protocol includes an inti'oduction, in which the interviewee was 
reminded of the context of die study and nature of the scenario process. A brief 
overview was then provided of the earlier work in chai*acterising lifestyles, and the four 
consumption categories were explained to the interviewee, along with the various 
categories of external factors. A 'crib sheet' was then provided to the interviewee, 
consisting of the diagram in Figur'e 2.2, portrayed in Chapter 2, with the four 
consumption categories and tire external factors, along with some examples of what 
might fall under each category. The interviewee was encouraged to use this as a prompt 
if they required inspiration, but also cautioned that this was purely an illustrative
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diagram and that they shouldn't feel bound by the categorisation provided therein.
After this introduction, the so-called 'oracle question' was presented, albeit in slightly 
modified form. Interviewees were then given time to reflect and respond, often seeking 
clarification of the categories etc. Only when the answers seemed to slow did the 
interview proceed to the next question, in which the intemewee was invited to express 
their vision of a desirable world. The interviewee was reminded of some of the key 
issues they had previously drawn out, and invited to describe how those might unfold in 
a desirable world. Naturally, this was followed by the question regarding an undesirable 
outcome.
Having explored these desirable and undesirable worlds, the interviewee was then 
invited to consider what developments within the external (STEPPE) factors might lead 
towards the desirable and away from the undesirable world. Finally, they were asked to 
reflect on what challenges and opportunities might lie ahead on these pathways. 
Specifically, the interviewee was asked to consider the challenges and opportunities 
fi.*om the perspective of different actors, including individuals, firms, government and 
NGOs.
5,4 Identification of key uncertainties
Having prepaied the interview protocol, a series of eight internal experts were 
approached and invited to participate. Seven of these were selected from across the 
different stiands within RESOLVE, to gather expert views on social, psychological.
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economic and political factors. With no 'technological' research stiand within 
RESOLVE as such, one further expert was recruited from the wider Centre for 
Environmental Stiategy at the University of SuiTey. Those experts and their main 
academic field (in alphabetical order) were: Kate Burningham, Sociology; Mona 
Chitnis, Economics; Angela Druckman, Economic Modelling; Shane Fudge, Politics 
and Governance; Birgitta Gatersleben, Psychology; Lester Hunt, Economics; Matt 
Leach, Environmental Technology; Michael Peters, Politics and Governance. These 
eight interviews were then conducted over a four week period, with the interviews being 
audio recorded and later transcribed.
Heijden suggests that a typical interview “may produce between 40 and 60 important 
insights” (Heijden, 1996, p. 151). These insights must then be brought out of the 
individual tianscripts and clustered together. The software package NVivo is a 
qualitative analysis tool that allows passages of text or audio to be coded, enabling 
clustering of common themes. Once the transcribed interviews had been loaded into 
NVivo, each one was analysed in turn. Coding tags were initially developed for the foui' 
consumption clusters, the various external factors, and key concepts that had been 
introduced during the interviews such as 'desirable', 'undesirable', 'challenges', 
'opportunities' etc. In this way, any given passage might be coded multiple times to 
captuie e.g. a 'social' development leading to a 'desirable' outcome in relation to the 
'food we eaf.
During the encoding process, new and more specific themes would become appaient. 
New codes were accordingly added in a hierachical fashion, so that 'technological' 
became composed of: 'electricity grid', 'heating', 'energy efficiency and conservation', 
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'decentralisation' etc, until eventually over 50 tags were used in the analysis.
A number of issues were identified as 'key uncertainties' by the interviewees. These 
issues were grouped together, in terms of'scope', i.e. global, national or household level, 
along with possible outcomes for each, to produce the following candidate uncertainties:
Global Factors
o growth (strong/trend/weak/iiil/negative) 
o geopolitical stability (increased/same/decreased)
o international emissions regime (strong/moderate/weak overall target, equitable/inequitable 
shar e of responsibilities, effective/ineffective operation)
o world markets and prices (scarce/abundant energy and mineral resources, high/trend/low 
growth in demand)
o global equity (greater/similar/less disparity between nations)
o technological innovation (rapid/trend/slow rate of innovation)
National Factors
o growth (higli/ti-end/low/nil/negative)
o income distribution (greater/similar/less disparity between households)
o energy security (increased/similai'/decreased security o f supply, increased/similar/decreased 
energy dependence)
o national emissions targets and how these are attempted (strong/moderate/weak overall UK 
target, nature of regulation and policy/financial mechanisms, str ong/weak public and private 
investment)
o electricity grid (centralised/decentralised, increase/stable/reduced demand, extensive/limited 
decarbonisation)
Household/Lifestyle Factors
° Household Income (high/middle/low income)
o Values/Attitudes (more/less pro-environmental values)
o Behaviour/Social Norms (more/less pro-environmental behaviour)
o Socio-demographics (urban/suburban/riiral household etc)
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While it would be possible to rank these issues according to the number of passages in 
which these are discussed, or the word count of those passages, such quantitative 
analysis would provide little insight into the stated significance of the issue for the 
interviewees. Thus, the process of identifying appropriate uncertainties from this list 
necessarily proceeded in a qualitative fashion.
A scenario panel meeting was aiTanged, where the members were provided with the 
complete list of candidate uncertainties above. At the same time, a presentation of 
possible combinations of these uncertainties was delivered, highlighting the possible 
broad scenarios that might result from different pairings on a 2x2 matrix. The criteria 
for the selection of uncertainties were tlueefold: they should each be expected to have a 
significant impact on the carbon intensity of lifestyles; they should each present a 
significant degree of uncertainty; together, the two uncertainties should provide a 
suitable scenario framework in terms of policy relevance.
5.4.1 Inputs and outcomes
Before proceeding with an assessment of the candidate uncertainties, a brief discussion 
of the nature of the variables in this scenario study is required. The various global, 
national and household factors identified earlier might be considered in any set of 
scenarios developed. In some cases, these factors will need to be treated as 'inputs' to 
the scenarios, i.e. factors that will drive change. In other cases, they will be more 
appropriately considered as 'outcomes', i.e. changes driven by the conditions of the 
scenario. In reality, these key factors would operate as both inputs and outcomes, as 
part of a dynamic interplay or co-evolution. Nevertheless, as with any modeling
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process, abstractions must be made if the investigation and communication of the 
system is to be made possible.
Some of the factors may be consistent across all foui* scenarios, if for example UK 
emissions targets had been applied as an exogenous constiaint. Others may vary 
according to one of the uncertainty axes, but not the other. Finally, some of the factors 
may differ in each of the foui* scenarios.
In essence what needs to take place is the selection of four scenarios from a vast series 
of possible configur ations. Assuming, for simplicity's sake, that each of the key factors 
has only two possible values, a set of 14 key factors therefore presents a total of 2*^* or 
16,384 possible configurations. In fact, many of the key factors identified duiing the 
environmental scanning phase contain a myriad of further uncertainties within them. 
Thus, UK electricity production for example, contains within it uncertainties around 
(de)centralisation, demand, and carbon intensity. So too for behaviour change/social 
norms, values/attitudes and so on. The point here is that the number of variables and 
possible outcomes quickly makes the range of possible configurations effectively 
infinite. Clearly the approach towai'ds selecting four of those cannot proceed by 
assessing all possibilities. Instead, an intuitive process must take place.
The following passages provide a summary of the case for selecting various 
imcertainties for use in this scenario study.
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5.4.2 UK and international emissions reduction targets
UK emissions targets are now enshrined in legislation, following the Climate Change 
Act 2008. Key provisions of the Act include GHG emission reduction tar*gets of at least 
80% by 2050. For the RESOLVE scenarios, suitable interim targets could be identified 
for 2030. The achievement of the UK target could be taken as one of the key 
uncertainties. Alternatively, the UK targets could be taken as an exogenous constraint 
on all four' scenarios, although this approach has been criticised above. It should be 
noted that the 80% emissions reduction by 2050 is intended to be achieved through a 
combmatiori of action in the UK and abroad. The Act requires that “the Secretary o f 
State must have regard to the need for UK domestic action on climate change" 
(DEFRA, 2008, p. 9). However, the achievement of the target clear ly assumes a role for 
international emissions trading. No figur'es are given in the legislation with regards to 
the proportion of reductions to be rmdertaken in the UK or abroad, instead responsibility 
for assessing the appropriate extent of emissions trading is placed in the hands of the 
Committee on Climate Change, an independent advisory body set up as part of the Act. 
Thus, even assuming the UK targets were met, different outcomes could still be 
explored from a consumption perspective as adopted in this study. Indeed, without the 
sufficiently robust operation of any international regime, tlie continued offshoring of 
emissions could become the chief means by which the UK tai'gets are met.
In this way, the international emissions regime could be taken as one of the key 
uncertainties. Three factors seem relevant here: the extent of the targets in absolute 
terms, the equitable sharing out of responsibilities, and the robustness of the operation 
of the regime. Wiüi no firm agreement resulting from the Copenhagen negotiation, all 
thr ee factors would seem to contribute to the overall uncertainty at present. Even if an 
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international agreement was achieved in the short term that had a clear absolute tai'get 
and distribution of responsibilities, arguably the effectiveness of its operation would 
remain an ongoing uncertainty. This encompasses several issues of concern including: 
the ability to accm*ately monitor emissions in different member states, the operation of 
different mechanisms including 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries’ (REDD), the tr ansparency of emissions‘trading 
and offsetting schemes. Thus, a combination of these concerns might be captrued in the 
uncertainty: 'effective international action on emissions' vs 'ineffective international 
action on emissions'.
Of particular concern here is that 'action abroad' may not represent a substantial 
reduction in current emissions, whether that is due to trading within a legitimate (but 
insufficiently strong) emissions ffamework or due to the ineffective operation of that 
framework. As a result, it is possible to envisage a friture in which the UK can claim to 
have achieved an 80% emissions reduction, while from a consumption perspective the 
carbon intensity of UK lifestyles has fallen far* short of this. In assessing the potential 
carbon intensity of UK lifestyles thiough to 2030 then, the first combination of 
uncertainties to be recommended to the scenario panel was the 'effectiveness of the 
international emissions regime' against 'domestic action'.
The candidate uncertainties below were also presented to the scenario panel for 
consideration.
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5.4.3 Growth
A key uncertainty is the extent and nature of economic growth over the 20 year' period. 
A distinction between global and UK growth is also important here. The rate of UK 
growth and tlius incomes will have a powerful influence on both the level of 
consumption of UK households, and the natui'e of goods and services produced in this 
countiy. Meanwhile the rate of global growth might have an impact on the carbon 
intensity of imported goods and services, and on the demand for those goods and 
services on the world maiket, subsequently affecting prices to UK consumers. Taking 
'Growth' as an axis therefore presents four possible configurations (allowing for 
high/low growth at the global/UK level). Arguments may be put forward as to the 
(im)plausibility of tliose combinations, which might help to identify the two most 
appropriate opposing outcomes. Of course, determining what constitutes 'high' and 'low' 
remains a matter of fur ther uncertainty.
5.4.4 Electricity Production
A decarbonised electricity supply has the potential to reduce the carbon intensity of 
lifestyles without necessarily requiring significant lifestyle change. However, there are 
various characteristics of the electricity supply that make its selection as an axis less 
than straightforward. Decarbonisation is clearly a central issue, but is this in relative or 
absolute terms? That is, what if electricity demand is driven upwards by a transition to 
electric cars and/or electric heating? Also, the currently centr*alised nature of the grid 
might change substantially over time. So, tlrree distinct characteristics -  carbon 
intensity, demand, (de)centralisation -  would again lead to eight possible 
configur ations. Resolving these for use as one composite axis would be problematic.
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5.4.5 Equity
A recuiTing theme across the internal RESOLVE interviews was the question o f  equity'. 
This was discussed variously in terms of global equity, national equity, social justice, 
income distribution etc. It seems straightforward enough to determine what the 
opposing outcomes might be: global equity could be seen as more vs less even 
distribution of global GDP, while national equity could be seen as more vs less even 
distribution of UK GDP. Global equity will be driven by global growth (relative to 
OECD growth), therefore global growth might be preferable to global equity as an axis. 
Domestically though, the growth of the UK economy could still result in a more or less 
even income distr ibution, thus national equity might offer some scope for exploring the 
changing natiue of household carbon intensity in a UK with more or less even income 
distribution.
Another way to bring in the equity issue would be in terms of the regulatory approach 
taken towards meeting the UK emissions target. The mechanisms may operate on a per 
capita basis, or else per unit of carbon/GDP. This distinction may be crucial in driving 
national equity in one direction or another, and thus might be considered a more suitable 
uncertainty.
5.4.6 Governance
The shape of UK governance might also be considered. Specifically whether the 
responsibilities for carbon mitigation are distiibuted more centrally or regionally. This
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uncertainty might present an opportunity to include associated uncertainties like the 
nature/success of community responses, and the currently centralised nature of the 
electricity grid.
5.4.7 Lifestyle Change
It could be argued that using 'lifestyle change' as an axis offers the opportunity of 
exploring the consequences of a shift in societal values. Ideally, since (potential) 
lifestyle change is what the scenarios are intended to explore and portray, it may be 
preferable to seek to portray the drivers of such change, in order to avoid 'lifestyle 
change' simply happening or not happening, as an exogenous constiaint.
5.5 Provisional Scenario Framework
In order to develop an appropriate provisional fi*amework, a series of possible 
combinations of uncertainties were assembled, including a short summary of the outline 
scenarios that might result from these. Thus, from the longlist of candidate 
uncertainties identified earlier, a shortlist of possible frameworks were developed and 
presented to the scenario panel for consideration. Of these possible frameworks, a 
recommendation was made to the panel for a provisional scenario framework consisting 
of the 'international emissions regime' as one axis and 'domestic action' as the other. 
This combination would allow the differences between the production and consumption 
perspectives to be explored, in particular the possible role of imported goods and 
services in driving consumption emissions even as production emissions are in decline. 
This framework was approved by the panel and prepared for the next stage.
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Ful'ther reflection on the particular outcomes of the 'domestic action' uncertainty led to a 
slight modification in how this was articulated. Rather than 'domestic action' per se, the 
axis was described in terms of the timing of any domestic action. On the one side, an 
'early transition' would involve a strengthening of UK (and Eur opean) policy for a low 
carbon economy, while a 'late transition' would reflect a response to the global recession 
that saw funding cuts for existing low carbon initiatives, and a focus on business-as- 
usual growth^. This formulation would then enable the exploration of a key issue 
discussed in the internal interviews: energy and resource depletion.
As discussed in Chapter 2, in a 2009 report on global oil depletion the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC) conclude that a peak in global oil production is highly likely 
to occm* within the time horizon of the present study, 2030 (UKERC, 2009a). The report 
further concluded that there was even a significant risk of the peak occuring by 2020. 
Given the potential impact of oil depletion on (the carbon intensity of) lifestyles, and the 
timeline for depletion suggested in the UKERC report, it was essential that the scenarios 
addressed this issue directly. The positing of different configurations of domestic and 
international action on emissions in this study sets the scene for a variety of responses to 
the risk of oil depletion. It was decided that, along with other basic commodities, a 
significant increase in oil prices would be represented in the scenarios, over the period 
2015-2020. The different conditions in each scenario would then determine the 
response duiing that phase, and the possible consequences for the following period
3 At this point, it was still being contemplated whether the early and late transitions might represent 
distinct responses to the economic recession and thus involve a diamatic depaiture in tenns of 
assumptions m ound growth, employment etc with a possible double dip recession being implied if the 
response to the crisis was poor. In the end, it was concluded that to conflate the 'late' and 'early' low 
carbon transition with 'good' mid 'bad' responses to tlie economic crisis would be to conflate quite 
seperate political and economic factors in what might be seen as a deeply partisan approach. Thus, 
although remnants of the 'recession response' issue came through in the discussions that took place 
with external experts, the uncertainty was eventually resolved purely in terms of the timing of the 
timisition, as will become clear in the scenarios themselves.
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2020-2030.
5.6 External expert interviews
Having identified the general issues and trends of interest to the research group and 
selected two key uncertainties from those, a series of interviews were then airanged 
with external experts. To select appropriate individuals, a longlist of potential experts 
was drawn up in consultation with members of RESOLVE. A spreadsheet matrix was 
created in order to mark out the external factors, consumption categories and sectors of 
tlie economy that each potential expert could be said to represent. From this longlist, a 
shortlist of individuals was then created, with the experts being selected in such a way 
as to cover as much ground as possible in an initial round of interviews. Although a 
provision was made to conduct a fiirther round of interviews if deemed necessary, it 
became clear during the first round that diminishing returns had set in, such that the 
latter interviews tended to reaffirm the significance of key factors already identified. 
The experts were sought from a variety of sectors, including academia, government, 
business and industry, and included:
• Chris Foster, an environmental consultant for EuGeos Limited and visiting 
research fellow at Manchester Business School. Mr Foster's research and 
consultancy has included projects focusing on the sustainability of food 
production and consumption.
• David Kempton, a non-executive director of Impax Funds Ireland pic, "an 
enviromnentally focused fund management company for institutional and 
private investors". Mr Kempton is also Chairman of EGS Energy, engineered 
geothermal systems, and an occasional columnist for 'citywire', a financial news 
and investment magazine.
• Francesco Sindico, Lectuier and Deputy Director of the Enviromnental
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Regulatory Research Group at the University of Surrey. Mr Sindico's research 
interests include international environmental law, emissions trading and carbon 
leakage.
• Nicholas Howarth, School of Geography and the Environment at University of 
Oxford. Mr Howarth is co-author of "Cai'bon Markets: an International 
Business Guide".
• Nick Eyre, Jackson Senior Research Fellow at the Environmental Change 
Institute, University of Oxford. Dr Eyre is the leader of the Lower Carbon 
Futuies group and co-director of the UK Energy Research Centre.
• Ruairi O'Connell, Advisor to the Special Representative for Climate Change, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
• Nick Robins, Head of Climate Change Centre of Excellence, HSBC, and co­
editor of "Sustainable Investing: The Ait of Long Term Perfoimance".
Prior to each interview, a short primer entitled 'Introduction to the RESOLVE scenario 
framework' was sent to the inteiviewee providing context to the study (Appendix III). 
This included a summary of the distinction between production and consumption 
perspective accounting of emissions, and the implications in terms of historical trends 
for the UK. The two uncertainties were explained, followed by a diagram representing 
the 2x2 matrix:
effective international regime
early transition
A B
D C
late transition
ineffective international regime 
Figure 5.1: Provisional scenario framework
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Finally a list of key questions to be considered during the interview were provided. 
Having mailed out this primer in advance, each interview began with a general 
summary of the work of RESOLVE and the goal of the scenario study, followed by a 
quick review of the primer, including the scenario framework and the choice of 
uncertainties. The interviewees were then invited to respond to the general framing of 
the scenarios as critically as they felt necessary.
Following any discussion around the scenario framework itself, the implications of each 
scenario arising from the framework were then drawn out. The resulting transcripts 
proved invaluable in refining the framework. For example, Scenario A, in which there 
is a late tiansition domestically, alongside a stiong international regime, was seen as 
problematic by some of the interviewees. In response to this, a more nuanced outline 
emerged from the interview process, in which a business as usual approach, both 
domestically and internationally, was pui'sued through to 2020, until the pressures of 
resource scaicity led to a crisis and a collective turning point in terms of environmental 
legislation, with the following ten year period involving rapid decarbonisation. 
Similarly, Scenario C, in which there is an early transition domestically but no action 
internationally, drew attention to the inseperable nature of UK and EU policy on 
emissions, such that 'domestic' here could only work if it described tire direction of the 
EU as a whole. This neatly gave rise to the possibility (subsequently adopted) that 
Scenario C could involve tiade disputes between EU and key trade partners. Scenaiios 
B and D were seen as less problematic, and attracted less criticism in terms of their 
inherent plausibility.
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The key issues raised in the expert interviews were once again clustered together. The 
clustering process grouped these issues in relation to the key actors responsible, such 
that a series of possible global or international developments were grouped under the 
headings "EU", "US", "China", while further potential developments at the UK level 
related to "Government", "Media", "Activists/Society", "Firms". The document 
containing these clustered insights is provided in Appendix IV. At this stage, an outline 
naiTative began to be foimed for each scenario, by working through the insights and 
reflecting on whether that particular development was consistent with the broad 
conditions implied by the scenario or not. In this way, a series of potential 
developments as part of a generic template were transformed into a series of actual 
developments (or non-developments) in four seperate documents.
5.7 Draft scenarios
At this stage, a series of outlines were then produced to briefly simimarise the essence 
of each scenario. The outlines consisted of a paragraph describing the development of 
macro- and micro-level factors over the 20 year period. Revisiting the scenario 
framework:
effective international regime
late transition
A B
early transition
D C
ineffective international regime
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The outlines for each of the foui' scenarios are listed below:
• A: Better late than never - Little significant change in efforts to tackle 
emissions up to 2020, when increasing calls for climate action combine with 
rising fuel and commodity prices to bring things to a crisis point. Out of the 
crisis, international leaders build consensus on a comprehensive programme of 
emissions cuts. Although there is little improvement in the carbon intensity of 
UK lifestyles before the crisis, the securing of a global deal instills a sense of 
common purpose that encourages proactive behavioural change.
• B: All together, now - Voluntary climate action by different countries, including 
tlirough green job progiammes to aid economic recovery, helps to lay the 
groundwork for a comprehensive and equitable global deal in 2015. The 
cooperative approach observed at the international level is reflected in the 
behavioural change undertaken at the household level.
• C: Trading woes - Unilateral climate action by the EU is intended to draw 
fui'ther commitments from other parties, but with no such action forthcoming by 
2015, the EU threatens the use of trade measures. After a period of heightened 
political tensions and economic slowdown, a compromise is reached. The result 
is a series of bilateral emissions targets that remain insufficient to avoid 
dangerous climate change. The UK public are cautiously optimistic at first, but 
without commensmate international action, enthusiasm for pro-environmental 
behaviom al change is weakened.
• D: Over the edge - Witli little effort on emissions reduction, the global economy 
is exposed to increasing fuel prices towards 2020. With intensified social
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pressui-e to reduce fuel prices, and unable to work cooperatively on establishing 
an equitable emissions regime, countries instead pmsue divergent, often 
conflicting energy security policies. The persistence of fossil fuel extraction as 
part of those policies extinguishes any hope of a low carbon transition, and leads 
to international conflict.
The bullet point scenario outlines were then refined and developed into a more narrative 
form, and a formatting protocol was devised, including representation of the time period 
under discussion, colour* coding and icon labelling of each paragraph of text according 
to whether the passage related to global, national or household level developments, 
where the latter related to the four* consmnption categories identified previously: in the 
home, the food we eat, getting around and getting away. A draft narrative for each 
scenario was then used as the basis of the quantitative work, described next, with the 
narratives being fiirther refined alongside the quantification.
5,8 Quantification
The four household consmnption categories described above help to give shape to the 
nanatives. Nevertheless, in producing what are intended to be seen as complementar*y, 
illustrative quantitative figm*es, it was essential to adopt the formal classification system 
used in the economic model, ELESA, employed in this research (Chitnis & Hunt, 2009). 
That classification system is the UN Classification of Individual Consumption 
According to Purpose (COICOP).
131
The COICOP classification system consists of 12 top level categories of goods and 
services, each of which can be disaggregated fui’ther into sub-categories as appropriate. 
In the ELESA model, most of the top level categories have been adopted, while others, 
such as 'Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels' have been disaggregated to 
better understand the trends occuring in each sub-category. The final categorisation used 
within the model is as follows:
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics 
Clothing and footwear 
Electi’icity 
Gas
Other fuels
Other housing (includes: actual and imputed rentals for housing, maintenance 
and repair of the dwelling, water supply and miscellaneous services relating to 
the dwelling)
• Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance
• Health
• Personal vehicle fuels and lubricants
• Other ti ansport (includes pui’chase of vehicles, operation of personal transport 
equipment and transport services, i.e. rail, road, air and sea)
• Commimication
• Recreation and culture
• Education
• Restaurants and hotels
• Miscellaneous goods and services
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While the ELESA model has been described previously (Chitnis & Hunt, 2010),(Chitnis 
& Hunt, in press) a short summary is necessary in order to explain how the model has 
been used in the current scenario work.
ELESA is a structural time-series model, using historical data over a 45 year period for 
each of the 16 categories listed above. Quarterly data for price and expenditure in each 
category, and for income, is taken horn the Office for National Statistics database. 
Econometric analysis is then used to determine the effect of price changes and income 
changes on changes in expendituie. Having established the role of income changes and 
price changes, the model attempts to attiibute remaining expenditure change to 
'exogenous non-economic factors' (until only a small random error remains). Figure 
5.2 depicts the structui'e of the ELESA model for a given category.
price
income emissions
total
carbon
intensitypriceelasticity
income
elasticity expenditure
exogenous 
non-economic 
factors (exnej)
Figure 5.2: overview o f key components ofELESA^
4 Plain text indicates where historical data has been used, while text in italics represents values derived 
from this data using tlie model. The dashed line indicates a single category, with categoiy specific 
values embedded inside, while income is consistent across all categories.
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With these historical relationships established, a procedure was then possible whereby 
assumptions for incomes and prices could be projected out to some point in the future, 
with the price and income elasticities (along with the historical ex-nef trend) used to 
determine the impact on expenditure. For example, a shaip increase in prices for a 
category sensitive to price changes might be expected to show a significant reduction in 
expendituie (other things being equal).
Incorporating carbon modelling data, it was also possible to establish annual carbon 
emissions attiibutable to each category over the period 1992-2005 (Chitnis et a l, 2009, 
Chitnis & Hunt, 2009). Combined with expenditure data, it was then possible to 
determine the carbon intensity of each category over those years (as MtCOie/fm). 
Knowing the level of carbon intensity at 2005, and the tiend in carbon intensity over the 
period, it was then possible to extrapolate future emissions for each category, given 
expendituie.
In this research, the ELESA model is used to provide illustrative quantification to the 
scenaiios. The variables for which assumptions must be made are 'income' (applies 
across all categories), and 'price', 'exnef and 'carbon intensity' for each category. 
Rather than forecasting on the basis of historical trends, the assumptions are derived 
fi'om the storyline of that particulai* scenario. To be clear, the historical trends are used 
as a starting point in all foui' scenarios, from which they deviate as the nanatives unfold.
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5.9 Chapter Summary
At the outset of this research, a proposed methodology was prepared, and feedback 
sought from experts in the field of scenario planning. In response to that feedback, tlie 
methodology was revised before being carried out. The qualitative scenario narratives 
were developed over a series of stages, beginning with in-depth interviews with internal 
experts. The key uncertainties derived from this interview data were collated and 
presented to the scenario panel, an internal board appointed to provide guidance and 
oversight at key stages of the process. Two key uncertainties were then used to form a 
provisional scenario framework, which was tested with a series of external experts 
during a further round of in-depth interviews. The insights gathered from these experts, 
including further uncertainties and possible developments, were then compiled into a 
scenario naiTative template. This template was used to inform the draft nanatives for 
each scenario, before these diafts were expanded and revised into more fully formed 
storylines. For die quantification of the scenarios, an econometiic model was employed 
whereby assumptions for key variables were derived fi'om each of the scenario 
narratives.
In the next chapter, the complete scenario nanatives resulting from this process are 
provided, preceeded by a short introduction on how the read the nanatives, and 
followed by a summary of the illustrative quantification and a discussion of some of the 
key implications of the scenarios.
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6. Scenarios
6.1 Introduction to the Scenarios
In the next four sections of this chapter, the scenario narratives are provided including a 
summary of the quantification for each one. A more detailed breakdown of the 
quantification process is provided in Appendices V-Vlll. A description of the 
formatting used to present the narratives and the quantification is provided below.
Reading the Qualitative Narratives
The scenarios follow a consistent format to enable cross-comparison. In each case, the 
narratives have been broken down into three time periods, describing events unfolding 
from 2010-2015, 2015-2020, 2020-2030. A timeline feature identifies the relevant 
scenario and time period under discussion:
2010 2015 2020 2030
Key developments among the various factors of interest are then discussed:
Global factors. These Include social, political and economic developments at the 
international level, e.g. an international emissions regime, trade relations, or particular 
climate action taken by the US, EU and China.
Jk UK Factors. These include social, political and economic developments at the national 
jm  level, such as environmental policy measures, financial incentives, social pressures and 
media coverage.
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In each time period, global factors are generally grouped together in a series, followed 
by UK factors. Since some factors relate to general trends, while others relate to 
particular* events, in some cases it is necessai-y to intersperse global and UK factors to 
give a sense of sequence. Thus, although specific dates have been purposely avoided, a 
general chronology can be assumed from the order in which factors are described.
Next, a set of four* icons are used to indicate outcomes in terms of household 
consumption, according to the categories described in Chapter 2:
At Home. Describes consumption activities around the home, including use of energy I f  N  for heating and appliances. As with all the consumption categories, outcomes described 
here include behavioural changes resulting from price signals as well as those 
influenced by non-economic factors.
The Food We Eat. Relates outcomes in terms of dietary changes, food waste etc. As 
with the other categories, the carbon intensity of household consumption can be 
impacted by supply/production processes as well as behavioural change. Any changes 
in carbon intensity due to production changes are therefore also treated as outcomes.
Getting Around. Includes day-to-day transport use for commuting, visiting, leisure 
practices and so on. The category covers private car use as well as public transport, 
walking and cycling.
Getting Away. Relates exclusively to aviation for tourism. Whereas the other three are 
composite categories comprising a series of activities, the identification of aviation by 
members of the public as one of their four key consumption categories hints at the 
significance of this activity in two ways: the central importance of foreign travel as an 
aspiration in peoples lives, but also as an acknowledgement by consumers of the 
environmental impact of this activity.
Quantification
At the end of each scenario nan*ative, two charts are provided summarising total UK 
household expenditure and emissions over the full 20 yeai* period of the scenario. For a 
more thorough examination of the illustiative figuies, a detailed breakdown of the 
assumptions used in each variable, for each category, across each time period is 
provided in Appendices V-VIII.
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An example of the expenditure data for one time period is shown in Table 6.1 :
Household disposable income: 1.7% p. a.
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to:
Price
change
(%p.a.) Income Price ExNEF total
2015
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.00 0.43 -0.82 0.41 0.10 9200
Gas 2.00 - -1.07 1.48 0.37 9697
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.63 0.13 -0.14 2.51 2.51 28495
Other fuels 3.50 0.46 -0.09 -4.67 -4.46 832
Other transport 0.13 0.84 -0.15 2.25 2.94 111382
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -0.50 0.30 0.21 0.25 0.74 71075
Alcohol and tobacco A73 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 26052
Table 6.1: Example scenario expenditure data
First, the average annual change in household disposable income over the period is 
provided. Then, in the main table, the columns are arranged as follows:
1. The name of the category of goods and services;
2. the average annual change in prices;
3. the average annual change in expenditure:
1. due to income effect;
2. due to price effect;
3. due to exogenous non-economic factors;
4. in total (sum of all three);
4. total UK household expenditure for the category in the year falling at the end of 
the time period.
The expenditure table is followed by a series of notes explaining how key assumptions 
were derived from the scenario narrative.
Next, the emissions data are summai'ised for that time period, as in Table 6.2:
in 2015
carbon intensity Carbon Intensity Expenditure Emissions
change (%p.a.) (tCOae/mf) (m£) (mtCOae)
Electricity 0.00 1.19 9200 72
Gas 0.00 10.43 9697 101
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 3.11 28495 89
Other fuels -274 7.05 832 6
Other transport 1.03 1.46 111382 163
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.92 1.12 71075 79
Alcohol and tobacco 272 0.33 26052 9
Table 6.2: Example scenario emissions data
The columns are arranged as follows:
1. The name of the category of goods and services;
2. the average annual change in carbon intensity (%);
3. then, for the year falling at the end of the time period:
1. tlie level of carbon intensity (in tCOze/mf):
2. total UK household expendituie for the category (in m£, reproduced from 
the expenditure table);
3. total emissions resulting fr om UK household expenditure for that category 
(in mtCOie).
As with expenditine, notes aie provided beneath the emissions data table to indicate the 
reasoning behind key assumptions. The expenditine and emissions changes over each 
time period are then summarised in chart format.
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6.2 Scenario A
Better late than never
Little significant change in efforts to tackle emissions up 
to 2020, when increasing calls for climate action combine 
with n'sing fuel and commodity prices to bring things to a 
crisis point. Out o f the crisis, international leaders build 
consensus on a comprehensive programme o f emissions 
cuts. Although there is little improvement in the carbon 
intensity o f UK lifestyles before the crisis, the securing of 
a global deal instills a sense of common purpose that 
encourages proactive behavioural change.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
The lack of a decisive outcome from the Copenhagen summit leads to a general slowing 
down of efforts to achieve a substantive international agreement on climate change.
Concerns turn towards the economy and the precarious recovery from the global 
recession of 2008.
As a result of the global slump in demand, commodity prices including fossil fuels remain 
below the historically high levels seen leading up to the recession. Consequently, there 
are few substantial incentives to encourage greater energy or resource efficiency, either 
by producers of goods and services or by households directly.
In developed countries, mainstream media coverage continues to represent climate 
science as something contested, and the solutions expensive, ensuring the 
marginalisation of climate activists and campaigns. In those countries worst affected by 
extreme weather events, there are continued (and increasing) calls for developed 
countries to act on climate change.
Jk  At home, the government renege on some of the environmental policies of their
predecessors, while attempting to establish a green agenda of their own. On balance
though, environmental policies become another victim of the programme of cuts in public 
spending.
For most UK households, employment remains the primary concern during a period of 
slow recovery.
The negative portrayal of climate science in parts of the UK mainstream media intensifies, 
with increasing attacks on leading climate scientists and institutes detracting from the 
science itself.
Meanwhile, other parts of the UK media continue to report on climate change in 
accordance with the mainstream scientific community. For these outlets, the extreme 
climate variability of recent years acts as a stark warning of the need for radical change.
Whilst the environmental movement grows in number and improves its outreach capacity, 
a largely ambivalent public refuse to commit to serious behavioural changes or support 
political action.
A lack of government incentives and subsidies combined with short term financial worries
M  keep capital expenditure on home insulation and micro-generation at a low level.
Although consumers report energy efficiency as being an important consideration when 
purchasing new appliances, actual purchasing behaviour points to the prevalence of 
cheap, low energy efficiency products.
IE The absence of economic or behavioural incentives means there is no meaningful change in food consumption patterns.
Financial contraints prevent significant uptake of new, more efficient vehicles. 
Meanwhile, lack of incentives means no significant reduction in vehicle use, e.g through 
shorter trips or car sharing.
The absence of effective policy measures to tackle the environmental cost of aviation 
leads to an increase in flights, with demand recovering sharply from a drop during the 
economic crisis of 2008.
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From 2015, rising global demand leads to significant increases in prices of commodities 
and fuels. Through to 2020, this sustained price pressure leads to slower growth in the 
global economy.
Concerns about unrelenting fuel prices crystallise into two distinct factions: those calling 
for short term action (lowering fuel taxes), and those attaching themselves to a growing 
and increasingly coordinated environmental lobby, calling for a rapid transition away from 
dependence on fossil fuels.
These social movements are mirrored politically, with world governments and their 
opposition parties grappling with these competing interests.
By 2020 the issue remains unresolved, but the impact on the global economy combined 
with increasing social unrest means that action becomes inevitable. International talks 
are scheduled, sparking the largest, most coordinated environmental campaign to date.
In the UK, as elsewhere, increasing fuel prices put pressure on household expenditure. 
Unable to make an immediate transition away from fossil fuels in the absence of 
appropriate government support, households are forced to curtail expenditure on other 
goods and services.
The slowing of the economy towards 2020, and the associated impact on incomes, leads 
to increasing dissatisfaction with government and a political crisis.
The motoring lobby campaigns vigorously for reduced taxes on vehicle fuels, elements of 
the energy sector campaign for a relaxation of environmental targets. Meanwhile other 
players in the transport and energy sectors call for subsidies to support investment in 
public transport and low carbon energy sources respectively. These competing industry 
forces form alliances with social movements in an ideological conflict that reflects the 
global crisis as a whole.
Although modest steps are taken towards emissions reductions, and the economic 
slowdown inevitably results in less economic activity, it also has a significant impact in 
delaying low carbon investment in the private sector. There is a gradual realisation that 
emissions reduction targets for 2020 will not be achieved.
Going into international negotiations in 2020, the UK government comes under immense 
pressure from both sides of the debate, as opposition parties wait to take full advantage 
of any public dissatisfaction arising from the talks.
While some basic energy efficiency measures are adopted, lack of robust policy 
”  measures and capital funding for retrofit leaves most households exposed to higher fuel 
prices. Those increases in fuel prices mean that electricity and gas bills take up an ever 
larger share of household expenditure through this period.
E Food prices are similarly affected by global demand (and by higher fuel costs). Unlike electricity and gas though, households are able to adapt by shifting expenditure from 
high-end, quality food to more affordable value products.
Regardless of a shift in quality, the broad footprint of food purchasing hardly changes, 
with no transformation of attitudes with respect to meat consumption or local sourcing, 
and little progress on the reduction of food waste.
A significant rise in vehicle fuel prices means an increasing proportion of households’ 
disposable income is spent on petrol/diesel. Despite continued price pressures, only a 
gradual shift in transport behaviour is observed over the period, with some households 
beginning to cycle, car share etc. as they increasingly identify with the sustainability 
movement.
Increasing fuel costs feed through to flight ticket prices. Still, in the absence of any policy 
measures or significant behaviour change, growth in household disposable income 
means that increased costs can only slow the growth in aviation, rather than stop it.
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The international summit of 2020 comes at a time of crisis in the global market, with 
unprecedented demand for fuels and commodities.
In developed countries, there are concerns about the impact of high prices on economic 
growth, and the viability of a business as usual approach for the long term.
In developing countries the impact has been more severely felt, with lack of sufficient 
food and fuel supplies leading directly to conflict and humanitarian disaster.
In response to the crisis, leaders at the summit manage to agree on a programme of 
measures including a global emissions trajectory peaking by 2030 and falling 
substantially by 2050. Developed countries commit to stringent domestic cuts and an 
assurance of support for developing nations via low carbon technology transfer and 
preferential trade agreements with countries implementing decarbonisation programmes.
In accordance with its international commitments, Europe and the UK pass climate and 
energy legislation aimed at substantial cuts by 2050, with a programme of short term 
measures towards interim 2030 targets.
In the UK, government rapidly enacts legislation drafted in anticipation of a successful 
international deal. Funding is made available for a suite of decarbonisation programmes, 
while financial support mechanisms are established -  for households and industry -  to 
encourage take up of low carbon technologies.
The success of the sustainable development movement inevitably signals the defeat of 
the motoring lobby in its demands for vehicle fuel subsidies. Instead, government signals 
a long term commitment to the diversification of the private vehicle fleet, with strict targets 
for manufacturers on electric, hybrid and flexifuels vehicles.
A commitment to low carbon public transport, including substantial seed funding, raises 
the prospect of a long term resurgence, attracting further private sector investment. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the industry means that change is slow to materialise in the 
short term.
A series of measures are aimed at reducing gas consumption. A nationwide domestic 
"  retrofit programme initially focuses on the most vulnerable households; older people and 
low income families in the most inefficient buildings. The programme includes insulation, 
solar water heating and micro-renewables where appropriate, at no cost to those 
households.
After the first few years, the programme scales up sufficiently to be rolled out beyond 
those priority groups, with financial mechanisms in place to ensure capital costs are paid 
through savings in bills, rather than upfront investment.
Community level micro-generation schemes, including wind, small-scale hydro and 
biomass with district heating, contribute to the decarbonisation of electricity while 
bringing further reductions in gas use. These schemes are co-funded by central and local 
government, private operating companies, and local residents who benefit from price 
guarantees.
E In a collective push to reduce food waste, government, food retailers and NGOs work together to raise awareness and provide information and tools for better food planning 
and storage, with reasonable success over the period.
Growing awareness of the impact of food production leads to a slight reduction in meat 
and dairy consumption, and a drive on the part of producers to reduce that industry's 
environmental impact.
Introduction of mandatory carbon labelling for food leads to further consumer behaviour 
change.
There is a general expectation that vehicle fuel prices are likely to be driven higher over 
the period, leading to significant shifts in behaviour.
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Purchase of fuel efficient vehicles gathers apace, while government commits to more 
rapid deployment of electric vehicle charging infrastructure, sparking substantial growth 
in electric vehicle sales and signalling the beginning of a gradual shift away from liquid 
fossil fuels.
Equally significant is the reduction in single person car journeys, including through 
increased car-sharing, aided by innovations in communication technologies that allow 
more effective coordination between networks of friends and colleagues.
Public transport use begins to increase. The gradual shift away from cars and onto 
trains and buses, results in a less carbon intensive transport sector overall, although 
aviation continues to play an ever greater part.
With rising aviation fuel costs leading to higher ticket prices, some families opt for 
'staycations'. Nevertheless, increasing disposable incomes ensure that many people 
remain ready and willing to pay higher prices to ensure regular foreign holidays, meaning 
growth in aviation is only curbed so far. and is somewhat offset by increased 
road/rail/bus travel.
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6.3 Scenario B
All together, now
Voluntary climate action by different countries, including 
through green job programmes to aid economic recovery, 
helps to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive and 
equitable global deal in 2015. The cooperative approach 
observed at the international level is reflected in the 
behavioural change undertaken at the household level.
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The perceived failure of the Copenhagen summit leads to a period of soul searching 
among activists, policy makers and climate scientists, and while the UNFCCC process 
continues, with regular meetings and summits, there is no great hope of this process 
delivering any substantial deal in the short term.
A slow recovery from the economic crisis of 2008 ensures that jobs remain the central 
concem for developed countries.
Sustainability advocates pursue a localised, participatory approach to developing positive 
visions of a low carbon future. Gradually, these groups build support for a green recovery 
campaign, outlining how a green job creation programme can result in a 'triple win' for 
economic, environmental and social concerns.
While mainstream media remains a complex terrain in terms of climate science reporting, 
effective public communication by a 'transition alliance' manages to engineer a shift in 
column inches towards an emerging positive outlook, particularly around a green 
economic recovery.
Meanwhile, the EU improves its emissions reduction target to 30% on 1990 levels by 
2020 .
In the US, despite lack of progress in establishing climate legislation, action begins at the 
sub-national level with some states establishing programmes for green jobs, emissions 
trading, and sector-by-sector industrial efficiency targets.
Continuing along a high growth trajectory, China announces a series of ambitious 
industrial carbon intensity targets.
In the UK, amid the public spending cuts announced in 2010, there is concern that a 
number of environmental initiatives may be dropped.
As part of a global alliance, activist groups in the UK renew strategies for public 
engagement, with a focus on green jobs for a sustainable recovery. Allied with trade 
unions and social justice campaigners, environmental groups attract considerable support 
for their green jobs agenda.
The UK media seek to capitalise on public anxieties around the recovery, with many 
spearheading their own campaigns for green jobs, giving a platform to those concerned 
about the possible impact of proposed spending cuts.
Coordinated protests and strike action puts significant pressure on the government to 
abandon spending cuts, including on green initiatives.
Citing a desire to lead on emissions reductions within Europe, the UK government 
responds to improved EU-wide targets with an ambitious emissions reduction target of 
42% by 2020, on 1990 levels. In light of the revised target, the government announces a 
reorientation of public spending priorities, with some ringfenced spending for emissions 
reduction initiatives, and measures to boost green jobs.
Government launches the green bank to coordinate low carbon investment. Although 
funds are initially low due to the slow recovery, priority is given to job training programmes 
for retrofitting, and investment for wind turbine manufacture.
A national retrofit schedule is published, in preparation for a roll out across the most 
vulnerable households. Measures are also put in place to galvanise neighbouring private 
households to act collectively in adopting retrofit measures, with a pool of money made 
available for a range of insulation options to reduce energy demand, and installation of 
renewables for electricity and heat generation.
Changes to the tax structure around private transport are announced, intended to 
incentivise more fuel efficient vehicles.
147
The emergence of a more positive vision of transition leads to more favourable public 
attitudes on climate action. Still, a gap remains between commitment and action as many 
households remain unclear as to the most effective action to take.
Having succeeded in persuading their own decision makers to lead on the strengthening 
of binding targets, UK environmental groups are joined by the general public in calling for 
government to insist this example is followed internationally.
Exploiting the low hanging fruit of energy efficiency and conservation ensures the EU is 
on track with voluntary emissions reductions towards the end of this period.
In the US, progress by 'early adopted states leads to wider adoption of industry targets 
and sub-national emissions schemes, with steps taken towards a link up with the EU, 
putting pressure on the US govemment for implementation at the national level.
In China, industry presses ahead with efficiency measures, in line with sectoral targets.
A global alliance of sustainability advocates gains momentum, citing various early 
successes in the EU, parts of the US, and in China as evidence of the viability of low 
carbon development. The alliance calls for global leaders to commit to further action in 
the form of an international legally binding agreement.
Ahead of a global summit in 2015, two possible outcomes begin to emerge. With the EU, 
US and China pursuing their own unique strategies for low carbon development, the 
cementing of these commitments under a unified emissions regime seems credible. 
Nevertheless, there are fears that without such a binding regime, these distinct 
approaches may come to be seen as competitive rather than complementary, with the 
threat of trade measures being used to protect key industries in each region.
Although slowly at first, household energy management shows some improvement over 
■ ■  the period, reducing demand for electricity and gas. This is aided in part by publicity 
around the national roll out of smart meters and energy display devices, although 
coverage over this period remains low.
Financial incentives for private households to adopt retrofit and micro-generation leads to 
increased adoption of such technologies, although the initial funds are limited. A 
government scheme to retrofit the most vulnerable households begins to unfold in 
parallel. However, starting from such a small base, the initial success of these schemes 
is more symbolic than substantive.
As part of an improved EU target, increased energy efficiency requirements for electrical 
appliances leads to higher expenditure on these items, but in the short term there is no 
significant reduction in household electricity consumption resulting from these measures.
LÜJ As part of a positive vision for a sustainable transition, environmental groups promote low carbon cuisine, with celebrity and retail endorsement, beginning a shift in attitudes on 
food, but little immediate reduction in the carbon intensity of food production.
Increasingly, households attempt to grow some of their own food, with results initially 
failing to match enthusiasm. Nevertheless, local support networks ensure persistence 
and the development of knowledge and skills.
Households become increasingly engaged in the need to reduce food waste and some 
progress is made in this regard.
Overall expenditure on new vehicles remains constrained by the slow recovery at first, 
although changes to pricing mean that fuel efficient models become relatively more 
popular. Demand for electric vehicles outstrips their modest supply, with hybrid vehicles 
securing a greater share of the market over this period.
The shift in environmental attitudes leads to a modest change in travel behaviour, with a 
slight increase in walking and cycling for short journeys and informal car sharing.
After a dip during the recession, aviation begins to grow again with foreign holiday travel 
proving a particularly difficult area in terms of pro-environmental behaviour change. 
Although aviation is brought into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme from 2012, the 
generous provision of permits allows the industry to continue largely as before.
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Ahead of the 2015 summit, a global sustainability alliance campaigns for a positive, 
ambitious and equitable outcome. The movement capitalises on the international 
participation in visioning projects to demonstrate the widespread grassroots support for a 
low carbon future. The co-option of leading thinkers, business leaders and decision­
makers reinforces the case for a successful outcome, putting further pressure on 
negotiators to deliver.
The successful performance by early adopters, concern about the high costs of a carbon 
intensive pathway and the implications of failure in terms of trade relations, all contribute 
to a successful summit outcome. Developed countries establish a series of ambitious 
emissions reduction targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050.
A revitalised UNFCCC takes on a monitoring and evaluation role in relation to carbon 
trading schemes and emissions reporting, with developing nations committing to deeper 
transparency in addition to further efficiency targets. Technology transfer agreements 
offer significant opportunities to the least developed countries.
Despite efficiency gains, rising global demand leads to higher prices of commodities and 
fuels, amid expectations that this trend will be sustained.
In the UK, the signing of an international agreement reinforces business certainty, most 
immediately noticeable through a surge of interest by large investors, including pension 
funds, unlocking much needed funding for a series of large-scale infrastructural 
investments through the green bank.
Despite teething problems, the retrofit of vulnerable households begins to deliver steady 
results, expanding coverage steadily through this period. The financing scheme for retrofit 
of private households proves extremely popular, but progress is limited by budgetary 
constraints, with the scheme being oversubscribe each year.
Decarbonisation of electricity generation continues at a reasonable pace, but a serious 
step change is required to meet expected future demand as a result of electrification of 
transport and heat.
Additional funding for the green bank is announced, with support for smart grid, high 
speed rail and electric vehicle charging technologies. The institution also launches a 
series of products aimed at attracting capital from individuals and community groups. 
These products prove popular, attracting funds away from high street banks, and 
prompting those institutions to offer similar product ranges of their own. An active 
customer base increasingly influences project funding, leading to a diversification of low 
carbon investments.
Small and medium enterprises are some of the beneficiaries of that diversification, as a 
revival of local agriculture and manufacturing is promoted against a backdrop of 
anticipated higher costs for overseas goods.
The deployment of smart meters and energy display devices continues, with the aim of 
”  covering every household by 2020. The devices contribute to a small reduction in 
demand although advocates suggest that advanced features such as tar riffs allowing 
remote control of appliances are essential to deliver further savings and to assist in load 
balancing.
Demand for private retrofit grows substantially over this period, with financial support 
remaining oversubscribed despite increases in funding. A national roll out of retrofit 
solutions across vulnerable households remains on track, contributing to reductions in 
fuel consumption and fuel poverty.
Improvements in energy efficiency requirements for electrical appliances continue to 
have a small impact on electricity consumption, although efficiency gains are somewhat 
offset due to an increase in the average size of televisions, fridges etc.
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Following a sustained period of increased global demand, there are significant pressures 
on global prices of fuels and commodities. This pressure has been alleviated somewhat 
by global developments on energy efficiency, preventing a full-scale crisis. Nevertheless, 
ongoing improvements in energy and resource efficiency are called for to reduce further 
impacts, particularly on the world's poorest nations.
The scarcity of fossil fuels and the incremental impacts of carbon pricing provide further 
stimulus for developed countries in their efforts to decarbonise. The burst of activity 
around low carbon development brings price pressures of its own, although these begin 
to stabilise over the course of the period.
With increasing pressure to reduce emissions from transportation, countries are required 
to balance the drive towards specialisation with the need for more localised production. 
As a result, economies become increasingly diversified.
J t  The UK economy enters the 2020s with domestic emissions on a strong downward 
trajectory. The resurgence of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, whilst 
contributing to that reduction in emissions in many ways, also brings some emissions 
back 'onshore' by displacing production of goods imported from overseas. Whilst positive 
from a global emissions perspective, this trend puts an increased emphasis on the need 
for more strategic economic development if these industries are to develop amid 
increasingly stringent emissions targets.
By 2020, involvement by mainstream society in the articulation of a sustainable future has 
ensured that low carbon development is no longer seen as a constraint, but rather as 
something positive and constructive. Although the visions themselves remain diverse, an 
underlying commitment to the basic principles of participation and fairness ensure that the 
transition is viewed positively and carried forward proactively by the majority of individuals 
and communities.
Through this period, the drive for carbon reductions brings further diversification of the 
economy. The resurgence of domestic production in agriculture and manufacturing 
coincides with increased efforts by all sectors of the economy to identify energy savings 
through improved industrial ecology, maximising the reuse of energy and resources, 
whilst minimising waste. This leads to innovative regional partnerships, with waste 
agricultural products increasingly used for biomass energy production, and the heat from 
those processes reused in district heating networks for local homes, hospitals and 
schools.
Through this period, the electrification of the UK energy system becomes the primary 
mechanism by which further domestic emissions reductions are to be achieved. After 
years of technological development, attitudinal change, and investment in infrastructure, 
the groundwork has been laid for a decade of mass electrification of the transport sector. 
Significantly increased demand is also anticipated from the electrification of residential 
heat.
With the roll out of smart meter technology essentially complete, householders are better 
^  able to assess and understand the impact of particular energy related activities. Energy 
companies begin to roll out advanced metering contracts, with households offered 
incentives to allow appliances including fridges, freezers, hot water tanks and storage 
heaters to operate partly in response the needs of the grid. Towards the end of this 
period, such contracts are making a valuable contribution to load balancing.
The retrofit programme for vulnerable households begins to scale down, with the majority 
of intended recipients having been targetted by 2030. Retrofit work continues apace in 
the private sphere, as households seek to reduce their own vulnerability to sustained 
high energy prices through improved insulation and microgeneration.
Such retrofit solutions increasingly include community-wide schemes, allowing some 
deployment of biomass power stations and district heating systems.
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Earlier regulatory measures to improve the energy efficiency of household appliances 
have ensured that all new electrical appliances now meet stringent efficiency standards, 
although energy savings are partly offset by the emergence of ever more electrical and 
electronic gadgets in the home.
By 2020, changing attitudes towards food production and consumption have had a 
noticeable impact on the carbon intensity of food purchases.
The 'grow your own' culture continues to develop, with local networks and cooperatives 
for knowledge (and produce) exchange, and expanded allotment schemes for 
households without private gardens, including 'city farms' run by urban households. 
These schemes are successful not just in reducing food expenditure directly, but in 
influencing people's attitudes towards the food that they do buy, with stronger support for 
local and organic produce.
This adoption of more pro-environmental attitudes to food purchasing is reinforced by 
continuing price increases for carbon intensive products, including meat and air-freighted 
foods, ensuring that low carbon food consumption is widely established as a way of life, 
rather than just a trend.
By 2020, the charging infrastructure for plug-in hybrid/electric vehicles has reached a 
critical level of deployment, ensuring that these are increasingly seen as the technologies 
of choice for new car purchases. Although petrol/diesel engines continue to play a role, 
this is increasingly as a range extending device in plug-in hybrid vehicles. By the end of 
the decade, the purchase of new internal combustion engine vehicles is negligable, and 
their share of the overall vehicle fleet has fallen significantly.
Through the 2020s, investment in public transport ensures further electrification of the 
rail network, while the introduction of new high speed rail lines leads to increased 
passenger miles by train. Crucially, efforts are made to integrate all aspects of the public 
transport infrastructure, and to streamline payments and journey planning, encouraging 
further adoption of public transport among commuters.
Improvements in information and communication technologies continue to impact on 
working arrangements, with more employers allowing and even encouraging employees 
to work from home where appropriate.
With the implementation of strict emissions targets for the aviation industry, costs 
increase considerably through this period. With improved public transport infrastructure 
in the UK, domestic flights begin to fall, and with high speed rail links to many parts of 
Europe, growth in short-haul european flights is halted.
International long-haul flights prove more difficult to curb, although with higher prices and 
changing attitudes on the part of holidaymakers - increasingly prepared to look for 
holiday destinations closer to home -  growth begins to slow.
In addition to behavioural change resulting from price signals and more pro- 
environmental attitudes, logistical and technological developments ensure a leveling off 
of aviation emissions attributable to UK households by 2030.
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6.4 Scenario C
Trading woes
Unilateral climate action by the EU is intended to draw 
further commitments from other parties, but with no such 
action forthcoming by 2015, the EU threatens the use of 
trade measures. After a period o f heightened political 
tensions and economic slowdown, a compromise is 
reached. The result is a series of bilateral emissions 
targets that remain insufficient to avoid dangerous 
climate change. The UK public are cautiously optimistic 
at first, but without commensurate international action, 
enthusiasm for pro-environmental behavioural change is 
weakened.
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In the aftermath of Copenhagen, enduring divisions between the various parties in the 
negotiations overshadow the efforts of sustainability advocates to rebuild a sense of 
momentum towards action on climate change. Instead, campaigners in the EU and US 
focus on green jobs programmes as a route to recovery.
The shifting political landscape in the US ensures that commitment to low carbon 
development remains weak, with rhetorical demands for commensurate action from 
China, and energy security the predominant policy objective. With the increasingly 
distant prospect of federal climate legislation, some individual states set out their own 
policies on low carbon development, including regional emissions trading schemes, 
green jobs programmes and industrial efficiency targets. However, these initiatives come 
under concerted attack from carbon-intensive industries and conservative political 
groups.
Continuing to insist that developed countries must lead on climate action, China refuses 
to commit to binding targets, but pledges that it will adhere to existing, voluntary 
measures on energy efficiency.
In the EU, campaigners are cautiously optimistic as leaders agree to an improved 
emissions reduction target of 30% on 1990 levels by 2020 in an apparent effort to 
encourage action from the US and China.
With hopes fading for an international agreement in the short term, UK sustainability 
advocates focus on securing domestic action in line with the improved EU emissions 
targets, including a green jobs programme to lead an economic recovery.
Afraid that such action is threatened by proposed austerity measures, the environmental 
lobby join trade union activists in offering fierce resistance to public spending cuts.
In the absence of any significant climate action outside of the EU, the UK media is divided 
over the issue, with some commentators joining the call to reign in spending cuts in 
support of green growth while others insist further unilateral action would be futile, and 
would only cede bargaining power.
Pressured by the improved target at the EU-level and increasing calls for action at home, 
the UK government announces an improved emissions reduction target of 42% by 2020, 
on 1990 levels, but signals that an increased proportion of reductions may be met through 
carbon trading and offsetting measures until an international agreement is reached.
Alongside the revised emissions target, the government announces it is ringfencing 
funding for emissions reduction initiatives and providing measures to boost green jobs.
A green bank is also established, amid concerns that it will simply streamline existing 
investment commitments. Although government announces some fresh funding, fears 
remain that - with the increased role for carbon trading and offsetting - the green bank will 
be used to fund projects that fail to provide 'additionality' of carbon savings.
In a bid to counter such criticism, a range of domestic programmes are some of the first 
to be given support through the green bank, including support for wind turbine 
manufacture and other renewables research and development.
Sensing that the public remain divided on the merits of unilateral climate action, 
government stops short of adopting policy measures that risk being seen as restrictive of 
lifestyles. Instead, policy is focused on the 'cost saving' arguments for action, through 
retrofit schemes funded by the private sector, and costs recouped from savings on 
household bills.
Towards the end of this period, the lack of international cooperation leave the public 
unwilling to adopt measures that are seen as self-sacrificial, but investment focused on 
green growth and opportunities to adopt more eco-friendly purchasing behaviour are 
broadly welcomed.
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Through a combination of energy efficiency and conservation measures, investment in 
renewable capacity and extensive carbon trading and offsetting, the EU remains 
nominally on track with emissions targets by the end of this period. Environmental groups 
are scathing of the role of carbon offsetting, arguing that real emissions reductions fall far 
short of the levels required.
In the US, efforts by individual states to establish their own industry efficiency standards 
and emissions targets have been hampered by intensive lobbying and legal action.
In China, growth remains the priority, with no strengthening of emissions targets beyond 
existing efficiency goals.
In what feels like the last roll of the dice ahead of an international summit in 2015, global 
sustainability campaigners warn of serious economic consequences resulting from failure 
to secure a deal.
Unilateral action by the EU has failed to prompt a commensurate response from either 
the US or China. Bowing to intensified lobbying by energy and other heavy industries 
who face tough carbon constraints, the EU warns other parties that trade measures are 
being considered in order to protect those industries against cheap, carbon-intensive 
imports.
A national roll out of smart meters and energy display devices begins in this period, 
■ ■  although coverage remains too low to deliver significant savings through behavioural 
change. Ambivalence at the household level towards voluntary actions on climate 
change prevents any significant attitudinal or behavioural change around household 
energy use.
There is an increase in the uptake of retrofit and micro-generation technologies by 
private households over the period, although a relatively low starting point means there is 
only a small impact on demand for gas and electricity.
In line with an improved emissions target, the EU establishes plans for increasingly 
stringent efficiency standards for electrical goods over the forthcoming decade.
LE Environmental groups seek to influence dietary habits through the promotion of a low carbon diet, gaining some support from celebrity chefs and supermarket chains, but with 
limited uptake from hesitant consumers.
Efforts to encourage home growing of basic food staples are also met with brief 
enthusiasm but limited success. Meanwhile, food waste is reduced to some extent.
Although initially constrained by the slow recovery, sales of new vehicles begin to pick up 
again with more fuel efficient models enjoy an increasing share of the market. Demand 
for electric and hybrid vehicles also send positive signals to manufacturers regarding the 
promise of future sales.
Lingering scepticism around the merits of voluntary behavioural change prevent any 
significant shift in environmental attitudes towards transport use.
After falling during the recession, aviation bounces back with strong growth. Even with 
aviation brought into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2012, the move has little 
impact on prices due to the abundance of permits allocated to the industry.
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The 2015 summit descends into crisis, with seemingly intractable divisions between 
negotiating parties. Despite desperate efforts from a broad alliance of activists to push 
for an agreement, the summit fails to reach a conclusive outcome, putting the entire 
UNFCCC process in doubt.
The EU sets a timetable for the imposition of trade barriers to protect carbon intensive 
industries and prevent them from relocating to other regions, sparking immediate 
retaliation from the US and China through the World Trade Organisation.
The period is marked by a slowdown in economic activity as trade disputes multiply 
between key countries and trading blocs.
In the US, efforts to boost energy security focus on the development of North American 
fossil fuel supplies.
In China, increased priority is given to developing the domestic market.
Increased demand from developing nations puts upward pressure on prices, just as 
world markets are marred by trade disputes, leading to significantly increased prices for 
commodities and fuels.
In the UK, as elsewhere in the EU, business certainty is rocked by developments in 
international trade. Industry opinion is divided on the merits of trade action. Those that 
largely serve the European market argue trade barriers are necessary if their businesses 
are to be protected from competition from cheaper, more carbon intensive imports. 
Others, particularly exporting industries, raise concerns that their goods will be less able 
to compete on the international market if strict emissions standards are driven through 
domestically without commensurate action abroad.
Uncertainty around the international situation saps investor enthusiasm for industrial 
decarbonisation projects, although many other investment opportunities remain attractive 
such as renewable energy installations, with domestic government commitments 
unaffected by international concerns.
Funding for the green bank remains at a low level, with government nervous about 
redirecting further funds to low carbon development at a time when the economy is 
experiencing a slow down as a direct result of trade action resulting from lack of climate 
action abroad.
In the light of funding and political constraints, plans to roll out a nationwide retrofit of 
vulnerable households are shelved.
Ongoing investment in electricity decarbonisation continues to deliver carbon reductions, 
even as demand is rising. But if plans for the electrification of transport and heat are to 
proceed, far greater capacity is required than the current investment climate is delivering.
With uncertainty around how international trade disputes will be resolved, there is some 
reorientation of the economy around local production of goods and services. Although 
resulting in overall emissions savings, from reduced transportation and more efficient 
production processes, this relocalisation also brings those emissions back within the 
jurisdiction of the UK, putting further stress on self-imposed emissions targets.
Although the trade disputes have encouraged some increase in domestic production, 
consumers are increasingly resentful of the increased costs arising from these disputes, 
with consumer groups drawing attention to the impact of increased prices on the poorest 
in society, and calling for a rethink on the pursuit of unilateral action.
Isolated climate action in the EU has resulted in significant emissions cuts, but the use of 
carbon offsetting schemes to make up the gap between actual cuts and legally-binding 
targets has drawn sharp criticism from other countries and from critics within the EU.
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International trade disputes and rising commodity and fuel prices have taken their toll on 
the global economy, leading to calls for intemational compromise on trade and emissions 
cuts.
The roll out of smart meters and energy display devices continues over this period, 
^  leading to widespread coverage by 2020. The devices encourage some reduction in 
electricity demand due to cost concerns, but with continuing reservations towards pro- 
environmental behaviour, significant householder engagement around energy reduction 
has failed to materialise.
Retrofit of private households proves increasingly popular, with demand increasing as 
fuel costs soar. However, plans for a publicly funded retrofit programme across 
vulnerable households are put on hold over this period.
Attempts at improved standards for the energy efficiency of household appliances are 
stalled amid trade disputes. With increasing demands in terms of the size and 
performance of appliances such as televisions, consoles, fridges etc, electricity use for 
these appliances increases.
IIL Although the trade situation has encouraged some increase in demand for domestic food produce, this shift has taken place amid resentment rather than enthusiasm, with many 
consumers feeling they are being penalised by increased costs when trade measures 
have failed to elicit legally binding commitments from other countries. Adoption of a lower 
carbon diet is therefore a by-product of higher prices, rather than enduring attitudinal 
change.
Another by-product of increasing prices is the reduction in food waste, as households 
become increasingly conscious of the need for better food purchasing, planning and 
storage to reduce overall costs.
The research and development of electric vehicles and the necessary charging 
infrastructure have been a priority of EU governments, providing some investor 
confidence during a time of uncertainty around low carbon investments. However, with 
less enthusiasm for such technologies outside of Europe, and trade barriers affecting the 
import of key materials and components, technological development has been slower 
than hoped. Sales of electric vehicles have increased, although with persistently high 
purchasing costs the mass electrification of transport seems a more distant prospect. 
Plug-in hybrid vehicles have taken a larger share of the market, while the traditional 
internal combustion engine seems set to dominate the market for the foreseeable future, 
with steadily improving fuel efficiencies in response to concerns over fuel prices.
Increasing fuel prices encourage private car owners to economise to an extent, although 
there is little appetite for a significant shift to public transport or walking/cycling.
Although flights within the EU are subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme, the industry 
continues to benefit from a generous allowance of permits. Attempts to apply charges for 
international flights become yet another area of dispute through the WTO.
Increased fuel prices have had some impact on the growth of the industry, but 
enthusiasm for foreign travel is otherwise unabated.
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With little progress on emissions reductions from other parties, the appetite within 
Europe for further unilateral action on climate change is severely diminished.
Meanwhile, there is an increasing acceptance within the US that action on climate 
change is both necessary and inevitable, and a softening of the Chinese stance on a 
legally-binding emissions cap. In an orchestrated stand down from the deadlocked trade 
disputes, the EU begins to scale back its use of trade measures, in retum for bilateral 
agreements on emissions reductions from trade partners.
After years of trade disputes and the threat of increasing protectionism, the result is a 
compromise which - through some energy efficiency savings -  stabilises commodity and 
fuel prices on world markets in the short term. Nevertheless, critics insist the bilateral 
agreements fall far short of the drastic cuts in emissions necessary to tackle climate 
change.
While European countries continue to pursue domestic decarbonisation programmes, the 
dismantling of trade barriers means consumption of carbon intensive imports continues 
to grow.
Jk In the UK, the dismantling of trade barriers leads to a resurgence in economic growth in 
the short term, and a drop in prices of goods and services from overseas.
Though domestic emissions continue to fall as a result of ongoing decarbonisation 
programmes, a flood of cheap carbon intensive imports causes emissions from 
consumption to rise rapidly before beginning to stabilise, as producer countries begin 
their own decarbonisation programmes.
Through the 2020s, environmental groups push hard to raise awareness of the impact of 
embedded emissions. For some, the disparity between domestic and foreign carbon 
intensity is a reason to 'buy British', but recent experience with trade measures and the 
resulting price impact leads most consumers to believe that the solution is further 
decarbonisation of those overseas economies, rather than the relocalisation of their own. 
Concessions on emissions from the US and China, however limited, simply reinforce this 
view.
Good progress is made with electrification of transport and heat over the decade, but 
delayed investment during the previous period and subdued public support mean that the 
energy system remains significantly dependant on fossil fuel inputs by 2030.
With coverage of smart meters essentially complete, households are better able to 
"  monitor and minimise energy use as a cost saving measure. By the end of the period, 
more advanced metering contracts become available, enabling cheaper per unit 
electricity in exchange for flexible operation of appliances including fridges, freezers, hot 
water tanks and storage heaters.
With high prices having contributed to a significant increase in fuel poverty, a nationwide 
programme of retrofit for the most vulnerable households is finally given the go ahead. 
Despite a delayed start, increased capacity in the industry means this work can proceed 
rapidly, contributing to significant reductions in gas use by 2030. Retrofit of private 
households continues apace.
I  W| I The immediate drop in food prices after trade barriers are removed leads to a significant 
increase in imported, particularly air-freighted food products. The prospect of emissions 
reductions from producer nations, however limited, ensures a low level of consumer 
engagement around the carbon intensity of food purchasing.
The return of lower food prices also means a slight relapse in levels of food waste.
Further investment in infrastructure and technological development through this period 
makes electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles increasingly financially viable. By the end of
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the period, these account for the majority of new vehicle sales, although internal 
combustion engines continue to dominate the existing vehicle fleet.
As well as a preference for fuel efficiency in the purchase of new vehicles, increasing 
vehicle fuel costs lead to a reduction in single person car journeys, with colleagues, 
neighbours and friends finding ways to combine journeys where convenient, aided by 
advances in information and communications technology.
Increasing vehicle fuel costs also lead to an increase in public transport use, with 
electrification of the rail network leading to further emissions reductions.
With aviation now receiving fewer allowances under the EU ETS, costs begin to increase 
over the period. Concessions on tackling international aviation mean that long-haul 
flights gradually become subject to carbon pricing, but the appetite for foreign travel 
ensures continued growth in aviation emissions attributable to UK households.
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6.5 Scenario D
Over the edge
With little effort on emissions reduction, the global 
economy is exposed to increasing fuel prices towards 
2020. With intensified social pressure to reduce fuel 
prices, and unable to work cooperatively on establishing 
an equitable emissions regime, countries instead pursue 
divergent, often conflicting energy security policies. The 
persistence o f fossil fuel extraction as part o f those 
policies extinguishes any hope o f a low carbon transition, 
and leads to international conflict.
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The failure of Copenhagen leads to a loss of faith in the UNFCCC process and the 
effective abandonment of any serious attempts to secure an intemational emissions 
regime.
Short term action is taken around the world to stimulate the global economy.
Commodity and fuel prices remain below pre-recession levels for some years, offering 
little incentive for energy or resource efficiency.
Media portrayal of climate science and activists is increasingly scathing, with the 
individuals involved being accused of pushing a political agenda that risks undermining 
the recovery. Extreme weather events are attributed to natural variability and in many 
cases to poor development strategies, including deforestation.
Prioritising deficit reduction, the UK government renege on a number of key 
environmental policies, focusing political capital on pushing through cuts in public 
spending.
Amid the austerity measures, employment remains the primary concern for the majority of 
households.
Climate scepticism among the public is fed by further negative portrayals of climate 
science in the popular UK media, even as limited corners of the progressive UK media 
report on climate change in accordance with the mainstream scientific findings.
The environmental movement fails to attract significant support over the period with 
enduring scepticism on the part of the public preventing any significant behavioural 
change or political action.
A lack of funding mechanisms prevents any significant expenditure on home insulation, 
"  let alone micro-generation.
LÏL With food prices remaining relatively stable, and in the absence of any other behavioural incentives, food consumption patterns show little change over this period.
The slow recovery limits new vehicle sales at first, and when sales do begin to pick up 
there is no significant 'above trend' shift to more fuel efficient models. Lack of any 
behavioural incentives over this period means no significant reduction in vehicle use, e.g 
through a shift to public transport use or car sharing.
As the economy recovers, and in the absence of any policy measures to mitigate against 
aviation growth, the industry sees record passenger numbers.
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From 2015, rising global demand leads to significant increases in prices of commodities 
and fuels.
The global environmental lobby calls for a transition away from fossil fuels, but these 
calls are drowned out by lobbyists in different countries insisting on further investment in 
fossil fuel resources for energy security.
In the US, this leads to rapidly increased investment in non-conventional oil and gas and 
further deep sea exploration. In Europe, there are calls for closer cooperation with 
Russia to secure long term gas supplies, and investment in deep sea oil and gas 
resources in the Arctic and North sea.
By 2020, significantly increased investment helps to stunt the increase in fuel prices but 
with little action on developing alternative energy solutions, countries remain locked in to 
carbon intensive development for the foreseeable future.
jk  In the UK, increasing fuel prices lead to some reduced consumption but social pressures
j k  on government to act eventually lead to some reduction in fuel taxes. Towards the end of
this period, significant investment in oil and gas exploration reduce these price pressures, 
removing any real incentive for households to adopt significant energy conservation 
measures.
Meanwhile, some decarbonisation of the electricity supply has taken place, through 
increased investments in renewables and further switch from coal to gas. However, the 
absence of sufficient direct support in the form of subsidies, and the lack of any real
prospect of a global emissions regime lead to a slow down in investment in renewable
capacity.
Despite temporary price increases during the early part of this period, the slowing of this 
”  trend offers little incentive to households to invest in retrofit measures. Insufficient 
support for micro-generation also prevents any significant adoption of these 
technologies.
ilL Food prices are affected by increased global demand and higher fuel prices. Consumers respond by shifting to more affordable food products with little impact in terms of 
reducing carbon emissions.
In addition to purchasing cheaper food products, some action is taken to reduce food 
waste in response to high costs.
A significant rise in vehicle fuel prices is then alleviated through reduced fuel tax, 
removing pressure on households to shift from private car use, or towards more efficient 
vehicles. Although the research and development of electric and hybrid vehicles 
continues, insufficient funding ensures these remain expensive and very much on the 
periphery.
With environmental attitudes undergoing little change over this period, and vehicle fuel 
prices brought under control, there is little appetite for a shift to public transport use, or 
walking/cycling as an alternative.
Aviation fuel costs rise over this period, then stabilise. Meanwhile, increasing household 
disposable income means that even in the face of increased costs, this important 
aspiration is increasingly fulfilled.
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In Europe and the US, measures to bring additional fossil fuel supplies onstream have 
helped to alleviate price pressures in the short term. While gas supplies remain sufficient 
to meet demand over this period, oil supplies plateau through to 2025.
In the first half of this period, in developing countries, increased prices for food, fuel and 
basic commodities leads to social unrest and humanitarian crises. In developed 
countries, despite measures to increase domestic oil production, limited global supply 
leads again to steadily increasing prices.
The global market for oil becomes increasingly redundant as powerful consumer nations 
pursue direct bilateral supply agreements with producers.
In the UK, some increased renewable capacity contributes to the electricity supply, but 
apparent lack of public support for a wholescale decarbonisation programme have seen 
increased gas supplies used to replaced retiring coal and nuclear power stations.
With domestic oil supplies grossly inadequate to meet demand, and global market 
mechanisms under threat, the UK looks vulnerable to oil shocks. With increasing prices 
once more towards the middle of this period, pressure mounts on government for further 
tax reductions.
While environmental campaigners continue to call for desperate measures to shift away 
from fossil fuels, the movement becomes increasingly marginalised from the crisis politics 
that defines the period. Rising membership of environmental NGOs among young people 
offers hope, but can do little to divert the UK from its current path in the short term.
Towards the end of this period, it is established that global oil production peaked in 2025. 
The associated price shocks lead to economic crisis. Major oil consumers, including the 
US, Europe and China compete for access to remaining oil resources, particularly in the 
Middle East, leading to military skirmishes and conflict by proxy.
Meanwhile, efforts to increase production of unconventional oil supplies receive 
substantial investment, enjoying a level of commitment that sustainability advocates 
could only have dreamed of with regard to their own cause.
Competition over oil leaves many developing countries unable to secure the feedstocks 
for agricultural production, leading to widespread humanitarian disaster.
Transportation costs also affect global trade, with air freight becoming increasingly 
untenable.
Jjk In the UK, an oil price shock pushes the economy into recession towards the end of the 
period.
Despite right wing calls for intervention abroad, the UK's reduced standing in the world 
leaves little scope for competing with the US and China for oil resources. Instead, 
emergency measures are introduced to ration fuel for agricultural use first, public 
transport second, and private car use last.
Significant steps to secure long term gas supplies has removed any immediate pressure 
■ ■  on households to adopt retrofit measures to reduce gas consumption, although prices 
rise again towards the end of this period, tracking high oil prices.
Household electricity demand continues to increase over the period, but insufficient 
investment in renewables and continued reliance on gas means reduction in emissions 
proceeds slowly.
JL
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In the early half of this period food consumption is impacted by increasing prices, but this 
is partially offset by increasing incomes and continued adaptation through purchase of 
cheaper food products. As the period progresses, a crisis in global food production leads 
to shortages of imported foods. As a result, households are forced to adopt dietary 
changes that imply some reduction in carbon intensity.
Food waste is significantly reduced over this period, as pressures mount on households 
for better management of household budgets.
Despite a stabilisation of prices for vehicle fuels by the beginning of this period, global 
developments lead to further price shocks, partly offset by government action to reduce 
fuel taxes. By the end of the period though, private car use has been significantly 
curtailed.
Where private cars are used, measures are in place to effectively oblige drivers to carry 
passengers. Fuel inefficient vehicles are subject to increasing vilification. More efficient 
vehicles take up a far larger share of new vehicle sales, although sales drop away to due 
to the recession. Electric and hybrid cars see a surge in popularity, but from such a small 
base that they make up only a small share of the market by 2030.
Public transport use sees a surge over the second half of this period.
Gradually increasing prices in the early half of this period give way to wholescale shocks, 
with many airlines falling victim to economic conditions. In the UK, a combination of the 
high cost of aviation fuels and an economic recession leads to a collapse in demand 
towards the end of the period.
166
h  T i  I I I  
2010
Illustrative Quantification 
(for full breakdown see Appendix VIII)
Scenario D: UK Household Expenditure (total)
-----^
2030
1400000
g  1200000
oegfla
8c2!
Ew2âTJI
1000000
800000
600000
400000
■J5 2000000}OH
■  Misc. goods and services
□  Health
■  Education
■  Furnishings; HH oqpt & maint
■  Communication
■  Other housing
■  Recreation and cultire
■  Restaurants and hotels
■  Clothing and footwear
■  Alcohol and tobacco
■  Food and non-alcoholic drinte
■  Other transport
■  Other fuels
□  Vehicle fuels and lubricants
■  Gas
■  Electricity
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Q)Oo
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Scenario D: UK Household Emissions (total)
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
■  Misc. goods and services 
□  Health
■  Education
■  Furnishings; HH eqpt& maint
■  Commiri cation
■  Ottier housing
■  Recreation and culture
■  Restaurants and hotels
■  Clothing and foot\*ear
■  Alcohol and tobacco
■  Food and non-alcoholic drinks
■  Other transport
■  Other fuels
IB Vehicle fuels and lubricants
■  Gas
■  Electricity
167
6.6 Scenarios Summary
In this section, the emissions figures for each scenaiio are brought together to enable 
cross-compaiison, before some general reflections are offered in relation to key factors.
6.6.1 Emissions comparison
In the preceeding sections, each of the four scenario narratives were accompanied by 
two graphs summarising total expenditure and emissions (across all categories of goods 
and services) associated with UK household consumption from 2010-2030. More 
specific details about the assumptions used for each variable in each categoiy and across 
each time period are available in Appendices V-Vlll, along with a series of notes 
explaining the reasoning behind those assumptions.
A comparison of the total expenditure charts reveals a relatively consistent set of 
pathways across the foui* scenarios, with tlie exception of'Scenario D: Over the edge', in 
which economic turbulence from 2025 onwards results in stagnating household incomes 
and expenditure. More pronounced is the difference in emissions ti'ajectories between 
the foui' scenaiios, compared in Figuie 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Emissions trajectories across the four scenarios (in MtCOic)
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Looking at these fom' emissions ti'ajectories, a number of observations can be made with 
regai'ds to the general direction of each. In 'B: All togetlier, now', emissions continue to 
increase in the first five years, but decline steadily thereafter, to end at the lowest level 
of all the four scenarios. 'D: Over the edge' demonstrates a steady increase in emissions 
through to 2025, before events (described in the nanutive) lead to a severe economic 
contraction resulting in significant emissions reduction. Nevertheless, the fossil fuel 
intensive nature of economic development over the course of this scenario means that 
even those reduced emissions remain at the highest level of all four scenarios.
In 'A: Better late than never', the lack of proactive change in response to rising prices of 
fossil fuels slows the economy towards 2020, before a strong global commitment to 
decarbonisation leads eventually to a decline in emissions. In 'C: Trading woes', there is 
a proactive attempt at decai'bonisation across Eui'ope in the first half of the scenario, but 
trade conflicts with China and the US have their own dampening effect on the economy, 
and the resulting compromise adversely affects the rate of emissions reductions. Thus, 
for Scenarios A and C, despite the distinct economic development pathways described 
in the narratives, the net result is a close proximity in the 2030 emissions levels between 
the two.
An important comparison should also be made between 'Scenaiio A: Better late than 
never' and 'Scenario D: Over the edge', where developments in the first five years are 
remarkably similar, but where, in response to the fossil fuel and commodity price 
pressures fiom 2015-2020, there is a divergence in reactions seen at the social level, 
which drive responses at the political level, i.e. the (un)successful establishment of an 
emissions regime. These scenarios highlight the significance of social action as a 
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driving force in any transition.
Ultimately, it is a matter of opinion as to whether these trajectories ought to be seen as 
'conventional' or 'alternative' in terms of their level of deviation as discussed in Section 
3.4.3. In this research, the process of establishing appropriate assumptions for use in 
the model has proceeded by using the historical trends identified in the data as a starting 
point for all foui* scenaiios. Then, according to developments in the storylines, those 
assumptions gradually deviate from this tiend. The key point to note here is the 
'gradual' nature of that deviation. That is, where expenditui'e in a given category of 
goods and services has been found to have a strong positive contiibution from 
exogenous non-economic factors in the past, in this research the decision has been made 
not to suddenly 'flip' this contribution on its head but rather to phase in any changes 
over time. Similarly, where one scenaiio exhibits a change in certain prices due to 
economic policy interventions, it is assumed that these would also be phased in 
gradually. In that sense, the rate of change applied to the quantitative trends used in the 
scenaiios is subject to inertia.
Imported emissions and the relevance of the consumption perspective
One of the key concerns raised in this research is the growing gap between emissions 
measuied from a production versus consumption perspective. The decarbonisation of 
the UK economy over the last 20 years has been due in lai'ge part to the 'dash for gas' 
and the offshoring of heavy indusüy. Households have meanwhile continued to 
purchase more goods and services, now increasingly produced abroad. The 
implications of any further shift in production and consumption patterns are explored in 
the qualitative scenaiios, although these are hard to quantify in the model used to 
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produce illustrative emissions figures, as no explicit distinction is made between 
emissions from imported vs domestically produced goods and services. Nevertheless, 
the issue can be investigated further by conducting a thought experiment pitting strong 
domestic decarbonisation in the UK against inaction 'abroad'. As documented earlier, 
when tested with experts it became clear that this simple formulation was implausible, 
and that the UK could only feasibly act in concert with the rest of the EU, however the 
initial thought experiment and associated calculations provided a useful foimdation for 
exploring the growing emissions gap. In those calculations, emissions over the period 
1992-2004 were seperated into those associated with direct energy use (electricity, gas, 
vehicle fuels and other fuels) and those 'embedded' in goods and services. Embedded 
emissions were then fuither divided into 'UK' and 'imported' emissions (Druckman & 
Jackson, 2010). These thiee categories, 'direct', 'UK embedded' and 'imported 
embedded' emissions could then be assessed in terms of their levels, growth and share 
of the total over that period. Conducting a simple extrapolation, it was then possible to 
suggest where this would lead by 2030, assuming those historical growth trends 
continued. Table 6.3 summarises the results.
Emissions in MtCOae 
(share of total)
1992 2004 2030
projected
annual growth
Direct 244 (41%) 235 (35%) 217 (20%) -0.30%
UK Embedded 234 (39%) 260 (38%) 330 (30%) 0.92%
Imported Embedded 118(20%) 181 (27%) 563 (50%) 4.47%
Table 6.3: Extrapolated trends in household consumption emissions
The results from this simple analysis imply that even without a domestic 
decarbonisation programme, emissions attiibutable to the UK (direct and UK embedded 
emissions) would fall as a share of total UK household emissions from 73% to 50%. It
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may be argued that only so much of UK goods and services could really be 
'economically' offshored, and that accordingly a slowing of the growth for imported 
emissions should take place over time. Nevertheless, it can be countered that if a 
domestic decarbonisation programme were to be introduced, direct emissions (and UK 
embedded) could fall diamatically. Thus, although the result would be lower absolute 
emissions, the proportion of the remaining emissions falling within the jurisdiction of 
the UK and therefore amenable to UK policy intervention, would be lower.
These illustrative calculations emphasise the significance of the axes chosen in this 
study. The continued uncertainties around how these might play out have implications 
for policymakers as well as for households and individuals themselves, in understanding 
the global implications of domestic and household behavioui'. If things turn out one 
way, it may be that consumption emissions fall into line with production emissions, 
obviating the need for a redundant 'shadow' accounting method. Alternately, as the 
calculations and scenaiios suggest, the gap between consumption and production 
emissions may widen fuither still, perhaps reinforcing the need for a complementary if 
not competing approach to the official accounting mechanism.
6.6.2 Reflections on scenario inputs and outcomes
In the development of any set of scenarios, it seems inevitable that the key themes, 
uncertainties, drivers and outcomes of interest will - to a significant extent - be a 
product of their time and place. The wider social and cultuial setting of the work and of 
the facilitator(s), experts and participants will necessarily influence the process, and the 
emergence in the recent past of particular thieats and opportunities in the public
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discoui'se will influence the perceived significance of different vaiiables. There is 
therefore an inescapable subjectivity about the framing of the 'problem' space and the 
articulation of 'solutions' to that problem.
It is also inevitable that significant events will come to pass during the course of 
constructing the scenarios, challenging and/or vindicating the selection of particular 
vaiiables and values in different ways. The present study has certainly witnessed 
important developments, both stresses and shocks, that might impact on the perceived 
significance of different variables included in the scenaiios, and the direction in which 
those were assimied to unfold in the given circumstances of each naiTative. Although 
there have been many developments over that time, it is perhaps worth reflecting on 
those that relate most strongly to the two key uncertainties and to the challenge of high 
oil and food prices, starting with the latter.
Food and fuel prices
In Chapter 5, it was explained that a period of rising costs of fuels and basic 
coimnodities would be intioduced to each scenario, from 2015-2020. The particular 
conditions of each naiTative would then determine the social, political and economic 
implications over the subsequent period. The decision to include such a development 
was motivated by the publication of the UKERC report on global oil depletion, with its 
conclusion that there was a significant risk of a peak in conventional oil production 
before 2020 (UKERC, 2009a).
Oil prices had reach a record high of $ 147/barrel in 2008, with a knock on effect on 
food and other commodity prices. However, the financial crisis that followed (and the
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subsequent drop in global demand for oil and coimnodities), coupled with the apparent 
slow recovery, were taken as a reason for assuming that any future oil price rises would 
be some time in coming. In fact, over the coui*se of the development of these scenaiios, 
oil prices have recovered fi'om a low of around $35/barrel in 2009 to over $115 in 
March 2011. At the same time, global food prices have reached historic highs (Brown, 
2011).
A comprehensive analysis of the causes and effects of these price changes is beyond the 
scope of this discussion, but at the time of writing it is clear that there are pressuies on 
both supply and demand, including; imrest in the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) oil producing countries; growing demand from emerging markets; increased 
domestic consumption within oil producing nations, increased costs associated with 
extraction of non-conventional oil (not forgetting the cost of disaster response as in the 
case of the BP Deepwater Horizon accident).
An analysis of factors behind the recent record food prices is also beyond the scope of 
this study, but once again these clearly include a mixture of demand and supply side 
pressures, such as: the changing diet of the bmgeoning middle class in developing 
countries and the impact of numerous extreme weather events on food crops in 2010.
Important to note here is the dynamic inteiplay between these different factors, with 
higher oil and gas prices leading to higher costs of energy and resoiuce inputs for 
agricuhui'e, and higher food prices (among other things) contiibuting to the umest in 
MENA countiies and the subsequent impact on oil production.
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It was suggested in the scenario narratives that developments in energy and 
environmental policy, as well as social outlook, would determine how well-equiped the 
world would be to deal with these crises through 2015-2020. With price pressures 
reappearing so soon, however, the exact role of social and political factors in responding 
to these remains in the balance. Much depends on whether these price levels stabilise, 
fall away, or even intensify in light of fiuther developments. Clearly, the global (and 
UK) economy can only withstand so much, but exactly what level oil prices would need 
to reach and for how long, to bring about a recession, remains a point of ongoing 
debate. At the same time, the higher fuel prices might be the catalyst for a rapid shift in 
social and political attitudes towards a low cai'bon transition. In developing countries of 
course, the impact of high food prices is felt all the more severely, and the spectre of 
humanitarian crises abroad - as articulated in some of the scenarios - could well play a 
part in motivating abmpt social responses in the UK, sooner than imagined.
Europe
One of the key uncertainties used to frame this scenaiio study was the question of 
whether or not the UK (as part of the EU) would voluntarily adopt more ambitious 
tai'gets at the outset of this decade, and partake in an 'early ti'ansition' to a low carbon 
economy.
The initial impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the perceived significance of various 
economic factors were clearly formative to this study. However, the crisis was far fr om 
over, nor were the full consequences yet clear, while the scenario study was being 
conducted. As such, a variety of economic factors related to that crisis remain deeply 
uncertain, affecting the prospects for a low carbon transition. In Europe, concerns over
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levels of sovereign debt, the so called Eui'ozone crisis, culminated in May 2010 with a 
bailout package for Greece, and fears that the crisis might spread to other peripheral 
Eui'ozone countries. In November 2010, Ireland became the second country to receive a 
financial package from the EU/IMF. The downgrading of some European countries by 
credit ratings agency continues to have an impact on market confidence (BBC, 2011). 
Depending on one's political and economic outlook, concerns over levels of sovereign 
debt are either alleviated or compounded by austerity measures at the national level. 
For some, the measures are necessary to drive down deficits as quickly as possible and 
restore confidence, while for others the measm*es risk exacerbating economic woes by 
adding to unemployment and heightening the chances of a double dip recession.
It is impossible to know how the uncertainties around the broad economic fortunes of 
European countries will play out, but it should be clear that the outcomes will be cmcial 
in determining approaches to - and levels of - investment for a low carbon economy. If 
anything then, the increased stakes around Em'opean countiies' finances and the 
associated impact on energy and enviromnental policy have come into even sharper 
relief since the outset of the study.
Aside from the issue of finance, there remains the question of whether or not EU 
decision-makers adopt the str onger target of a 30% reduction on 1990 levels by 2020. 
The UK climate change secretary, Chris Huhne, has argued: "moving to 30% would give 
our businesses a head-start in new green industries and get us off the oil hook quicker, 
insulating us from oil price spikes" (Harvey, 2011b). Meanwhile, opponents of such a 
move have argued that a unilateral adoption of sti'onger targets would simply lead to 
further offshoring of industiy. In the most recent analysis at the time of writing, the
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recently announced low carbon 'roadmap' for the EU appears to suggest a compromise 
of 25%, although this target would require to be ratified (Public Service, 2011).
International emissions regime
Ahead of the Copenhagen summit in December 2009, there was a sense of anticipation 
over the possibility of a comprehensive global deal, as evidence by the responses 
gathered duiing the internal interviews in this study. Unfortunately, by early 2010, this 
anticipation had been replaced by a deep sense of pessimism, even cynicism, made clear 
by the responses from the external interviews conducted duiing that period. This 
pessimism inevitably informed the development of the scenarios, ensuring that even in 
the most 'optimistic' or 'green' scenario (B) the emergence of a comprehensive global 
deal on emissions would have to wait until 2015. The subsequent summit in Cancun in 
December 2010 was widely expected to achieve not very much at all, and indeed, 
despite talk of consensus, no fuither legally binding commitments were adopted over 
existing measmes by member states. In fact, given the expectation in some quaiters that 
the entire UNFCCC process was now defunct, even the achievement of a political 
agreement (to agree further measuies in the futuie) was hailed a success (WWF, 2010). 
The speed of change in outlook that has taken place fi'om pre-Copenhagen to post- 
Cancun - anticipation, disappointment, disillusionment, renewed hope - is a reminder of 
both the significance and uncertainty that continues to suiTOund the establisliment of an 
intemational emissions regime.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, a short guide to reading the scenarios has been provided, followed by the 
four scenario naiTatives themselves. A comparison was then made between the 
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emissions trajectories for each scenario, and with regards to imported emissions a brief 
calculation was performed to highlight the importance of adopting a consumption 
perspective as a complement to the traditional production perspective. Finally, some bf 
the key factors explored in the scenarios were discussed as they relate to recent 
developments, including around food and fuel prices, European policy on climate 
change and the prospects of an international emissions regime.
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7. Conclusions
A summary of key issues arising out of the scenario naiTatives themselves was provided 
in Chapter 6. In this chapter, some of the more general conclusions arising from the 
overall research process are highlighted, including lessons for qualitative narrative 
development and dissemination, ideas for a revised model and reflections on the 
epistemological enquiry discussed in Chapter 4.
7.f Scenario planning and beyond
Chapter 5 described personal correspondence between this author and Ron Bradfield of 
Stiathclyde Business School in which Bradfield ai'gued that: "developing scenarios is 
not science, it is art and craft and as such, the process must he flexible ” (Bradfield, 
personal correspondence, 2009). Accordingly, in that chapter, differences were 
highlighted between an eaiiy proposed methodology and the steps that were actually 
earned out. In many scenario building exercises, paiticipatory approaches aie centi'al to 
the development of the narratives. However, one of the key challenges in this research 
was the need to maintain ownership over the process, in order for the outcomes to 
qualify as a personal contribution in the form of a PhD. For this reason, paiticipation 
was limited to data collection thiough expert interviews. It was also made clear in 
Chapter 3 that this resear ch was focused strictly on the task of 'scenario building', and 
that any 'scenario plamring' activities would be perfoiined subsequent to the main body 
of reseai'ch and completion of tliis thesis. Having developed the scenarios then, it is 
worth considering how these might be disseminated successfully in order to ensure 
maximum impact.
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7.1.1 Scenario dissemination
An important next step, and a priority of the resear ch group, is to now prepare and 
publish a high-quality output aromid the scenarios, for public dissemination. In addition 
to the scenario narratives themselves, this 'glossy' publication might include a series of 
short responses from members of the research group, and/or a selection of external 
stakeholders. These responses would include a reflection on tire implications (for their 
discipline or sector) of each scenario, and might involve challenging some of the 
assumptions made.
Following publication of this 'glossy' report, it is anticipated that one or more 
stakeholder workshops would be organised, including academics, policy makers and 
business leaders, but also potentially civil society groups. By drawing out responses 
from stakeholders to specific characteristics of the different scenarios, it would be 
possible to identify perceived points of conflict or opportunity for specific groups on 
certain issues. Responses from one stakeholder group could be fed into the discussion 
of the scenarios presented to the next group. Ideally this process would be conducted in 
such a way that the groups were able to interact in a truly dynamic way, simultaneously 
debating and responding to the developments of the scenarios.
A final activity being discussed as pait of the dissemination process, possibly 
constituting part of the 'glossy' publication, is the development of a series of fictional 
accounts of individuals and households in each scenario. This was inspired by the use
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of 'Personas' in the field of Hmnan-Coniputer Interaction (HCl) Design, a technique 
developed to help software engineers better appreciate the needs of end users by 
representing the motivations, skills, (dis)abilities etc of a fictional character in the form 
of a short biography. Typically, the personas are built through a series of interviews 
with real users. The personas are then presented to the software engineers to encouiage 
them to reflect on how their design decisions might impact on these users. One 
outcome of any stakeholder workshops with civil society groups might be a collection 
of ideas around how individuals and households might respond to and shape the 
circumstances of each scenario, which may then be brought together into discrete stories 
representing different households according to the age and number of occupants, 
rural/urban setting, socio-economic status etc. These 'personas' might be portrayed as 
progressing in time through each scenario, with relevant actions, decisions and conflicts 
accounted for. Alternately, the personas might take the form of a reflection, in 2030, on 
the past 20 years.
The intention behind the inclusion of personas would be very much in keeping with the 
motivation for using the technique in HCl, namely to better represent individuals and 
the lifestyle choices they might make, for the benefit of decision and policy makers.
7.1.2 Ideas for a revised model
From the outset, the quantitative work performed within this study has been described 
as illustrative, with the intention tliat these should be read as secondaiy to the scenario 
narratives themselves. Inevitably, for those who prefer to deal with numbers, the 
quantitative side of the scenaiios may come to dominate, thus it remains an important
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aspect of any futm'e dissemination activities to ensure an appropriate representation of 
the model, its strengths and weaknesses, and its application in this study. Importantly 
though, the application of the model in these scenaiios has proved invaluable in 
assessing exactly what those stiengths and weakness are, and how things might have 
been done differently with the benefit of hindsight. Thus, several constructive ideas 
have emerged from the application of the model in the present work that might form 
part of any follow-up work devising a second version of the model. At the very least, 
these might prove insightful for other researchers developing different but related 
models.
Classification of goods and services
The disaggiegation of COICOP categories, as outlined in Chapter 5, has proved limiting 
in certain specific areas. Importantly, electiicity, gas and other fuels were disaggregated 
fi'om the top level 'housing' category, ensui'ing that trends within these emissions 
intensive sub-categories could be uncovered. Fuithermore, 'vehicle fuels and lubricants' 
was taken outside of 'tiansporf for explicit analysis. However, the cmrent study has 
made it cleai* where further disaggregation might prove useful in better understanding 
key trends, e.g. by extracting aviation fi'om 'other tiansporf.
The following list offers a proposed disaggregation that might be applied in any revision 
of the model:
01 - Food and non-alcoholic beverages^
02 - Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics
5 bold fonnatting indicates a usefiil categoiy. In some cases new composite categories have been 
proposed, with a suggested heading for the category indicated in single quotes, followed by a list of 
component categories from the official COICOP classification system.
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03 - Clothing and footwear
(04 - Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels) disaggregated into; 
'Rentals for housing’ composed of:
04.1 - Actual rentals for housing
04.2 - Imputed rentals for housing
’Household maintenance, repairs and services’ composed of:
04.3 - Maintenance and repair of the dwelling
04.4 - Water supply and miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling
04.5.1 Electricity
04.5.2 Gas
Other fuels composed of:
04.5.3 - Liquid fuels
04.5.4 - Solid fuels
04.5.5 - Heat energy
(05 - Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance) 
’Furnishings and routine household maintenance’ composed of:
05.1 - Furniture and furnishings, caipets and other floor coverings
05.2 - Household textiles
05.4 - Glasswai'e, tableware and household utensils
05.5 - Tools and equipment for house and gai'den
05.6 - Goods and services for routine household maintenance 
05.3 - Household appliances^
06 - Health 
(07 - Transport)
’Purchase and maintenance of personal vehicles’ composed of:
07.1 - Purchase of vehicles
07.2.1 - Spare parts and accessories for personal tiansport equipment
07.2.3 - Maintenance and repair of personal transport equipment
07.2.4 - Other services in respect of personal transport equipment
07.2.2 - Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment 
(07.3 - Transport services)
6 Fuither categories covering different types of electrical appliances can be found in recreation and 
culture, communications, and miscellaneous, thus tliere is an opportunity to consolidate these under a 
composite 'appliances' category
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’Rail, road, sea passenger transport’ composed of:
07.3.1 - Passenger transport by railway
07.3.2 - Passenger transport by road
07.3.4 - Passenger transport by sea and inland waterway
07.3.5 - Combined passenger transport
07.3.6 - Other purchased ti'ansport seiwices
07.3.3 - Passenger transport by air
OS - Communication
09 - Recreation and culture
- 09.1 - Audio-visual, photographic and information processing equipment
- 09.2 - Other major durables for recreation and culture
- 09.3 - Other recreational items and equipment, gardens and pets
- 09.4 - Recreational and cultural services
- 09.5 - Newspapers, books and stationery
09.6 - Package holidays (taken out of recreation and culture for possible 
combination with passenger tr ansport by air)
10 - Education
11 - Restaurants and hotels
12 - Miscellaneous goods and services:
-12.1 - Personal care 
-12.2 - Prostitution
- 12.3 - Personal effects n.e.c.
-12.4 - Social protection
- 12.7 - Other services n.e.c.
’Insurance and Financial Services’, composed of:
- 12.5 - Insur'ance
-12.6 - Financial services n.e.c.
Automating reallocation of expenditure
As part of the modelling process, assumptions were applied that led to increased or 
decreased expenditure in particular categories. Inevitably, for households that avoid
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expenditui'e in one area, e.g. on gas as a result of improved insulation, the money saved 
will be reallocated either as expenditui'e elsewhere or as savings. Unfortunately, no 
mechanism exists within the model at present to automate this process, meaning that - 
as assumptions are applied to specific categories - gaps emerge between household 
income and total expenditiue. One approach might be for futui'e expenditure in a 
paiticulai' category to be modified not only by the fixed income elasticity, but also by a 
dynamic variable that operates on 'remaining' or 'available' income, taking into account 
expenditure as cui'rently estimated for the other categories. More simply perhaps, any 
income saved in one category could be reallocated to other categories in a way that is 
proportional to the income elasticity, i.e. more of the avoided expenditiue would be 
allocated to categories that demonstiate a strong historical relationship between 
increases in income and increases in expenditui'e.
Translating production assumptions into consumption emissions
Given the preeminance of the production perspective, it is unsuiprising tliat the majority 
of work to date around modelling of emissions has adopted this approach. Accordingly, 
when policy documents appear indicating future emissions targets, a range of models 
can be adopted in order to assess how these targets might be distributed across different 
sectors of the national economy.
This research has argued the need for a consumption perspective and employed an 
econometi'ic model designed for that puipose. An important next step would be to think 
about how the fiequently published sectoral targets and pathways can be ti'anslated in a 
way that demonstiates the impact on UK household emissions from a consumption 
perspective. Cleai'ly it would be necessary to identify, for each category of goods and
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services, the breakdown of expenditure and emissions between the UK and other 
regions. At a very basic level, it would then be clearer where the sectoral tai'gets 
indicated for the UK economy might be expected to impact on different consumption 
categories. Similarly, if those other regions were themselves disaggregated into e.g. EU 
and rest of the world, then targets and pathways developed for the European economy 
could be similarly followed through.
7.2 Epistemological conclusions
At the outset of this study an epistemological question was raised, asking what 
contribution might be made to the knowledge space by a set of scenarios around the 
carbon intensity of UK household consumption. Chapter 4 described an enquiry into 
how historians explain or make sense of past events. This was intended as a guide for 
futures thinking: If scenario planning involves the positing of a causal narrative across 
possible friture events, then starting from more solid ground what lessons can be drawn 
from the process historians go through in developing a causal narrative across events 
that have already unfolded. As was shown in that chapter, even when historians take 
events that have already unfolded, trying to identify conclusively the set of causes that 
gave rise to those specific events is deeply problematic. The attempt to derive general 
laws that might indicate where such events can be predicted in the future was passed off 
as folly, mere speculation. Historians do not attempt to derive general laws in a 
scientific sense, but ratlier 'contextual generalisations' that may provide a helpful 
heuristic guide to understanding events within a limited time and place.
Despite this speculative aspect of historical analysis, the process at least begins with 
more or less scientific procedures (e.g. in assessing archaeological artefacts). In futures 
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thinking though, the building blocks are often those very generalisations and trends 
drawn ftom history. Thus, the epistemological contribution of scenarios can hardly be 
judged along scientific lines.
Benson and Stangroom argued that: "history is highly interpretive, to he sure, hut... 
...the interpretation is o f evidence, not o f daydreams or fantasies" (Benson & 
Stangroom, 2006, pp. 122-123). Interpretation can be more or less robust. Even once 
we accept that futures thinking is necessarily speculative then, there is still a role for 
ensuring that such speculation is based on the most robust interpretation of the data 
available.
As Kaplan explained, whereas the historian may be content with an explanation 
covering specific events: 'what is true of these cases', the scientist aims to discover what 
must be true in all cases (Kaplan, 1964, p. 123). Instead of settling for contextual 
generalisations then, it would be worth examining the social sciences to see just how 
much progress has been made in establishing 'general laws' for use in predictive work. 
In such an examination, a more complete review of the epistemologies of different 
disciplines, assessing strengths as well as weaknesses, might provide a grounding for a 
more informed synthesis of 'general trends' drawn from different bodies of work. 
Unfortunately, a rneaningfril review of the epistemology of psychology, sociology, 
political science etc remains beyond the scope of this work, but as this study employed 
an econometric model that derived tiends from historical data, a discussion of 
epistemology in economics was provided.
It was argued that since the establishment of the discipline, economists have moved
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from employing the method of inductivism, briefly through deductivism, before settling 
on an instrmnentalist approach as articulated by Milton Friedman in 1953, who ai'gued 
that the 'realism' of assumptions used in economic theory should be disregarded, and 
that economists should be concerned only with the accuracy of a theory's predictions 
(Friedman, 1953). This view has been heavily criticised by philosophers of economics, 
who insist that the examination of the realism of assumptions is essential to ensure the 
progression of the discipline. As suggested in Chapter 4, if simple 'um*ealistic' 
assumptions were sufficient to fully explain consumer behaviour, then perhaps this 
instrumentalist approach would be defensible. Instead, an analysis of the historical data 
(which was the basis for the quantification in this research) highlighted the important 
role played by non-economic factors across all categories of goods and services 
consumed by UK households, in some categories far outweighing the role of economic 
factors. Thus, if a more accurate explanation (and/or prediction) of consumer behavioui* 
is to be developed, this will require moving beyond instrumentalism towards a more 
systematic examination of the underlying assumptions employed in economic theory. 
Such an examination lies beyond the scope of this research. However, the scenario 
naiTatives have provided a 'sandpit' for the exploration of key economic and non­
economic factors that might influence UK consumer behaviom* over the next 20 years.
7.3 Concluding remarks
In the Introduction, tlnee reseai'ch questions were articulated. One of these, described 
as a prelimenary question, sought a definition of lifestyles for use in this research. 
Chapter 2 explored this question, concluding that - in relation to sustainability - the key 
to understanding lifestyles was consumption. Thus, four categories of consumption 
were adopted as a working framework in this research, with a variety of external factors 
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placed around these as drivers of consumption.
An epistemological question was also identified, asking what contribution can be made 
to the knowledge space by a set of scenaiios exploring the carbon intensity of lifestyles. 
In Chapter 4 this question was addressed from two angles. Fhstly, the epistemological 
contL'ibution of qualitative narratives was explored thiough an examination of history, 
including how historians have viewed their discipline thi'ough the ages. A discussion of 
causality and of general laws was provided, wherein it was concluded that rather than 
being a 'nomothetic' discipline concerned wiüi deriving general laws, history can be 
better understood as an 'idiographic' discipline focused on describing particular 
instances and events. Wliere generalisations do occur, these are 'contextual' 
generalisations and are not intended to be applied outside the time and place under 
investigation. Lessons were drawn from this discussion in relation to futuies thinking, 
where it was suggested that the term Wissenschaft might be employed, as in history, to 
describe "aM organised body o f knowledge acquired through research carried out 
according to generally agreed methods, presented in published reports, and subject to 
peer review” (Evans, 2000, p. 73). In addition, an examination of epistemological 
issues in economics were highlighted, indicating the progression (or regression) of 
approaches to validating economic theory, from inductivism, thiough deductivism and 
eventually on to instrumentalism where predictions alone are all that matter. In this 
way, the principle of rationality - originally intended as a 'mere abstraction' requiring 
subsequent accommodation of non-economic factors if human behaviour* were to be 
explained - was able to become enshrined in modern economics as a core assumption, 
however 'unrealistic'. Criticisms of this assumption were discussed, along with a 
summary of the model employed in this research, in which non-economic factors were
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shown to play an important role in consumer behaviour. Thus, if consumption is to be 
more fully understood, and sustainable consumption in particular encom*aged, then the 
accommodation of non-economic factors into the underlying framework of assumptions 
represents an essential step in the progression of the theory of consumer behaviour.
Finally, the centi'al research question asked how the carbon intensity of UK lifestyles 
might be affected by various external factors over the next 20 years. In conducting a 
scenario building exercise that resulted in four qualitative naiTatives with accompanying 
quantification, this research has illustrated a series of pathways that attempt to address 
this question. Those narratives were also quantified using a structural time series model 
based on historical trends in the data.
In arriving at appropriate assumptions for the different variables in each scenario, a 
decision was made to introduce any changes to the trends gradually over time. The 
comparison of emissions trajectories in Section 6.6 highlights the effect of this: rather 
than incorporating abnipt changes in voluntary behaviour change and economic 
incentives, these processes of social and economic change are instead characterised by a 
sense of inertia. Clearly, a decision could have been taken to dispense with such caution 
and to develop a more radical set of alternative trajectories by allowing historical tr*ends 
to be flipped at a specific point in time. However, that approach would itself require 
considerable justification, ideally with reference to historical data showing abrupt but 
persistent changes in the relevant trends. Such data may well exist outside the pur view 
of the present research (e.g. data from an earlier period, fi.*om an alternative country, or 
from more narrowly disaggregated categories of goods and services than are explored 
here), however the approach taken here has been to acknowledge those trends identified
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in the historical data that was used to infonn this research, and to adopt those trends as a 
starting point, requiring gradual and persistent pressure in a particular direction before 
any changes could really be seen to affect expenditure and emission outcomes.
As highlighted in section 6.6, there are several key issues arising out of the scenarios 
that may be relevant to policy and decision-makers in the UK and elsewhere. One of 
the key themes explored has been the role of trade and - in ’Scenario C: Trading woes' - 
even the use of trade measures, in affecting UK consiunption emissions. Clearly, any 
further decarbonisation of the UK economy, if it were to come at a cost to UK producers 
and manufacturers, would risk exacerbating the offshoring of heavy industry unless this 
decarbonisation takes place within an effective international emissions regime or is 
subject to the use of tarriffs on more carbon intensive imports. Exactly what impact 
these measur’es might have on the UK economy and consumption emissions would 
require further review, including through a more disaggregated multi-regional model of 
embedded emissions flows. Nevertheless, as a signpost of possible political trouble 
ahead, these scenarios have highlighted this tlireat.
Another surprise, as discussed in Section 6.6.2, has been the speed with which the 
prices of fossil fuels, food and basic commodities have recovered since the crash of 
2008, even in the midst of a lacklustre economic recovery in the developed world. 
Greater attention is now being paid to suggestions in recent data from the Inter-national 
Energy Agency that conventional oil production may in fact have peaked already 
(Inman, 2010). In light of these developments, the decision to adopt a 'peaking' period 
for conventional oil production of around 2015-2020 might now be considered 
conservative, nevertheless the approach is defended here as having made use of the
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conclusions from the most authoritative report to date on the subject. It is for the reader 
to reflect on how economic and energy policy, not to mention social unrest and other 
developments in the UK and elsewhere, might be affected if the threat of energy and 
resource depletion is found to be more inmiinent than has been supposed here. In that 
case, it must also be for the reader to consider how the storylines explored in these 
scenarios might nevertheless inform strategic responses on the part of different interest 
groups.
No set of scenarios can ever be said to provide conclusive explanations in a scientific 
sense. Importantly though, the epistemological enquiry carried out here has given 
context to the scenarios by clarifying the nature of the knowledge contribution they can 
be said to offer, namely that of informed narratives that play a 'propaedeutic' or learning 
role aimed at challenging people's assumptions and mental models, and assisting in 
making sense of the uncertainties of the present.
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Appendix I. Proposed Methodology
Email message sent to experts detailing the first iteration of a proposed methodology:
My intention is to interview approximately 20 experts in a 
variety of fields. My model of lifestyles focuses around 
consumption, as this is of course the key determinant of 
carbon emissions. The three main consumption clusters are 
Food/Nutrition, Transport, and Housing. Also I have 
identified six external factors that shape the development of 
our lifestyles: Social, Technological, Economic, Political,
Psychological and Environmental. Basically, I wish to 
identify experts that can speak for each of these 
clusters/factors. Of course an expert on 'Food' say, may well 
be more than just that, if they have an economics background 
or have had a role in advising on policy. But as a general 
rule, I want to secure a representative sample from across 
these key areas. Additionally, I wish to ensure that these 20 
or so experts come from across the range of sectors, 
public/private/third. My final consideration here is to 
ensure I don't simly recuirt 'green' experts, i.e. those who 
will speak normatively towards a sustainable future. I wish 
these scenarios to be descriptive and as such I think it is 
important to have a balance of views.
This selection of experts is not a major hurdle in itself, 
indeed I have prepared a shortlist of candidates. What I am 
struggling with though is how best to conduct the interviews. 
For example, largely inspired by [...] Kees van der Heidjen 
et al, there is the open ended approach of inviting 
interviewees to imagine themselves dealing with a 
clairvoyant, asking questions about the things of interest to 
them etc etc. This seems a particularly useful mechanism for 
putting the participant at ease, and allowing them to think 
in an unconventional manner. On the other hand I want to 
ensure I collect ideas across the full range of 
clusters/factors identified above. So, with that in mind, I 
have colleagues encouraging me to use semi-structured
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interviews, and such an approach might be one way to 
incorporate each of the clusters/factors, ensuring I get a 
good range of feedback from each interviewee on these topics. 
I have been questioning the wisdom of this approach however. 
Specifically, if I call in an expert on 'technology', perhaps 
I should confine my questioning to that area, rather than 
also eliciting their views on social and environmental 
matters for example. Otherwise, as far as social and 
environmental matters are concerned. I'm essentially just 
interviewing a lay person.
So, the range of options for this interviewing process are 
vast and I want to get it right. If you have any thoughts on 
this from your experience as a practitioner, I would love to 
hear them.
These interviews will then be transcribed using NVivo, 
whereupon I can tag relevant contributions and begin to 
analyse common themes from across the interviews. The result 
will be a set of key themes, or clusters of insights, that I 
shall take forward into the next phase.
My intention beyond this stage is to hold a scenario agenda 
workshop with the (approximately) 20 members of our research 
group. They would be presented with the clusters of insights 
extracted from the interview data and invited to discuss and 
debate the relevance and significance of each. Over the
course of a day or two, the intention would be for the team 
to agree on the key themes to be researched further - the 
scenario inputs - and on the two key uncertainties that
should frame the scenario development.
After this a period of desk research on the identified themes 
would be undertaken by myself. This would then develop into a 
series of discussion meetings with a scenario panel 
comprising a small selection of the experts in our research
group. At these meetings we would begin to discuss the
pathways for each of the inputs under each of the scenarios. 
At this stage I will also take advantage of the work of one 
of my colleagues on an econometric model of consumption 
trends in the UK to offer illustrative forecasts of where our 
consumption and consequently out carbon emissions might be
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headed under each scenario. From here it would only remain to 
develop the actual narratives based on the agreed input 
pathways and forecasts.
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Appendix II. Interview protocol
The following script was prepared for use in the interviewing of experts as part of the 
environmental scanning process:
Thanks again for putting time aside to talk with me, much appreciated. 
For your information, let me just point out that this recording will 
be transcribed for use in my data collection. I thought it might be 
useful if I begin by reminding you of the context of my research to
help ease us in to the discussion.
I'm developing scenarios to portray the carbon-intensity of UK 
lifestyles through to 2030. So my work actually draws on all of the 
RESOLVE research themes - the modelling, the psychological, 
sociological and policy and governance, and brings these insights 
together to help inform those scenarios. I'll soon begin conducting
interviews with a series of external experts from government, 
industry, academia, and I'll be asking them to give me their views on 
the future of various key factors likely to impact on lifestyles.
Now obviously I'll be inviting them to tell me what they think those
key factors are, but in order to prepare a framework for those
interviews I want to do some initial scanning for factors within the 
RESOLVE team, for three reasons really:
1) It will help me identify the right experts. Obviously if I get a 
clear signal from RESOLVE colleagues that a particular set of 
factors should be explored, it sets me on the trail of the right 
people to inform me on those topics.
2) It helps me build a framework or protocol for the interviews so
that, if the conversation isn't flowing so naturally, I can
suggest some topics for discussion.
3) But also, it's because I want these scenarios to capture the 
essence of our research concerns within RESOLVE, and so, by
conducting these initial internal discussions. I'm able to get a 
broad idea of ways in which I might begin to frame the scenarios 
to reflect the work of the group and ensure that I'm developing 
scenarios that are going to engage the rest of the team and 
ensure their contribution.
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WHAT ARE LIFESTYLES
So what is it I'm trying to portray exactly, what do I mean by 
lifestyle?
Well, we've had discussions on this before if you remember, where 
different people across the research strands in RESOLVE offered their 
views on what they mean when they say ' lifestyle ' . For the purposes 
of this work, what it boiled down to was that - in order to discuss 
the carbon-intensity of a lifestyle - we need to focus on consumption. 
So I've developed a working model that focuses on the key areas of 
consumption. So let me talk you through this briefly.
At the centre we have these four 'consumption clusters', these are 
collections of activities and behaviours grouped together 
thematically, so we have 'at home' including heating and applicances 
and so on, 'what we eat ' which is self-explanatory, 'getting around' 
in other words day-to-day travel for commuting, visits, leisure, and
'getting away' or holiday travel. I've also listed a sample of the
kinds of things that might contribute to the carbon-intensity of those 
sets of activities, but I'm sure you can think of others.
So that's how I have characterised lifestyles, but of course we then 
have all sorts of external factors that impact upon our lives and our
decisions, and the choices available to us, so these also form part of
the model. There are: 'Social' factors such as fashion, religion and
belief; 'Technological' factors like innovation or research and 
development;
'Economic' so productivity, growth, incomes; 'Political' factors like 
the model of growth pursued, international agreements; 'Psychological' 
factors like our needs, attitudes and desires; and finally 
'Environmental' factors, so we're talking here about direct impacts of
climate change, resource scarcity etc.
Now I want to stress that this is a working model, the categories are 
of course arbitrary. I've chosen to bundle together certain 
consumption activities in a way that is convenient for me given the
purposes of this study, to build a set of narratives about how our
lifestyles might change over time, so if you feel at any stage that 
you want to discuss ideas that don't necessarily follow this model.
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that's fine, just think of this as a guide or a prompt to help you 
conceptualise your ideas, rather than a strict framework.
So before we begin, I wonder if you might want to just summarise your 
work within RESOLVE and that might lead us in to some of the areas I 
want to explore ............................
Excellent, thank you.
KEY ISSUES
Well, let's begin to explore this idea of future lifestyles then. What 
I'd like us to do to begin with is for you to imagine that you can see 
the future! I want you to transport yourself forward to 2030 and 
imagine that you only have a few minutes to speak to someone in the 
future and you want to gather as much knowledge about lifestyles as 
possible, where would you start? What would be the key issues in each 
of these categories that you would most want to know the outcome of?
At home................................................
What we eat...........................................
Getting around........................................
Getting away..........................................
Social.................................................
Technological.........................................
Environmental.........................................
Economic...............................................
Political..............................................
Psychological.........................................
DESIRABLE OUTCOMES
Now what I'd like you to do is imagine a future in which all of those 
issues that you've just raised had all developed in a way that you 
would consider desirable. I'd like us to work within realistic 
boundaries, but if you can imagine a good and bad extreme for each 
issue, i'd like you to describe the good scenario to me. So let's go 
back through the four categories and I'll just remind you of some of 
the ideas you raised as we go through each of those.
At home................................................
What we eat...........................................
Getting around........................................
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Getting away..........................................
Social.................................................
Technological.........................................
Environmental.........................................
Economic...............................................
Political..............................................
Psychological.........................................
UNDESIRABLE OUTCOMES
Now I ’d like to flip the whole question on it's head and ask you to
imagine a future in which all of those issues developed in a way that
you would consider u n d e s i r a b l e . Again, I'd like us to work within 
realistic boundaries, but this time describe your idea of a plausible,
bad scenario to me. I'll go through the four categories again and
remind you of the issues.
At home................................................
What we eat...........................................
Getting around........................................
Getting away..........................................
Social.................................................
Technological.........................................
Environmental.........................................
Economic...............................................
Political..............................................
Psychological.........................................
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD
What are the challenges and opportunities then, in veering away from 
what we might consider the undesirable world, towards the desirable 
world outlined earlier? What are the challenges, opportunities or 
other implications for different actors?
Individuals and Households...........................
Firms...................................................
Government ............................................
NGO's ...................................................
That's great, and thanks again for your time.
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Appendix III. Introduction to the RESOLVE scenario 
framework
Short primer document sent to external experts ahead of the interview process:
R E S O  L V  E
Introduction to RESOLVE Lifestyle Scenarios Framework
As part of the Research Group on Lifestyles, Values and Environment (RESOLVE), a set of 
scenarios are being developed to explore the carbon-intensity of UK lifestyles through to 2030. 
These scenarios w ill depict potential changes in our relationship with energy, goods and 
services at the household level and the carbon impact associated with those changes. So far, a 
provisional framework has been developed comprising two key uncertainties, the significance 
of which w ill be discussed during the interview, as well as the policy relevance of the four 
scenarios thus generated. In this primer, relevant background work in RESOLVE is explained 
along with an introduction to the framework.
Background
Am ong the multitude of factors relevant to this study, the legally-binding emissions target is of 
particular interest (currently 80% reduction on 1990 levels by 2050). Policy measures suclr as 
those set out in the Government's Low Carbon Transition Plan, include efforts to reduce 
emissions from the power, transport and residential sectors among others. Importantly though, 
this 80% target accounts for em issions from a 'production' rather than a 'consumption' 
perspective.
• In the production perspective, a country is responsible for em issions arising from the 
production of energy, goods and services within its borders, regardless of where those 
goods are eventually consumed. In this way, emissions arising from the production of j
goods are counted even if those goods are exported, w hile emissions from imported |
goods are not.
• In the consumption perspective, responsibility is attributed on the basis of emissions 
arising from energy goods and services consumed within that country. Therefore, 
emissions arising from the production of imported goods are counted, w hile emissions 
from exported goods are not.
• The difference between production and consumption em issions has been referred to as 
the CO2 trade balance.
Although the production perspective is important in many respects, a study focused on the 
carbon intensity of lifestyles needs to consider the impact of energy goods and services 
consumed at the household level, regardless of where these are produced. Thus, a consumption  
perspective is adopted in this study.
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C onsum ption em issions trends
Previous work in RESOLVE analysed the historical data tlirough these two perspectives, 
showing that production em issions fell 9% from 1990-2004 (when aviation and shipping are 
included). Although consumption em issions also fell through the early 1990s (during the dash 
for gas), emissions then took a sharp upward trend, averaging 2% p.a. from 1995. To examine 
these trends further, consumption em issions can be disaggregated into:
• emissions from direct energy use such as gas, personal vehicle fuel and electricity^;
• emissions em bedded in goods and services produced in the UK, or UK embedded 
emissions;
• emissions em bedded in goods and services produced abroad, or ROW  embedded 
emissions.
Seen in this way, emissions from direct energy use fell by 3.7% from 1992-2004. UK and ROW 
em bedded emissions are estimated to have grown by around 12% and 33% respectively over the 
same period®.
International em issions regime
Although UK decarbonisation w ould  have an obvious impact on direct energy use and UK 
embedded emissions, the absence of equivalent international measures could mean that:
• UK consumption em issions fall far short of production perspective targets;
• the share of consumption em issions attributable to UK production w ould shrink, 
meaning further domestic efforts w ould have a diminishing impact;
• higher costs of UK goods and services resulting from decarbonisation may even  
exacerbate the offshoring trend.
The effectiveness of any international em issions regime is therefore considered a key 
uncertainty for the carbon intensity of UK lifestyles, made all the more significant by the 
increased domestic target (90%) that an effective international regime w ould im ply for the UK.
Transition tim ing
Another significant factor for this study is the recent economic recession and the impact on  
investment for a low  carbon transition. The recession has led to reduced energy demand, and 
thus lower emissions over this period. In the short term this implies that the current carbon 
budget (2008-2012) w ill be easily met. However, the Committee on Climate Change has warned 
that without sufficient investment now  in the measures required for the long term, eventual 
economic recovery w ill put pressure on later carbon budgets. Economic factors over the period
7 Although electi'icity is not a fuel as such, it is commonly perceived in this way by consumers.
8 For embedded emissions growtli, the relative share of UK and ROW C02 emissions is known, but not 
tlie relative shaie of overall GHG emissions. The 0 0 2  proportions have tlierefore been 'scaled up' to 
give indicative figiu'es for overall GHG emissions.
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to 2030 w ill be significant in a number of ways, including the direct impact of demand on 
emissions levels and tlie role of taxation and public spending, both in stimulating the economy 
in the short term and ensuring the necessary measures are put in place to enable increasingly 
stringent carbon budgets to be met in the medium and long term. These factors must therefore 
be portrayed in the scenarios. Perhaps most significantly though, is the uncertainty around the 
availability of credit and the role of private sector investment for the transition to a low  carbon 
economy. To explore this uncertainty in this study, two provisional pathways have been  
selected. An 'early transition' patliway facilitated by high investment in appropriate 
technologies from the early 2010s, continuing through to 2030. In this pathway 2020 interim 
targets are met. A  'late transition' pathway sees insufficient investment through the 2010s, 
meaning that 2020 interim targets are m issed. This, combined w ith relatively high exposure to 
increased global energy prices, incentivises a rapid low  carbon transition through the 2020s.
The two uncertainties identified, when placed as axes on a diagram, generate four scenarios;
effective international regime, 90% UK target
late transition
A B
D C
early transition
ineffective international regime, 80% UK target
Discussion areas
Tire aim of the interview is to explore the suitability of the uncertainties chosen, and the 
plausibility of the scenarios thus generated. Some of the key areas to be explored include:
• The nature of an 'effective international regime' in the aftermath of Copenhagen. H ow  
w ide a range of possible outcom es can w e now  contemplate for this uncertainty? What 
level of em issions reduction seems feasible in the 'effective' case? H ow  might these 
responsibilities be shared? W hen w ould this become operational? In the absence of an 
international regime, how  realistic is it that the UK government w ould retain existing 
reduction targets? H ow  m ight the UK take advantage of carbon trading and offsetting 
under a new  regime or in the absence of one?
• What assumptions w ould be suitable in the case of a late and early transition with  
regards to GDP, consumer expenditure, taxation, public spending, private investment 
etc?
• If, as has been suggested above, the scenarios will examine UK exposure to increased 
global energy prices, what w ould be an appropriate set of assumptions to use?
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Appendix IV. Template of key points for narratives
The following list of key points was collected from the interview data for use in drafting 
outlines for the four scenarios:
political
international emissions regime
legally binding is a prerequisite, so complex, need umbrella agreement. UNFCCC consensus approach 
problematic, yet consensus keystone of international democracy.
we need an international regime, bottom up approaches will not deliver the business certainty we need.
without balanced global regime, we may have carbon leakage.
best to have domestic legislative measures in place first.
international top down coordination tluough UN too difficult.
the political orthodoxy suggests no global regime without US legislation
Chinese not yet made tire leap from seeing UNFCCC as a burden sharing exercise to seeing it as 
oppoitunity to lead the creation of a low carbon economy.
international regmie is for coordination, communication and consistency (in accounting methods).
importance of consistent carbon accoimting methods.
led by domestic legislation - infomred by international negotiation
transpar ency hr accounting is key in strong scenario
countries choosing own: reduction targets, target years, baseline years, accouirtmg methodology, punitive 
measures unclear for developed cormtries. developing cormtries making vohmtary (not legally binding) 
targets, in develophrg courrtries, sorrre action self-financed and not open to hrtenratiorral measurement, 
other internationally financed action open to verification.
no rrrore str ingerrt targets set, over time as countries are missing those other countr ies give up too, 
reestablishing new targets fiirther off into the future etc.
arry cap and trade system lacking supplementar ity principle would mean actors shnply rush to buy penults 
at end of commitment periods, meeting tar gets but at cost, and with lack of infrastructure investment.
varying standards across trading schemes, we get bogged down in dispirtes over quality of credits.
accounting methodology consistency is key. weak means flimsy targets, varying methodologies, actors 
biasing accounts in their favour.
credits fr om different jurisdictions having different values
with carbon mar kets, if there's an economic collapse somewhere, growing economies will buy credits 
fi'om there to avoid low carbon investment.
maybe the situation is simply too difficult for any process to succeed.
equally, if the situation was clarly understood as win-win-win, UN process might be unnecessary.
an mternational regime is dependent on the political decision that low carbon transition is necessary and 
possible equally, part of tire belief tliat it is possible is the belief tliat an mternational deal can be reached, 
circular feedback is operating here.
cynically - there may be a link between desire to avoid a regime, and the focus on fixing the process 
piecemeal carbon market integration very hard... need whole framework to make it effective, 
we bounce back fforn Copenhagen quickly but need to keep political momentum.
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international regimes tend to emerge fiom existing practice
UNFCCC trying to install a top down regime out of nothing
could argue Copenhagen was the last chance of top down.
legally binding with high cap or poor compliance regime, no good.
does a strong regime meet scientific reconnnendation? which one?! 1.5 or 2C?
extremely complicated to reach international agreement with crurent (consensus based) procedrues.
regime may be single agreement or multiple concurrent agreements.
in a non treaty world - no siupassing of existing commitments.
US/EU/China/bloc measures
in treaty world, will EU, US, china ambitions match those of SK, brazil and japan?
norway and EU as a model for non-legally binding US interaction with an international regime.
no US legislation in first term of Obama, but eventually a cap n trade scheme geared towards the interests 
of financial sector, tr ading, offsetting etc.
even in weak there will be pressm e in US for some kind of legislation.
US will not be negotiated into a position tluough UN process, requires a change in domestic political 
outlook that sees benefits for prosperity, jobs, national security.
no credible mternational regime without US and no US action until there is the domestic will.
US less exposed to global international trade, might deal better with a crisis, although food market price 
shocks an example of true global interdependency
US able to meet crurent targets without cap n trade bill
china relirctant to sign up to per capita emissions lower than developed countries, US legislation falls far 
short of what's necessary.
Chinese not yet made tire leap from seeing UNFCCC as a burden sharing exercise to seeing it as 
opportunity to lead the creation of a low carbon economy.
optimistically - perhaps china simply hasn't figured out how it can benefit from climate regime as yet.
china's offer was compatible with a 2degree world, have stated that they wish to sign up to an 
international fianrework, they moved on reporting and verification .
EU has small way to go, US will cap n trade or be regulated by 2012
US, EU, Japan, Oz, NZ coordinated carbon markets. China etc national emissions intensity goals, but 
with specific sectoral targets geared around meeting carbon requfrernents of developed markets.
EU had ambitious targets but lacked the political strategy necessary to seciue equivalent commitments 
from other blocs.
consider regional and bilateral agreements backed up by trade measures against 'laggards' as alternative to 
legally binding agreement?
carbon trading at subnational level, a bottom up driver for national level trading schemes? 
domestic carbon trading schemes inevitable.
action fiom developed countries required first... followed by demands for commensurate action in 
developing countries
developed countries fail to take sufficient action to pressme developing countries to act.
high degree of EU action on economic planning e.g. infr astructure, focus on creating areas of concuirent 
opportunity, brings about a race dynamic between EU, US and China, already happening at meso level in 
electric and low carbon vehicles.
no race dynamic, ambition falls apait, activism has a smaller voice, mdustiy sees less govt intention to 
decarbonise, capital flows elsewhere.
makes little sense for EU not to go to 30% taiget. some sectors would be more competitive as a result.
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Korean case is interesting - have bet their economy on low carbon, developing countries e.g. china 
watching closely.
a sense of common cause more consistent with strong outcomes than US/EU ganging up on china
support for action fi'om developing world
assumption that industrialised cormtries will lead is wrong
countries who will lead anything in 21st century are china, korea, brazil
Korea: previous success in rapid development has been able to follow the OECD as a model, green 
growth phase has no precedent, forgmg ahead, exemplar for strong domestic action w/o regime.
EU may have more power, but lacks believability, noone believes they will do anything
trade
attempted US/EU trade measures against china etc followed by social backlash against higher prices, then 
abandomnent of measures?
for carbon intensive sectors offshoring may be problematic due to set up costs and transport costs, but 
possibly less so for more 'day to day' products
global trade is reduced as china turns to domestic market and south south trade to avoid north's trade 
measures.
consider regional and bilateral agreements backed up by trade measures against 'laggards' as alternative to 
legally binding agreement?
strong leadership from US/EU followed up by threat of carbon trade measures... but could backfire if  
developing countries trnn inward, or if encomages south-south trade.
trade measures would mean increased domestic production, reduced imports from developing cormtries, 
increased prices.
a reduction in global trade could reduce technology learning 
preferential treatment for low carbon goods and services?
any US legislation will require commensurate action from trading partners, else border tariffs will come 
into play
US will lead on demands for commensurate action from developing countries, rather than EU.
EU industry likely to tlueaten to leave unless imported competitors goods are blocked/taxed 
appropriately.
pre-Copenhagen, trade measures were kept on the shelf m case of failure to secure deal, 
attempts to use trade measures would be bad for opeimess of global economic system, 
no legally binding agreement, so we resort to trade measures, 
costs of tariffs outweigh the objectives by breaking the international economic system, 
threat o f tariffs vs creation of incentives... which is better to motivate change?
US trade measures against china can only happen with US legislation, (unlikely).
does the EU have the guts to face down US on trade measures? more significant than vs china/india etc
domestic action
best to have domestic legislative measures in place fh*st... international regime is for coordination, 
communication and consistency (in accounting methods).
accepted that tliere's a problem, but no consensus on solution, so focus political energy domestically.
led by domestic legislation - informed by international negotiation
limits on extent of taigets include concerns over prices, competitiveness, fuel poverty.
lack of transparency over energy policy i.e. fossil friel credit auctioning subsidies vs clean energy 
subsidies.
UK vs the world not credible, so weak scenario has to see UK action consistent with rest o f EU.
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climate scepticism among public prevents robust policy.
domestic action is necessaiy anyway - to demonstrate the economic viability o f a low carbon transition, 
can also create the confidence to do a deal.
domestic action so far is poor, incidental benefits from non-climate policy
UK has been waiting for international regime before acting, other countries leadmg through action
domestic action as a result o f national or individual self-interest
there's nothing the UK alone can do to chma.
sectoral measures
China etc national emissions intensity goals, but with specific sectoral targets geared aroiuid meeting 
carbon requirements of developed markets.
need clearer sectoral targets or road map en route to long tenu % reductions.
opportunities for virtuous policy incentives for consumer and producer can produce beneficial rather than 
antagonistic relationship.
use of carbon market without clear sectoral taigets may means overuse of financial mechanisms without 
structural change.
'governance' led by private sector, motivated by public attitudes 
economic
global
if economy is in declme, people are less prepared to spend money on doing things properly, e.g. if you 
can't afford clean energy you revert to coal
'inflation is over' view han't been realised as sunk investments mean that relocation is 'lumpy'
regardless of ethical/enviromnental perspective, investors still need to participate, pension funds etc must 
spread their investments and this mcludes to envhomnental technology.
recession means lower replacement rate for technologies, less public funding available to provide 
incentives.
some action mvolves state/private sector retooling of infrastnicture of consumption without much input 
from consumers
need for more secure investment for pensions - equities too volatile, pension frmds need long term safe 
assets
question is how can investment in renewables and low carbon be packaged in a way that's attractive for 
the long term
rapid turnover o f the capital stock required.
regardless of'peak', fossil fliel prices will increase due to increased production costs and increased 
demand.
US/EU/Chlna/blocs
europe has an ageing population, has impacted adversely on japan's economy, more resources will go 
towai ds supporting old people from a proportionally smaller cohort of working aged people.
younger economies have more consumption to dr ive the economy, europe disadvantaged, relative to 
US/emerging economies.
reflation of reimiinbi will result m increased Chinese labour costs
maybe growth for a tmie (for developed cormtries to decarbonise), followed by steady state
perhaps low/no growth in developed cormtries will happen anyway, green growth may be the only 
significant growth
national
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localised recession in UK = reduced interest rates = weak currency = higher prices for imported resources 
and fuels
over next 20 years, poimd will be weak against emerging market cunencies, hence long term impact on 
fuel costs
UK manufacturing could rapidly pick up again in event of weak currency
end of UK's economic dependence on consumption - accept there's no more public sector jobs, finance 
jobs, retail jobs, construction etc... instead, with energy secm ity and climate change as main priorities, 
let's employ those builders and do green infi astructure
possible convergence of UK manufacturing and green capitalists - finance needs to be smaller pait of 
economy, need less consumption more investment, thus a call for green infrastructure bank to frind green 
infrastructure.
shift to renewables and low carbon in primary sector can support many more second and third tier jobs 
wind fami production, unlike e.g. solar, makes sense to be localised
with most low carbon technology, higher up front cost, so chaimelling capital into infrastmcture but then 
not having to buy anything, potentially; rebound effect, or lower consumption.
impression of rising living standar ds based on: cheap credit/debt and falling prices from trade 
liberalisation.
tluough offshoring - people felt as Üiough living standards were rising, can it continue? revaluation of 
Chinese currency might suggest a slowing or reversal o f price trend.
prices either static or rising, noticeable impact on consumers.
more savings means more financial sector activity
financial transaction tax - way to tame the size of financial sector, ensme higher proportion of money 
stays in real economy/people's wallets
sociai/psycholog ical
stop where we aie now with momentum being lost due to concerns over economy and economic impact 
of climate legislation,
without a positive vision of low carbon lifestyles, we cannot achieve the political support we need.
scientific/activist coalition continue calling for radical cuts but are marginalised(?)
if economy is in decline, people are less prepai ed to spend money on doing things properly, e.g. if  you 
can't afford clean energy you revert to coal
need to get back to basics, restate case for impact o f climate change on prosperity and secmity. 
the green premium lifestyle shifts are on the margins
might be a shift in public thinking away from premium lifestyle changes towards green as engme of 
growth and jobs, away from green consimierism to green jobs.
'i will if  you will' implies 'they won't so i won't', low carbon transition has to be a shai ed enterprise, 
shared upfront costs, shaied benefits.
climate change may be the wrong baimer under which to achieve low carbon transition, too distant, 
instead, green economy delivermg security, jobs, innovation and btw lower emissions, hits at people's 
basic concerns.
period of economically inational exuberance giving way to a rethink, shift in sentiment from 'economy in 
equilibrium with strong growth engine, but unfortunate enviroimiental externalities' to 'economy out of 
equilibrium, environmental issues indicate system shortcomings, let's generate economic advantage out of 
that '
technological
key target for EV: 400 mile capacity, rechargeable in ISrnins
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investment miglit give rise to some 'just makes sense' technologies and practices, but some tecluiologies, 
e.g. coal CCS, will require restrictions on carbon to incentivise R&D.
stagnant economy could mean lack of investment in low carbon, thus extending the life of dirty 
technology
observations
carbon leakage may be overstated - differentials may not be large enough to impact on short term
evaluation cycles of management - all the more so if  a global regime is anticipated. |
range between 80% and 90% (for UK in 2050) probably not great enough. j
strong but late transition seems hnplausible
effective vs ineffective regime replaced by high vs Iw autonomy
do I want to represent a weak regime as being: a) nothing stronger than Copenhagen accord?
b)copenhagen promises being reneged upon over time or c) the attempt by developed nations to use trade |
measures to force developing nations to act, only to see those countries turn to their domestic markets to 
avoid action? or some combination in the order a., c... b?
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Appendix V. Scenario A: data tables and charts
Better late than never
Little significant change in efforts to tackle emissions up 
to 2020, when increasing calls for climate action combine 
with rising fuel and commodity prices to bring things to a 
crisis point. Out o f the crisis, international leaders build 
consensus on a comprehensive programme of emissions 
cuts. Although there is little improvement in the carbon 
intensity o f UK lifestyles before the crisis, the securing of 
a global deal instills a sense o f common purpose that 
encourages proactive behavioural change.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.7% p. a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to; 
Income Price ExNEF total
2015
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.00 0.43 -0.82 0.41 0.10 9200
Gas 2.00 - -1.07 1.48 0.37 9697
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.63 0.13 -0.14 2.51 2.51 28495
Other fuels 3.50 0.46 -0.09 -4.87 -4.46 832
Other transport 0.13 0.84 -0.15 2.25 2.94 111382
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -0.50 0.30 0.21 0.25 0.74 71075
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 26052
Clothing and footwear -3.94 0.58 3.25 0.95 4.82 72252
Restaurants and hotels 1.38 1.10 -1.27 0.92 0.75 84129
Recreation and culture 0.61 0.42 4.13 5.15 146117
Other housing 3.56 0.24 -1.50 2.18 0.92 139029
Communication -3.63 0.25 0.71 5.17 6.11 28689
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -0.88 1.17 0.85 -0.16 1.86 46179
Education 3.63 -0.35 0.77 3.52 4.29 13915
Health 2.13 0.13 -0.47 2.27 1.84 13094
Misc. goods and services 0.13 ____0.67 -0.03 1.53 2.17 127082
Table V.l: Scenario A, 2010-2015: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
Notes: Household disposable income grows at 0.2-0.3% through to 2012, before picking up to 
rates of 2-2.25%, thus a rate of 1.7% averaged over the period. The low rate of growth over the 
early part of this period reflects concerns that any economic recovery in the UK will be export 
led, with household disposable incomes lagging behind.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories over this period were derived from DECC 
projections.
Price changes for the remaining categories reflect historical trends, with appropriate adjustment 
made for a rise in VAT in early 2011.
In each category, the sensitivity of expenditure to changes in income and price has been derived 
from the historical data, and those same levels of sensitivity are applied here. Thus, given the 
income and price assumptions and the corresponding sensitivities in each category, the actual 
impact in terms of changes in expenditure are shown in the first two grey columns. In the third 
grey column, the contribution of behaviour change not associated with income and price effects 
(exogenous non-economic factors, or exnef) is shown. These might include impacts of a shift in 
environmental attitudes and values, and subsequent lifestyle changes. In this initial period, the 
historical trends for exnef have been used in each case. Most notably, 'other fuels' continues a 
historical decline, while 'recreation and leisure' and 'communication' see a strong increase in 
expenditure primarily through lifestyle factors.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2015
carbon intensity 
change (% p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity 0.00 7.79 9200 72
Gas 0.00 10.43 9697 101
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.58 3.11 28495 89
Other fuels -2.74 7.05 832 6
Other transport 1.03 1.46 111382 163
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.92 1.12 71075 79
Alcohol and tobacco 2.72 0.33 26052 9
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.24 72252 17
Restaurants and hotels 1.78 0.80 84129 67
Recreation and culture -5.49 0.30 146117 44
Other housing 0.00 0.35 139029 49
Communication -4.91 0.27 28689 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.70 46179 32
Education 3 2 6 0.81 13915 11
Health 0.53 0.39 13094 5
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 127082 78
Table V.2: Scenario A, 2010-2015: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: With regards to emissions intensity, the historical trends have once again been used in 
this period, in the absence of any significant drivers of change. The direct energy use categories, 
electricity, gas, vehicle fuels and other fuels remain significant in terms of carbon intensity and 
total emissions. 'Other transport' encompasses the purchase of new vehicles, public transport by 
rail, road and sea, and aviation, the last of which is the fastest growing of the subcategories. As 
such, the carbon intensity of the category increases over the period in line with the growth in 
aviation. Despite a relatively low carbon intensity, 'other transport' has a significantly higher level 
of expenditure, bringing it to the top of the list for total emissions.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.8% p.a.
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to:
Price 
change 
(% p.a.) Income Price ExNEF total
2020
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 10.00 0.55 7.00* 0.47 8 05 13772
Gas 10.00 - -2.21 11.98* 9.96 15874
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 10.00 0.15 5.03* 1.98 7.15 40740
Other fuels 10.00 0.67 5.59* -4.87 2.84 957
Other transport 3.00 0.88 -3.56 2 2 J -0.42 109070
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.50 0.31 -1.04 0.25 -0.46 69451
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.52 -0.84 -0.53 -0.86 24961
Clothing and footwear -2.00 0.64 2.16 0.95 3.76 87141
Restaurants and hotels 3.25 1.22 -2.94 0.92 -0.81 80789
Recreation and culture 0.00 0.67 -0.29 4.13 4.50 183021
Other housing 3.50 0.27 -1.47 2.19 0.98 146010
Communication -1.75 0.31 0.37 5.30 5.98 38696
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 1.00 1.25 -0.94 -0.16 0.14 46507
Education 5.50 -0.43 -0.03 3.73 3.14 16277
Health 4.00 0.15 -0.88 2.35 1.77 14306
Misc. goods and services 2.00 0.73 -0.55 1.53 1.71 138427
Table V.3: Scenario A, 2015-2020: Income, Price and Expenditure changes
*For electricity, vehicle fuels and lubricants and other fuels, the price coefficients in the model have been 
adjusted from those that fit the historical data over the whole period to values which better reflect activity during 
short term price shocks. For gas, given the difficulties with the formula (explained elsewhere by Chitnis and 
Hunt ref), the desired shift in expenditure due to price has been achieved instead through adjustment of exnef.
Notes: Economic slowdown means annual growth in household disposable income drops from 
2% to 1.5% over the period, with an average rate of 1.8%.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories of electricity, gas, other fuels and vehicle fuels 
are impacted considerably by global demand, with an increase of 10% annually used in the 
model. In the model, a fixed coefficient was originally used which -  in light of these price shocks 
-  would have implied an immediate and drastic reduction in expenditure for these categories. 
Instead, the coefficient has been adjusted to better reflect short term expenditure changes in the 
event of a price shock.
These impacts are also assumed to feed through onto the price of other goods and services, 
with average adjustments of 2-3% upwards for most categories, made according to the carbon 
intensity of the category (as a proxy for energy intensity). 'Other housing' is the exception, with 
price changes held at the historic trend, as the majority of the category consists of actual and 
imputed rentals, which are assumed to be held back on account of the economic slowdown.
In this period, the historical trends for exnef have broadly been continued, to reflect the absense 
of any meaningful attitudinal or behavioural change.
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1010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2020
carbon intensity 
change (%p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -8.69 4.41 13772 61
Gas -8.58 5.96 15874 95
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -6.59 2.09 40740 85
Other fuels -2.74 6.09 957 6
Other transport 1.03 1.54 109070 168
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.92 1.01 69451 70
Alcohol and tobacco 2.72 0.38 24961 9
Clothing and footwear -1.90 0.22 87141 19
Restaurants and hotels 1.78 0.87 80789 71
Recreation and culture -5.49 0.22 183021 40
Other housing 0.00 0.35 146010 52
Communication -4.91 0.20 38696 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.64 46507 30
Education 3.86 0.96 16277 16
Health 0.53 0.40 14306 6
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 138427 85
Table V.4: Scenario A, 2015-2020: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: The emissions intensity has been adjusted considerably for the four direct energy use 
categories which undergo abrupt price changes. This is necessary to prevent the significant 
increase in expenditure (driven by the price shocks) from implying an increase in 'quantity' 
consumed. Although quantity data does not form part of this modelling framework, it is assumed 
that some curtailment of consumption would indeed take place. Thus, for electricity (which 
undergoes some decarbonisation through this period) and for vehicle fuels (which begins to see 
a slight shift in exnef towards the end of the period as per the narrative of increased car sharing 
and cycling), there is a measurable drop in total emissions. For gas, which must accomodate an 
accelerated shift from 'other fuels', consumption has been held more or less constant.
Once again, the emissions intensity of 'Other transport' continues to increase in line with growth 
in aviation, thus despite a modest reduction in expenditure, total emissions for this category 
increase over the period. For the remaining categories, historical trends have once again been 
used.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 2% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2030
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 0.00 0.58 -0.51 0.93 1.06 15308
Gas* 3.00 - -1.42 -5.84 -4.86 9671
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 5.00 0.17 -0.75 -3.09 -3.67 28234
Other fuels 2.00 0.68 -0.19 9.79 10.71 2786
Other transport 2.00 0.98 -2.38 3.93 2.53 140477
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.00 0.35 -0.83 -0.38 -0.84 63866
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.57 -0.84 -0.53 -0.80 23044
Clothing and footwear -3.00 0.70 2.26 0.95 3.91 128901
Restaurants and hotels 225 1.34 -2.07 0.92 0.18 82257
Recreation and culture -1.00 0.73 0.29 4.13 5.15 306185
Other housing 3.50 0.29 -1.47 4.64 3.46 206303
Communication -2.75 0.33 0.52 5.30 6.16 71622
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.23 2.60 60340
Education 4.50 -0.45 0.42 3.73 3.56 23234
Health 3.00 0.16 -0.69 2.35 1.97 17416
Misc. goods and services 1.00 0.80 -0.28 1.53 2.05 169915
Table V5: Scenario A, 2020-2030: Income, Price and Expenditure changes
*due to lag effects in the model, price increases from the previous period continue to have a considerable
impact on gas expenditure.
Notes: Having recovered from the economic slowdown approaching 2020, annual growth in 
household disposable income averages 2% over this period.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories no longer experience substantial year on year 
increases as in the previous period. Electricity in particular begins to stabilise as alternatives to 
traditional sources of generation become more economically viable. Increased global demand 
leads to some increase in prices for gas and vehicle fuels, with supply shortages placing further 
pressure on prices in the case of vehicle fuels.
As the fuel price shocks abate, price changes for other goods and services also shift back 
towards their historical trends, although these are kept somewhat higher due to the cost of 
investment in low carbon production methods. In particular, food prices continue to rise, 
reflecting a shift in consumer attitudes around the carbon intensity of food production, with 
consumers prepared to spend more to ensure a lower environmental impact. The price of 'other 
transport' also continues to rise above the historical average, due to increased expenditure on 
higher priced fuel-efficient vehicles, and higher costs due to aviation fuels and investment in rail 
infrastructure.
Gas and vehicle fuels experience significant reduction in expenditure due to exnef, thanks to 
efficiency and conservation measures in home heating and private car use, and a shift towards 
public transport. For other fuels, the rapid rise in alternative heating solutions such as biomass or 
district heating leads to a substantial exnef increase. The exnef effect on electricity expenditure 
remains relatively stable as conservation measures are counteracted by electrification of home 
heating and private cars. The impact of behavioural change on 'other transport' expenditure 
increases over this period, above an already high historical trend. This is due to the shift towards 
public transport use, although slower growth in aviation disguises this shift to some extent. An 
increase in 'other housing' expenditure attributable to exnef represents the cost of retrofit 
measures.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2030
carbon intensity Carbon Intensity Expenditure Emissions
change (% p.a.) (tC02e/m£) (m£) (mtC02e)
Electricity -3.93 2.67 15308 41
Gas 0.00 5.96 9671 58
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -2.21 1.62 28234 46
Other fuels -6.32 2.24 2786 6
Other transport -1.45 1.32 140477 185
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -2.59 0.75 63866 48
Alcohol and tobacco -0.49 0.36 23044 8
Clothing and footwear -3.71 0.14 128901 18
Restaurants and hotels -1.22 0.77 82257 63
Recreation and culture -5.03 O.ll 306185 33
Other housing 0.00 0.35 206303 73
Communication -5.03 0.10 71622 7
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -2.59 0.47 60340 28
Education 0.51 1.01 23234 23
Health -0.95 0.37 17416 6
Misc. goods and services -1.39 0.53 169915 90
Table V.6: Scenario A, 2020-2030: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: Electricity undergoes significant decarbonisation over this period in line with ennissions 
reduction targets. The carbon intensity of gas is assumed to remain constant, while that of 
vehicle fuels falls as biofuels are introduced to some extent into the fuel mix. Combined with the 
effect of expenditure changes, total emissions fall substantially over the period. The category of 
'other fuels' undergoes a more rapid decarbonisation as expenditure on heating oil etc falls at the 
same time as biomass and district heating expenditure rises. A significant increase in 
expenditure on such solutions means a small absolute increase in emissions for other fuels.
Total emissions from 'other transport' rise over the period. The carbon intensity of that category 
falls over the period due to a shift in the balance of expenditure on public transport versus 
aviation, however an overall increase in expenditure on both means higher total emissions 
(emissions savings from public transport use are seen in the reduced expenditure on personal 
vehicle fuels).
For the remaining categories, a change in carbon intensity is assumed to take place as a result 
of the overall shift toward decarbonisation of the global economy. The rate of change assumed in 
each case relates to the historical trend as well as to the absolute carbon intensity so that, for 
example 'recreation and culture', which has a relatively low carbon intensity compared to other 
categories, sees little improvement on an already strong historical decarbonisation trend. 
Meanwhile, miscellaneous goods and services, which has a higher carbon intensity to begin 
with, experiences a significant shift towards decarbonisation.
For 'food and non-alcoholic beverages' as well as 'restaurants and hotels', in addition to supply 
side innovations, a stronger decarbonisation trend can be attributed to exnef as consumers 
undergo a shift in attitudes to food purchasing.
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Appendix VI. Scenario B: data tables and charts
All together, now
Voluntary climate action by different countries, including 
through green job programmes to aid economic recovery, 
helps to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive and 
equitable global deal in 2015. The cooperative approach 
observed at the international level is reflected in the 
behavioural change undertaken at the household level.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.7% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2015
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.60 0.43 -0.89 0.36 -0.02 9143
Gas 2 6 0 -1.15 1.01 -0.18 9425
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.63 0.13 -0.14 1.60 1.60 27223
Other fuels 3.50 0.46 -0.09 -4.87 -4.46 832
Other transport 0.13 0.84 -0.15 2 7 3 3.44 114166
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 0.10 0.30 -0.04 0.13 0.38 69780
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 26052
Clothing and footwear -3.44 0.58 3.09 0.95 4.66 71659
Restaurants and hotels 1.38 1.10 -1.27 0.92 0.75 84129
Recreation and culture 0.61 0.42 4.13 5.15 146117
Other housing 3.56 0.24 -1.50 2.87 1.61 143912
Communication -3.63 0.25 0.71 5.17 6.11 28689
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -0.88 1.17 0.85 0.41 2.43 47523
Education 3.63 -0.35 0.77 3.52 4.29 13915
Health 2.13 0.13 -0.47 2.27 1.84 13094
Misc. goods and services 0.13 0.67 -0.03 1.53 2.17 127082
Table VI. 1: Scenario B, 2010-2015: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
Notes: Household disposable income grows at 0.2-0.3% through to 2012, before picking up to 
rates of 2-2.25%, thus a rate of 1.7% averaged over the period. The low rate of growth over the 
early part of this period reflects concerns that any economic recovery in the UK will be export 
led, with household disposable incomes lagging behind.
Over this period, prices for the four direct energy use categories of electricity, gas, other fuels 
and vehicle fuels are guided by DECC projections, but increased slightly in the case of electricity 
and gas to reflect the increased costs associated with early decarbonisation efforts. Price 
changes for the remaining categories reflect historical trends, with adjustment made for a rise in 
VAT in early 2011.
In each category, the sensitivity of expenditure to changes in income and price has been derived 
from the historical data, and those same levels of sensitivity are applied here. Thus, given the 
income and price assumptions and the corresponding sensitivities in each category, the actual 
impact in terms of changes in expenditure are shown in the first two grey columns. In the third 
grey column, the contribution of behaviour change not associated with income and price effects 
(exogenous non-economic factors, or exnef) is shown. These might include impacts of a shift in 
environmental attitudes and values, and subsequent lifestyle changes.
In this scenario, some shifts in exnef begin to take place, notably for gas and vehicle fuels. 
Additionally, the cost of retrofit measures is reflected in slightly increased exnef contributions 
towards expenditure on other housing, (which includes maintenance and repair of the dwelling), 
and furnishings (which includes carpets and floor coverings, a potential factor in any retrofit 
involving underfloor heating etc). It is important to note that in this scenario such retrofit 
schemes are adopted precisely because these are funded by government subsidies, meaning 
the expenditure would not necessarily show up as household consumption. Nevertheless, in 
keeping with the illustrative nature of these figures, the expenditure has been accounted for 
within household consumption to reflect the final goods and services expected to be affected by 
such schemes.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2015
carbon intensity 
change (%p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -1.16 7.34 9143 67
Gas 0.00 10.43 9425 98
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.58 3.11 27223 85
Other fuels -2.74 7.05 832 6
Other transport 0.20 1.41 114166 161
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -2.09 1.11 69780 77
Alcohol and tobacco 2.00 0.32 26052 8
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.24 71659 17
Restaurants and hotels 1.60 0.79 84129 67
Recreation and culture -5.82 0.29 146117 43
Other housing 0.00 0.35 143912 51
Communication -5.71 0.26 28689 7
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.70 47523 33
Education 3.36 0.79 13915 11
Health 0.53 0.39 13094 5
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 127082 78
Table VI. 2: Scenario B, 2010-2015: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: With regards to emissions intensity, some deviation from historical trends takes place in 
this scenario as a result of early decarbonisation efforts, the so called low hanging fruit. In 
particular, electricity begins a gradual decarbonisation of just over 1% p.a., while other transport 
sees a slowing of its 'carbonisation' trend, although a return to growth in aviation expenditure 
prevents any absolute or even relative drop in carbon emissions. Generally, some slight 
improvements begin to be felt across most categories.
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1010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.85% p.a.
Price 
change 
(%> p.a.)
viicui^  ^ui \/o uuc lu.
Income Price ExNEF total
2020
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 8.00 0.56 5.36 1.81 7.73 13470
Gas 10.00 - -2.32 11.48 9.22 14868
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 10.00 0.16 5.03 -0.34 4.84 34675
Other fuels 10.00 0.67 5.59 0.76 8.44 1264
Other transport 3.00 0.91 -3.56 3.97 1.32 121952
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.50 0.32 -1.04 -0.06 -0.76 67174
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.53 -0.84 -0.53 -0.84 24979
Clothing and footwear -2.00 0.66 1.91 0.95 3.53 85440
Restaurants and hotels 3.25 1.25 -2.94 0.92 -0.78 80903
Recreation and culture 0.00 0.68 -0.29 4.13 4.52 183170
Other housing 3.50 0.27 -1.47 4.89 3.68 173028
Communication -1.75 0.31 0.37 5.30 5.99 38704
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 1.00 1.28 -0.94 1.44 1.77 51925
Education 5.50 -0.43 -0.03 3.73 3.13 16272
Health 4.00 0.15 -0.88 2.35 1.77 14308
Misc. goods and services 2.00 0.75 -0.55 1.53 1.73 138553
Table VI. 3: Scenario B, 2015-2020: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
Notes: Economic slowdown means annual growth in household disposable income drops from 
2% to 1.75% over the period, with an average rate of 1.85%, slightly higher than in e.g. Scenario 
A, due to earlier efforts to curb dependence on imported fossil fuels.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories are impacted considerably by global demand, 
with an annual increase of 10% for gas, vehicle fuels and other fuels used in the model. The 
annual increase for electricity is lower than in e.g. Scenario A, at 8%. This is because some of 
the cost increases are associated with decarbonisation efforts which -  due to having been 
brought forward in this scenario to the previous five year period -  are spread out more evenly 
than in that alternate scenario.
In the model, a fixed elasticity was originally used which - in light of these price shocks - would 
imply an immediate and drastic reduction in expenditure for these categories. Instead, this has 
been adjusted to better reflect short term expenditure changes in the event of a price shock.
These impacts are also assumed to feed through onto the price of other goods and services, 
with average adjustments of 2-3% upwards for most categories, made according to the carbon 
intensity of the category (as a proxy for energy intensity). 'Other housing' is the exception, with 
price changes held at the historic trend, as the majority of the category consists of actual and 
imputed rentals, which are assumed to be held back on account of the economic slowdown.
Adjustments to the historical trend for exnef have been made to several categories, including 
vehicle fuels, where a series of factors including more fuel efficient vehicles and changing 
attitudes towards car sharing and alternative means of transport begin to make a significant 
difference on fuel consumption (allied with an increase in expenditure on 'other transport').
Also, whereas 'other fuels' historically experienced a significant downward trend for exnef, this 
scenario sees a significant reversal, with the exnef contribution increasing slightly during this 
period, as reduced expenditure on heating oils is replaced with equivalent expenditure on 
biomass and district heating. Other significant exnef deviations include a continuation of 
increased expenditure on other housing and furnishings to reflect ongoing take up of retrofit 
solutions.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2020
carbon intensity 
change (% p. a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -8.80 4.11 13470 55
Gas -P.&7 5.28 14868 79
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -6.59 2.09 34675 72
Other fuels 4.28 1264 5
Other transport -0.49 1.37 121952 167
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -27P 0.95 67174 64
Alcohol and tobacco 0.00 0.32 24979 8
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.19 85440 16
Restaurants and hotels -0.59 0.77 80903 62
Recreation and culture -5.91 0.21 183170 38
Other housing 0.00 0.35 173028 61
Communication -5.91 0.18 38704 7
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.64 51925 33
Education 2.33 0.88 16272 14
Health 0.37 14308 5
Misc. goods and services -0 9& 0.59 138553 81
Table VIA: Scenario B, 2015-2020: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: The emissions intensity has been adjusted considerably for the four direct energy use 
categories which undergo abrupt price changes. This is necessary to prevent the significant 
increase in expenditure (driven by the price shocks) from implying an increase in 'quantity' 
consumed. Although quantity data does not form part of this modelling framework, it is assumed 
that some curtailment of consumption would indeed take place. Thus, for electricity (which 
undergoes continued decarbonisation through this period), vehicle fuels (which sees a shift in 
exnef as discussed above) and gas (as a result of significant investment in retrofit measures and 
some behavioural change) there is a substantial reduction in total emissions.
For 'other transport', decarbonisation efforts for public transport marginally outweight the growth 
in aviation to ensure a reduction in emissions intensity for the overall category. Nevertheless, 
increased total expenditure outweighs these intensity savings, leading to a slight increase in total 
emissions from this category.
Across the remaining categories, historical increases in emissions intensities are slowed, while 
historical reductions are accelerated, to reflect continued decarbonisation of the economy.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 2.00% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to; 
Income Price ExNEF total
2030
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 1.50 0.59 0.24 4.9 5.78 24022
Gas* 3.00 -1.42 -7.55 -6.94 7365
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 5.00 0.17 -0.75 -3.24 -3.81 23689
Other fuels 2.00 0.69 -0.19 10.13 11.07 3820
Other transport 2.50 0.98 -2.97 4 2.01 149101
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.25 0.35 -0.93 -0.39 -0.95 61071
Alcohol and tobacco 2.00 0.57 -0.96 -0.53 -0.92 22788
Clothing and footwear -1.50 0.70 1.19 0.95 2.85 113608
Restaurants and hotels 2.25 1.34 -2.07 0.92 0.18 82394
Recreation and culture -1.00 0.74 0.29 4.13 5.15 306465
Other housing 3.50 0.29 -1.47 5.14 3.96 257126
Communication -2.75 0.33 0.52 5.30 6.16 71652
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 0.50 1.38 -0.49 1.44 2.33 65564
Education 4.50 -0.45 0.42 3.73 3.56 23221
Health 3.00 0.16 -0.69 2.35 1.97 17420
Misc. goods and services 1.00 0.80 -0.28 1.53 2.05 170085
Table VI. 5: Scenario B, 2020-2030: Income, Price and Expenditure changes
"due to lag effects in the model, price increases from the previous period continue to have a considerable
impact on gas expenditure.
Notes: Having recovered from the economic slowdown approaching 2020, annual growth in 
household disposable income averages 2% over this period.
Prices for gas, electricity and other fuels no longer experience the substantial year on year 
increases as in the previous period. Electricity slows to an average 1.5% p.a. price increase as 
the historically high price has made alternatives to traditional sources of generation more 
economically viable, although the rapid deployment of alternative energy prevents electricity 
price from stabilising completely. Increased global demand leads to some increase in prices for 
gas and vehicle fuels, with supply shortages placing further pressure on prices in the case of 
vehicle fuels.
As the fuel price shocks abate, price changes for other goods and services also shift back 
towards their historical trends, although these are kept somewhat higher due to the cost of 
investment in low carbon production methods. In particular, food prices continue to rise, 
reflecting a shift towards methods of food production with a lower environmental impact. Other 
transport rises faster than e.g. Scenario A, due to the higher cost of more fuel efficient vehicles, 
including EVs, the higher cost of aviation and substantial investment in rail.
Regarding exnef, efficiency and conservation measures in home heating and private car use, 
and a continued shift towards public transport use, lead to significant annual reductions for gas 
and vehicle fuels.Other fuels sees a strong annual average increase from exnef, as alternative 
home heating solutions are adopted. For electricity, the mass electrification of transport and 
home heating is represented through a substantial annual increase in exnef. The exnef 
contribution to changes in expenditure for 'other transport' remains high through this period, 
reflecting a shift towards public transport use, even as aviation growth slows. An increase in 
'other housing' expenditure attributable to exnef reflects continued investment In retrofit 
measures.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2030
carbon intensity 
change (% p.a.)
Carbon Intensity Expenditure Emissions 
(tC02e/m£) (m£) (mtC02e)
Electricity -7.77 0.92 24022 22
Gas 0.00 5.28 7365 39
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -2.21 1.62 23689 38
Other fuels -6 32 1.57 3820 6
Other transport -2.53 1.03 149101 153
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -2.59 0.71 61071 43
Alcohol and tobacco -0.95 0.29 22788 7
Clothing and footwear -3.93 0.12 113608 13
Restaurants and hotels -1.81 0.63 82394 52
Recreation and culture -5.03 0.10 306465 31
Other housing -2.21 0.28 257126 71
Communication -5.03 0.09 71652 6
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -3.30 0.43 65564 28
Education -1.97 0.71 23221 16
Health -1.81 0.31 17420 5
Misc. goods and services -1.81 0.48 170085 82
Table VI. 6: Scenario B, 2020-2030: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: As a result of the early push towards decarbonisation, electricity sees a substantial 
average annual carbon intensity reduction of 7.7%. The carbon intensity of gas is assumed to 
remain constant, while that of vehicle fuels falls as biofuels are introduced to some extent into 
the fuel mix. Combined with the effect of expenditure changes, total emissions fall substantially 
over the period. The category of 'other fuels' continues to undergo rapid decarbonisation as 
expenditure on heating oil etc falls at the same time as biomass and district heating expenditure 
rises. A significant increase in expenditure on such solutions means a small absolute increase in 
emissions for other fuels.
Total emissions from 'other transport' fall over the period. The category enjoys a significant 
decarbonisation over the period, due to a shift in the balance of expenditure on public transport 
versus aviation. Even an overall increase in expenditure is counteracted by the rate of 
decarbonisation. Furthermore, emissions savings from a shift to public transport use are seen in 
the reduced expenditure on personal vehicle fuels.
For the remaining categories, a change in carbon intensity is assumed to take place as a result 
of the overall shift toward decarbonisation of the global economy..The rate of change assumed in 
each case relates to the historical trend as well as to the absolute carbon intensity so that, for 
example 'recreation and culture', which has a relatively low carbon intensity compared to other 
categories, sees little improvement on an already strong historical decarbonisation trend. 
Meanwhile, miscellaneous goods and services, which has a higher carbon intensity to begin 
with, experiences a significant shift towards decarbonisation.
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Appendix VII. Scenario C: data tables and charts
Trading woes
Unilateral climate action by the EU is intended to draw 
further commitments from other parties, but with no such 
action forthcoming by 2015, the EU threatens the use of 
trade measures. After a period of heightened political 
tensions and economic slowdown, a compromise is 
reached. The result is a series o f bilateral emissions 
targets that remain insufficient to avoid dangerous 
climate change. The UK public are cautiously optimistic 
at first, but without commensurate international action, 
enthusiasm for pro-environmental behavioural change is 
weakened.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.7% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2015
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.60 0.43 -0.89 0.36 -0.02 9143
Gas 2.60 - -1.15 1.14 -0.06 9488
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.63 0.13 -0.14 2.12 2.11 27937
Other fuels 3.50 0.46 -0.09 -4.87 -4.46 832
Other transport 0.13 0.84 -0.15 2.25 2.94 111382
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 0.10 0.30 -0.04 0.20 0.45 70037
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 26052
Clothing and footwear -3.44 0.58 3.09 0.95 4.66 71659
Restaurants and hotels 1.38 1.10 -1.27 0.92 0.75 84129
Recreation and culture -1.88 0.61 0.42 4.13 5.15 146117
Other housing 3.56 0.24 -1.50 2.65 1.39 142362
Communication -3.63 0.25 0.71 5.17 6.11 28689
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -0.88 1.17 0.85 -0.07 1.95 46381
Education 3.63 -0.35 0.77 3.52 4.29 13915
Health 2.13 0.13 -0.47 2.27 1.84 13094
Misc. goods and services 0.13 0.67 -0.03 1.53 2.17 127082
Table VII. 1: Scenario C, 2010-2015: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
Notes: Household disposable income grows at 0.2-0.3% through to 2012, before picking up to 
rates of 2-2.25%, thus a rate of 1.7% averaged over the period. The low rate of growth over the 
early part of this period reflects concerns that any economic recovery in the UK will be export 
led, with household disposable incomes lagging behind.
Over this period, prices for the four direct energy use categories of electricity, gas, other fuels 
and vehicle fuels are guided by DECC projections but increased slightly in the case of electricity 
and gas to reflect the increased costs associated with early decarbonisation efforts.
Price changes for the remaining categories reflect historical trends, with adjustment made for a 
rise in VAT in early 2011.
In each category, the sensitivity of expenditure to changes in income and price has been derived 
from the historical data, and those same levels of sensitivity are applied here. Thus, given the 
income and price assumptions and the corresponding sensitivities in each category, the actual 
impact in terms of changes in expenditure are shown in the first two grey columns. In the third 
grey column, the contribution of behaviour change not associated with income and price effects 
(exogenous non-economic factors, or exnef) is shown. These might include impacts of a shift in 
environmental attitudes and values, and subsequent lifestyle changes.
In this scenario, some shifts in exnef begin to take place, notably for gas and vehicle fuels. 
Additionally, the cost of retrofit measures is reflected in slightly increased exnef contributions 
towards expenditure on other housing, (which includes maintenance and repair of the dwelling), 
and furnishings (which includes carpets and floor coverings). While representing a shift in exnef 
away from the historical trends used in e.g. Scenario A for this period, the shifts are not as 
extensive as in Scenario B, given the cautious approach taken by householders in this scenario 
due to the lack of global cooperation.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2015
carbon intensity 
change (% p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -1.16 7.34 9143 67
Gas 0.00 10.43 9488 99
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.58 3.11 27937 87
Other fuels -274 7.05 832 6
Other transport 1.03 1.46 111382 163
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -2.09 1.11 70037 77
Alcohol and tobacco 2.00 0.32 26052 8
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.24 71659 17
Restaurants and hotels 1.60 0.79 84129 67
Recreation and culture -5.49 0.30 146117 44
Other housing 0.00 0.35 142362 50
Communication -4.91 0.27 28689 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.70 46381 33
Education 3.36 0.79 13915 11
Health 0.53 0.39 13094 5
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 127082 78
Table VII. 2: Scenario C, 2010-2015: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: With regards to emissions intensity, some deviation from historical trends takes place in 
this scenario as a result of early decarbonisation efforts. In particular, electricity begins a 
gradual decarbonisation of just over 1% p.a., while other transport sees a slowing of its 
'carbonisation' trend, although a return to growth in aviation expenditure prevents any absolute 
or even relative drop in carbon emissions. Generally, some slight improvements begin to be felt 
across most categories.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.7% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2020
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 8.00 0.54 6.03 1.31 7.89 13575
Gas 10.00 - -2.32 13.16 10.94 16321
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 10.00 0.15 5.03 1.04 6.21 38107
Other fuels 10.00 0.65 5.59 -2.54 5.14 1072
Other transport 3.00 0.83 -3.56 2.25 -0.47 108804
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.50 0.30 -1.04 -0.06 -0.78 67364
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 24925
Clothing and footwear -2.00 0.61 1.91 0.95 3.48 85250
Restaurants and hotels 3.25 1.16 -2.94 0.92 -0.87 80542
Recreation and culture 0.00 0.63 -0.29 4.13 4.47 182706
Other housing 3.50 0.25 -1.47 3.85 2.63 162372
Communication -1.75 0.30 0.37 5.30 5.97 38673
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 1.00 1.18 -0.94 0.66 0.89 48504
Education 5.50 -0.41 -0.03 3.73 3.15 16290
Health 4.00 0.14 -0.88 2.35 1.76 14300
Misc. goods and services 2.00 0.69 -0.55 1.53 1.67 138164
Table VII. 3: Scenario C, 2015-2020: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
Notes: Significant economic slowdown due to higher fuel and commodity prices and
international trade disputes means annual growth in household disposable income drops from 
2% to 1.25% over the period, with an average rate of 1.7%.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories are impacted considerably by global demand, 
with an annual increase of 10% for gas, vehicle fuels and other fuels used in the model. The 
annual increase for electricity is lower than in e.g. Scenario A, at 8%. This is because some of 
the cost increases are associated with decarbonisation efforts which -  due to having been 
brought forward in this scenario to the previous five year period -  are spread out more evenly 
than in that alternate scenario.
In the model, a fixed elasticity was originally used which - in light of these price shocks - would 
imply an immediate and drastic reduction in expenditure for these categories. Instead, this has 
been adjusted to better reflect short term expenditure changes in the event of a price shock.
These impacts are also assumed to feed through onto the price of other goods and services, 
with average adjustments of 2-3% upwards for most categories, made according to the carbon 
intensity of the category (as a proxy for energy intensity). 'Other housing' is the exception, with 
price changes held at the historic trend, as the majority of the category consists of actual and 
imputed rentals, which are assumed to be held back on account of the economic slowdown.
Adjustments to exnef have been made for several categories, to reflect a series of behavioural 
factors, although these adjustments are not as extensive as in Scenario B, where a stronger 
sense of cooperation internationally leads to greater attitudinal and behavioural change. Perhaps 
most notably, in this scenario there is no increase in the exnef trend for 'other transport' as there 
is in Scenario B, to reflect the accelerated modal shift that takes place under those conditions. 
Accordingly, the shift in exnef away from expenditure on vehicle fuels is less pronounced here. 
Other significant exnef deviations include a continuation of increased expenditure on other 
housing and furnishings to reflect ongoing take up of retrofit solutions, although these shifts are 
once again less pronounced than in Scenario B.
246
2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2020
carbon intensity 
change (%p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -8.46 4.23 13575 57
Gas -P.^7 5.28 16321 86
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -6.59 2.09 38107 79
Other fuels -7.^7 4.28 1072 5
Other transport 1.03 1.54 108804 167
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -2.79 0.95 67364 64
Alcohol and tobacco 0.61 0.33 24925 8
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.19 85250 16
Restaurants and hotels 0.00 0.79 80542 64
Recreation and culture -5.91 0.21 182706 38
Other housing 0.00 0.35 162372 58
Communication -5.91 0.19 38673 7
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.64 48504 31
Education 3.24 0.92 16290 15
Health 0.00 0.39 14300 6
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 138164 85
Table VII. 4: Scenario C, 2015-2020: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: The emissions intensity has been adjusted considerably for the four direct energy use 
categories which undergo abrupt price changes. This is necessary to prevent the significant 
increase in expenditure (driven by the price shocks) from implying an increase in 'quantity' 
consumed. Although quantity data does not form part of this modelling framework, it is assumed 
that some curtailment of consumption would indeed take place. Thus, for electricity (which 
undergoes continued decarbonisation through this period), vehicle fuels (which sees a shift in 
exnef as discussed above) and gas (as a result of investment in retrofit measures and some 
behavioural change) there is a measurable reduction in total emissions.
For 'other transport', decarbonisation efforts for public transport are outweighed by the continued 
growth in aviation to ensure an increase in emissions intensity for the overall category. Thus, 
despite a small reduction in total expenditure, there is a slight increase in total emissions from 
other transport.
Across the remaining categories, historical increases in emissions intensities are slowed, while 
historical reductions are accelerated, to reflect continued decarbonisation of the economy.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 2.1% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2030
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 1.50 0.60 -0.10 4.33 4.88 22128
Gas* 3.00 - -1.42 -5.21 -3.87 10965
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 5.00 0.17 -0.75 -2.25 -2.82 28735
Other fuels 2.00 0.70 -0.19 5.29 6.24 1999
Other transport 2.50 1.02 -2.97 2.25 0.30 112130
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.00 0.36 -0.83 -0.20 -0.65 63111
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.60 -0.84 -0.53 -0.78 23060
Clothing and footwear -1.50 0.73 1.19 0.95 2.87 113606
Restaurants and hotels 2.25 1.38 -2.07 0.92 0.23 82391
Recreation and culture -1.00\ 0.76 0.29 4.13 5.17 306460
Other housing 3.50 0.30 -1.47 5.08 3.90 239874
Communication -2.75 0.34 0.52 5.30 6.17 71651
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 0.50 1.43 -0.49 1.41 2.35 61369
Education 4.50 -0.47 0.42 3.73 3.54 23221
Health 3.00 0.17 -0.69 2.35 1.97 17420
Misc. goods and services 1.00 0.83 -0.28 1.53 2.08 170081
Table VII. 5: Scenario C, 2020-2030: Income, Price and Expenditure changes
"due to lag effects in the model, price increases from the previous period continue to have a considerable 
impact on gas expenditure.
Notes: After a slowdown in growth brought on by trade disputes in the previous period, the 
dismantling of trade barriers brings a boost in the short term, before stabilising, meaning an 
average annual growth in income of 2.1% over this period.
Prices for the direct energy use categories also come down from the substantial year on year 
increases of the previous period. Electricity prices grow at 1.5% p.a. as new price levels mean 
that alternative sources of generation become viable. Due to continuing increased global 
demand, prices for gas and vehicle fuels continue to increase annually, at 3% and 5% 
respectively.
Generally, after the price shocks of the previous period, annual price changes for other 
categories are lower. For food, prices rise 2% p.a., down from 2.5% in the previous period. 
Cheaper imported food (and a slowing of fossil fuel price increases) contributes to the slower 
increase, while continued efforts to decarbonise food production, globally as well as domestically 
ensures that prices rise nevertheless. For other transport, prices continue to rise at 2.5% p.a., 
as the cost of aviation fuel, more fuel efficient vehicles and decarbonisation of public transport all 
take their toll.
Changes in expenditure due to exnef include a rise for electricity due to increasing electrification 
of heating and transport. For gas and vehicle fuels, exnef contributes to a fall in expenditure, 
again due to electrification of heating and transport, but also due to further efficiency and 
conservation measures. Other fuels see a large exnef increase, as as result of increased 
expenditure on biomass and district heating. Exnef also contributes to a significant increase in 
expenditure for 'other housing', to reflect the cost of retrofit measures.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2030
carbon intensity 
change (%p.a.)
Carbon Intensity Expenditure 
(tC02e/m£) (m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -6.83 1.34 22128 30
Gas 0.00 5.28 10965 58
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -2.21 1.62 28735 47
Other fuels -6.32 1.57 1999 3
Other transport -0.95 1.39 112130 156
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.39 0.82 63111 52
Alcohol and tobacco -0.49 0.32 23060 7
Clothing and footwear -3.93 0.12 113606 13
Restaurants and hotels 1.62 0.92 82391 76
Recreation and culture -4.74 0.11 306460 34
Other housing -0.49 0.34 239874 81
Communication -4.51 0.10 71651 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -2.21 0.49 61369 30
Education -0.91 0.83 23221 19
Health -0.49 0.37 17420 7
Misc. goods and services -0.95 0.56 170081 95
Table VII. 6: Scenario C, 2020-2030: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: Electricity continues to be decarbonised, although at a slightly slower rate than in 
Scenario B, which enjoyed a head start. Also, in that alternate scenario, more rapid electrification 
of heating and transport takes place over this period, meaning greater overall expenditure on 
electricity, thus the differences in total emissions are not as sharp as the carbon intensity levels 
might suggest. Precisely because electrification has been slower in this scenario though, total 
emissions for gas and vehicle fuels do not fall as fast.
Since the resurgence of expenditure on 'other fuels' has been largely focused on biomass and 
district heating, while expenditure on heating oil continues to fall, the carbon intensity drops 
accordingly over this period.
For 'other transport', which sees little increase in total expenditure over the period, and some 
decarbonisation (held back by the continued growth in aviation), total emissions fall accordingly. 
Although total emissions for 'other transport' are only slightly higher by 2030 than they are in 
Scenario B, in that alternate scenario 'other transport' was also absorbing much of the shift away 
from private car use, thus the contribution to total reduction in household emissions was much 
greater there.
For other categories, any efforts at decarbonisation in the previous period are played off against 
the resurgence of international trade in the first half of this period, before decarbonisation efforts 
in producer countries make a contribution towards the end of the period. Combined with 
increased expenditure in most of these categories, the result is a mixture of some increases and 
some decreases in total emissions.
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Appendix VIII. Scenario D: data tables and charts
Scenario D: Over the edge
With little effort on emissions reduction, the global 
economy is exposed to increasing fuel prices towards 
2020. With intensified social pressure to reduce fuel 
prices, and unable to work cooperatively on establishing 
an equitable emissions regime, countries instead pursue 
divergent, often conflicting energy security policies. The 
persistence o f fossil fuel extraction as part o f those 
policies extinguishes any hope of a low carbon transition, 
and leads to international conflict.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.7% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Income Price ExNEF total
2015
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.00 0.43 -0.82 0.41 O.IO 9200
Gas 2.00 - -1.07 1.48 0.37 9697
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.63 0.13 -0.14 2.51 2.51 28495
Other fuels 3.50 0.46 -0.09 -4.87 -4.46 832
Other transport 0.13 0.84 -0.15 2.25 2.94 111382
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -0.50 0.30 0.21 0.25 0.74 71075
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.49 -0.84 -0.53 -0.88 26052
Clothing and footwear -3.94 0.58 3.25 0.95 4.82 72252
Restaurants and hotels 1.38 1.10 -1.27 0.92 0.75 84129
Recreation and culture 0.61 0.42 4.13 5.15 146117
Other housing 3.56 0.24 -1.50 2.18 0.92 139029
Communication -3.63 0.25 0.71 5.17 6.11 28689
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 1.17 0.85 -0.16 1.86 46179
Education 3.63 -0.35 0.77 3.52 4.29 13915
Health 2.13 0.13 -0.47 2.27 1.84 13094
Misc. goods and services 0.13 ___________ -0.03 1.53 2.17 127082
Table VIII. 1: Scenario D, 2010-2015: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
n.b. Assumptions for this period are identical to those in Scenario A, with the figures beginning to diverge from 
2015 onwards.
Notes: Household disposable income grows at 0.2-0.3% through to 2012, before picking up to 
rates of 2-2.25%, thus a rate of 1.7% averaged over the period. The low rate of growth over the 
early part of this period reflects concerns that any economic recovery in the UK will be export 
led, with household disposable incomes lagging behind.
Prices for the four direct energy use categories over this period were derived from DECC 
projections from early 2010.**
Price changes for the remaining categories reflect historical trends, with appropriate adjustment 
made for a rise in VAT in early 2011.
In each category, the sensitivity of expenditure to changes in income and price has been derived 
from the historical data, and those same levels of sensitivity are applied here. Thus, given the 
income and price assumptions and the corresponding sensitivities in each category, the actual 
impact in terms of changes in expenditure are shown in the first two grey columns. In the third 
grey column, the contribution of behaviour change not associated with income and price effects 
(exogenous non-economic factors, or exnef) is shown. These might include impacts of a shift in 
environmental attitudes and values, and subsequent lifestyle changes. In this initial period, the 
historical trends for exnef have been used in each case. Most notably, 'other fuels' continues a 
historical decline, while 'recreation and leisure' and 'communication' see a strong increase in 
expenditure primarily through lifestyle factors.
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2010 2015 2020 2030
illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2015
carbon intensity 
change (% p.a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity 0.00 7.79 9200 72
Gas 0.00 10.43 9697 101
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 0.5^ 3.11 28495 89
Other fuels -2.74 7.05 832 6
Other transport 1.03 1.46 111382 163
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.92 1.12 71075 79
Alcohol and tobacco 2.72 0.33 26052 9
Clothing and footwear -4.14 0.24 72252 17
Restaurants and hotels 1.78 0.80 84129 67
Recreation and culture -5.49 0.30 146117 44
Other housing 0.00 0.35 139029 49
Communication -4.91 0.27 28689 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.70 46179 32
Education 3.^6 0.81 13915 11
Health 0.53 0.39 13094 5
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 127082 78
Table VIII. 2: Scenario D, 2010-2015: Carbon intensity and emissions
n.b. Assumptions for this period are identical to those in Scenario A, with the figures beginning to diverge from 
2015 onwards.
Notes: With regards to emissions intensity, the historical trends have once again been used in 
this period, in the absence of any significant drivers of change. The direct energy use categories, 
electricity, gas, vehicle fuels and other fuels remain significant in terms of carbon intensity and 
total emissions. 'Other transport' encompasses the purchase of new vehicles, public transport by 
rail, road and sea, and aviation, the last of which is the fastest growing of the subcategories. As 
such, the carbon intensity of the category increases over the period in line with the growth in 
aviation. Despite a relatively low carbon intensity, 'other transport' has a significantly higher level 
of expenditure, bringing it to the top of the list for total emissions.
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m iOlO 2015 2020
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
2030
Household disposable income: 2% p.a.
Price 
change
change in expenditure (% p.a.), due to: I
2020 
Expenditure
(% p.a.) Income Price ExNEF total (m£)
Electricity 7.00 0.59 5.43* 0.47 6.52 12752
Gas 7.00 - -1.82 10.92* 9.29 15329
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 7.00 0.17 2.24* 2.57 4.96 36512
Other fuels 7.00 0.70 -1 .12* -4.87 -4.11 677
Other transport 2.60 0.98 -3.09 2.25 0.15 112203
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.50 0.35 -1.04 0.25 -0.43 69569
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.57 -0.84 -0.53 -0.80 25032
Clothing and footwear -2.00 0.71 2.16 0.95 3.82 87411
Restaurants and hotels 2.95 1.34 -2.68 0.92 -0.42 82355
Recreation and culture 0.00 0.74 -0.29 4.13 4.57 183653
Other housing 3.50 0.29 -1.47 2.19 1.00 146194
Communication -1.75 0.33 0.37 5.30 6.01 38742
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 1.00 1.38 -0.94 -0.16 0.28 46819
Education 5.50 -0.46 -0.03 3.73 3.10 16250
Health 4.00 0.16 -0.88 2.35 1.79 14317
Misc. goods and services 2.00 0.80 -0.55 1.53 1.79 138954
Table VIII. 3: Scenario D, 2015-2020: Income, Price and Expenditure Changes
"For electricity, vehicle fuels and lubricants and other fuels, the price coefficients in the model have been 
adjusted from those that fit the historical data over the whole period to values which better reflect activity during 
short term price shocks. For gas, given the difficulties with the formula (Chitnis & Hunt, 2010), the desired shift 
in expenditure due to price has been achieved instead through adjustment of exnef.
Notes: As a result of increased investment in fossil fuel extraction, an economic slowdown like 
that in Scenario A is avoided. Instead, household disposable income continues to grow at 2%  
p.a.
Although prices for electricity, gas, other fuels and vehicle fuels are impacted by global demand, 
consistent with all four scenarios for this period, the massive investment in fossil fuel extraction 
means supply is less constrained here than in those other scenarios. As a result, prices 
increase but at a slightly lower rate of 7%. In the model, a fixed coefficient was originally used 
which -  in light of these price shocks -  would have implied an immediate and drastic reduction in 
expenditure for these categories. Instead, the coefficient has been adjusted to better reflect 
short term expenditure changes in the event of a price shock.
The impact of high global demand also feeds through onto the price of other goods and services, 
with average adjustments of 2-3% upwards for most categories, made according to the carbon 
intensity of the category (as a proxy for energy intensity).
In this period, the historical trends for exnef have broadly been continued, to reflect the absense 
of any meaningful attitudinal or behavioural change.
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Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2020
carbon intensity 
change (% p. a.)
Carbon Intensity 
(tC02e/m£)
Expenditure
(m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -7.,»7 4.73 12752 60
Gas -6.59 6.99 15329 107
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -3.63 2.55 36512 93
Other fuels -11.45 3.01 677 2
Other transport 1.67 1.59 112203 178
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -0.9& 1.06 69569 74
Alcohol and tobacco 272 0.38 25032 9
Clothing and footwear -1.90 0.22 87411 19
Restaurants and hotels /.7& 0.87 82355 72
Recreation and culture -5.49 0.22 183653 40
Other housing 0.00 0.35 146194 52
Communication -4.91 0.20 38742 8
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.91 0.64 46819 30
Education 2,96 0.96 16250 16
Health 0.53 0.40 14317 6
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 138954 86
Table VIII. 4: Scenario D, 2015-2020: Carbon intensity and emissions
Notes: The emissions intensity has been adjusted considerably for the four direct energy use 
categories which undergo abrupt price changes. This is necessary to prevent the significant 
increase in expenditure (driven by the price shocks) from implying an increase in 'quantity' 
consumed. Although quantity data does not form part of this modelling framework, it is assumed 
that some curtailment of consumption would indeed take place._Thus, for electricity (which 
undergoes some decarbonisation through this period) there is a drop in total emissions. For 
vehicle fuels, efforts to keep prices from rising at the rate they do in other scenarios, along with 
the persistence of behavioural factors in increasing expenditure, both contribute to a rise in total 
emissions. For gas, which absorbs an accelerated shift from 'other fuels', total emissions rise 
slightly.
In comparison to all other scenarios during this period, the emissions intensity of 'other transport' 
increases sharply, in line with growth in aviation. Thus despite a steady level of expenditure, total 
emissions for this category increase over the period. For most of the remaining categories, 
historical trends in emissions intensity -  in combination with trends in expenditure -  lead to a 
continuation of trends in total emissions.
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D 2010 2015 2020 2030
Illustrative Expenditure Figures
Household disposable income: 1.1% p.a.
Price 
change 
(% p.a.)
change in 
Income
expenditure (% p.a.), due to: 
Price ExNEF total
2030
Expenditure
(m£)
Electricity 3.60 0.42 0.05 0.48 1.00 14101
Gas* 5.60 - -1.72 3.06 4.20 23092
Vehicle fuels and lubricants 7.20 0.1 -3.31 2.57 -0.66 34182
Other fuels 7.20 0.48 -1.45 -4.87 -4.62 427
Other transport 2.00 0.51 -2.38 3.06 1.19 126405
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 2.50 0.18 -1.04 -0.05 -0.88 63689
Alcohol and tobacco 1.75 0.30 -0.84 -0.66 -1.20 22210
Clothing and footwear -2.50 0.40 1.99 0.06 2.49 112037
Restaurants and hotels 2.25 0.74 -2.07 0.50 -0.83 75763
Recreation and culture -1.00 0.40 0.29 3.07 3.76 267270
Other housing 3.50 0.16 -1.47 1.24 -0.07 145169
Communication -2.75 0.20 0.52 4.28 5.01 63930
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint 0.00 0.74 0.00 -0.16 0.57 49558
Education 4.50 -0.28 0.42 3.73 3.73 23594
Health 3.00 0.09 -0.69 1.34 0.81 15517
Misc. goods and services 1.00 0.43 -0.28 0.84 0.99 153356
Table VIII. 5: Scenario D, 2020-2030: Income, Price and Expenditure changes
"due to lag effects in the model, price increases from the previous period continue to have a considerable 
impact on gas expenditure.
Notes: This time period is a story of two halves in keeping with the narrative. Growth in 
household disposable income of 2% annually over the first half is followed by a steady decline 
into negative territory by the end of the period, meaning an average rise of 1.1% p.a. over the 
period.
The price of electricity climbs gradually over the first half of the period and settles on an annual 
increase of 5% during the second half, giving an average of 3.6%. For gas, a 3% annual 
increase climbs gradually to a 7% annual increase midway through, and remains at that high 
rate for the remainder of the period (it should be noted that the increase in expenditure on gas. 
which fails to match up against the cumulative effects of income, price and exnef, is a result of 
lag effects, and therefore has had to be balanced out with a reduction in carbon intensity, to 
arrive at the desired total emissions for this category.) The price change for vehicle fuels starts 
at 2% and quickly climbs to 10% p.a. by the middle of the period, continuing to rise at that level 
for the remainder. Other fuels follows the same price rise profile.
Of the remaining categories, 'other transport' sees a significant shift in expenditure, as public 
transport is adopted in place of private car use. A substantial drop in expenditure on aviation 
towards the end of the period means that this shift to public transport isn't particularly visible 
within the aggregated expenditure figures, although this does contribute to a shift in emissions 
intensity (see below).
Expenditure on other goods and services is affected by changes in household disposable 
income, according to the income sensitivities identified in the historical data.
Significant changes are seen in the contribution to expenditure from exnef as consumers, fearful 
of impending economic hardship, reduce their spending. As well as contributing further to the 
economic downturn, this fall in spending also contributes to keeping prices from increasing as 
they might have been expected to, given the increased cost of production due to high fuel prices.
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Illustrative Emissions Figures
in 2030
carbon intensity 
change (%p.a.)
Carbon Intensity Expenditure 
(tC02e/m£) (m£)
Emissions
(mtC02e)
Electricity -2.59 3.50 14101 49
Gas -3.30* 4.69 23092 108
Vehicle fuels and lubricants -1.81 2.09 34182 71
Other fuels -6.32 1.11 427 0
Other transport -0.86 1.45 126405 183
Food and non-alcoholic drinks -1.40 0.91 63689 58
Alcohol and tobacco 2.90 0.49 22210 11
Clothing and footwear -1.81 0.18 112037 20
Restaurants and hotels 0.00 0.87 75763 66
Recreation and culture -4.74 0.11 267270 30
Other housing 0.00 0.35 145169 51
Communication -4.31 0.12 63930 7
Furnishings; HH eqpt & maint -1.82 0.52 49558 26
Education 4.23 1.37 23594 32
Health 0.53 0.43 15517 7
Misc. goods and services 0.00 0.62 153356 95
Table VIII. 6: Scenario D, 2020-2030: Carbon intensity and emissions
* as a result of lag effects in the model, which lead to an unintended rise in expenditure through the period, it 
has been necessary in this scenario to manipulate the carbon intensity of the gas category, to balance out this 
effect.
Notes: Electricity undergoes some decarbonisation over this period, although more slowly than 
in the other scenarios due to lack of investment. Total emissions for gas climb initially, then fall to 
remain unchanged by the end of the period. Emissions from vehicle fuels climb slightly before 
plummeting laregly due to reduced consumption as people shift to public transport use, but also 
due in part to some decarbonisation of vehicle fuels towards the end of the period in the form of 
a rapid introduction of biofuels. Other transport sees a slight overall increase in emissions over 
the period as a massive rise in public transport use manages to outweight any reduction from the 
collapse in aviation in the second half of the period.
Of the remaining categories, food is the only one that experiences any shift in the trend for 
carbon intensity, which a slightly higher rate of decarbonisation as food production adjusts to 
higher oil prices.
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